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A note on terminology
Throughout this text we use the terms pregnant person/s, pregnant 
women, pregnant woman, pregnant people, woman, and women 
interchangeably. We recognise that many trans* and non-binary people 
can become pregnant and may need abortion care. In all instances, 





The case for repealing the 8th 
The 8th Amendment to the Irish Constitution was ratified in 1983,1 
and provides—in the form of Article 40.3.3—that:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with 
due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in 
its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right.
At first glance, the 8th Amendment may seem innocuous or merely 
aspirational. However, over time this provision, which could have 
been read in dozens of ways, has come to ground a near-absolute 
prohibition on abortion in Irish law.2 
The 8th Amendment treats the foetus as a constitutional person, 
separate from the pregnant person to the extent that it is entitled to 
its own legal representation, and with a right to life exactly equivalent 
1 66.9% of voters voted in support of the 8th Amendment. The turnout was 
53.6%.
2 We are indebted to Ruth Fletcher here. See generally Fletcher, Ruth, 
‘Judgment: Attorney General v X’, in Enright, Máiréad et al (eds) Northern/
Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of 
Identity (2017, Hart/Bloomsbury Publishing). 
1
to hers.3 The constitutional concept of ‘life’ has been interpreted 
restrictively. Rather than recognise the 8th Amendment as protecting 
life in all its richness and depth, successive courts and governments 
have been content to assume that it only protects the bare condition 
of being alive.4 Those other rights that confer dignity and meaning 
on life—rights to privacy, equality, bodily autonomy and so on—have 
been excised from the law on abortion by prevailing interpretations 
of the 8th Amendment. The moment we become pregnant, our 
constitutional rights are subordinated to the right to life of the unborn 
and circumscribed by the constitutional status of ‘mother’.5 There 
are two points here. First, the Amendment’s concentration on life as 
mere survival has stripped the ‘as far as practicable’ clause of the 8th 
Amendment of its potential to rationalise abortion law and policy in 
Ireland. If the state’s obligation is merely to keep both pregnant person 
and foetus alive, real questions of practicability—of how much pain, 
suffering or risk the pregnant person can be compelled to endure—
carry no constitutional weight. Ordinary constitutional principles of 
proportionality do not apply. The only limit is that the state need not 
do what is ‘futile’ to preserve foetal life.6 So the 8th Amendment has 
provided cover for drastic intrusions into pregnant people’s private lives. 
For example, in the history of the 8th Amendment, people acting ‘on 
behalf of ’ the unborn have taken cases to disrupt attempts to access 
abortion care,7 while state actors have tried to vindicate the right to 
life of the ‘unborn’ by attempting to prevent people from travelling for 
3 Smyth, Lisa, ‘Feminism and Abortion Politics: Choice, Rights, and 
Reproductive Freedom’ (2002) 25(3) Women’s Studies International Forum 
335.
4 Fletcher, Ruth (see note 2). See also McNeilly, Kathryn, ‘From the Right to 
Life to the Right to Livability: Radically Reapproaching “Life” in Human 
Rights Politics’ (2015) 41(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 141. 
5 Article 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland.
6 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1; PP v HSE [2014] IEHC 622.
7 Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling & Well Woman Centre 
Ltd [1988] IR 593; SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753.
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abortion,8 or imposing unwanted medical interventions on women.9 
Second, concentration on mere biological life produces highly artificial 
legal reasoning. We do not treat two such different entities as a foetus 
and a grown woman equally when we treat them the same. The law 
can only achieve this sameness by ruling out all of the considerations 
that make the pregnant person’s life different from that of the foetus, so 
that a court is simply comparing each one’s chance of remaining alive. 
The Supreme Court has held that when a pregnant person proposes 
to terminate a pregnancy, the risk of loss of the foetus’ life is 100%. 
So, in order to be entitled to an abortion, the pregnant person must 
show that the risk that she will die, unless she obtains the abortion, is 
substantively as great.10 Of course, this will almost never be the case. 
This approach to the 8th Amendment was not inevitable, but it was 
intended.11 The 8th Amendment was not legally necessary; there was 
no discernible movement to legalise abortion (which was criminalised) 
in Ireland at the time, and the Supreme Court had made clear that even 
though there was a limited constitutional right to access contraception 
this did not extend to a right to access lawful abortion. However, the 
referendum that led to the 8th Amendment was the product of a potent 
mix of political turbulence, religious domination and conservative 
lobbying.12 It was at once a pre-emptive strike against any further 
liberation for woman, and a backlash against the limited liberation that 
had already occurred. Its intention was to ensure that, regardless of 
8 Attorney General v X (see note 6).
9 Attempts to secure medical treatment in spite of the pregnant woman’s lack 
of consent include South Western Health Board v K and Anor [2002] IEHC 
104; Health Service Executive v F (High Court, ex tempore, Birmingham 
J., 20 November 2010). See also Mother A v Waterford Regional Hospital 
(High Court, Hedigan J., 11 March 2013), in which the pregnant woman 
ultimately agreed to have a Caesarean section so that the court did not have 
to reach a decision.
10 Attorney General v X (see note 6).
11 McGuinness, Sheelagh, ‘Commentary on Attorney General v X’, in Enright, 
Máiréad et al (eds) (see note 2).
12 On the campaign, see further Connolly, Linda, The Irish Women’s Movement: 
From Revolution to Devolution (2001, Springer), pp 163-168. 
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societal change and the liberalisation of Irish politics, increased access to 
lawful abortion would only ever be possible if a successful referendum 
campaign were run to repeal the 8th Amendment. As we know, 
achieving that has proven difficult, and since 1983 no referendum has 
ever been put to the electorate that would have liberalised abortion 
law in any meaningful sense.
The key judgment on the 8th Amendment is Attorney General v 
X.13 In that case, the Supreme Court—faced with a suicidal teenager, 
pregnant through rape and seeking to travel for an abortion—developed 
the test for entitlement to access an abortion, which is now reflected in 
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA). Under 
this test, a pregnant person may only access an abortion where her 
life, as opposed to her health, is at ‘real and substantial risk’, including 
risk from suicide, and that risk may only be avoided by terminating 
the pregnancy. Because the focus is solely on ‘life’, if a foetus’ life is at 
risk, the state, and by extension medical personnel, may do anything 
practicable to save it; her suffering does not make that intervention 
impracticable or unconstitutional. 
Although this limited decision may seem entirely consistent with 
the desired outcome of the 8th Amendment, X was heavily criticised 
by anti-abortion campaigners.14 In their view, allowing for abortion 
in situations of a risk of suicide subverted the intent of the 1983 
referendum; instead, pregnant women could be ‘minded’15 so that the 
pregnancy could be carried to term. Abortion was not necessary; it 
did not, they continued to argue, ‘save lives’. Anti-abortion activists 
supported referendums (1992 and 2002) attempting to remove the 
suicide exception from the Constitution. These were unsuccessful.
Abortion travel has been the escape hatch in Ireland’s law; crisis 
pregnancy has always driven Irish women to travel to England 
13 See note 6.
14 See, for example, Binchy, William, ‘New Abortion Law Regime will have no 
Effective Limits’, The Irish Times, 6 March 1992.
15 See comments to this effect of Catherine Bannon in Tynan, Maol Muire, 




and elsewhere.16 While the Amendment was still new, the Society 
for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) brought cases 
attacking healthcare providers who assisted women to travel abroad 
for abortions.17 In X, the Attorney General sought an injunction 
to prevent a teenager from travelling for abortion. The majority of 
the Supreme Court recognised that pregnant people could not be 
prevented from travelling abroad to access abortions, in part because 
injunctions restricting travel were too difficult to enforce. Soon after 
X, the right to travel was added to the Constitution in a referendum, 
as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.18 The 14th Amendment 
guaranteed a limited right to access the information necessary to obtain 
an abortion abroad.19 With the state’s reliance on exporting abortion 
firmly installed in the Constitution, the development of abortion law 
at home stalled. The government eventually legislated to regulate the 
provision of information on accessing abortion abroad.20 However, it 
did not pass any legislation on access to abortion at home until 2013. 
The courts have not considered expanding the constitutional abortion 
law set out in the X case; the few abortion cases since X have largely 
stayed within the realms of abortion travel for teenagers and applied the 
X decision without setting out any more comprehensive interpretation 
of the 8th Amendment.21
16 Hug, Chrystel, The Politics of Sexual Morality in Ireland (2016, Springer), 
p 160.
17 Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling & Well Woman Centre 
Ltd [1988] IR 593; SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753.
18 Article 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland.
19 On the background to these referendums, see further McAvoy, Sandra, 
‘Vindicating Women’s Rights in a Foetocentric State: The Longest Irish 
journey’, in Giffney, Noreen and Shildrick, Margrit (eds) Theory on the Edge 
(2013, Palgrave), p 39.
20 Access to Information (Services outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancy) Act 1995 (Abortion Information Act).
21 Mary O’Toole, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 25 September 2017, referencing A and B v EHB and 
C [1997] IEHC 176 and D v HSE (unreported, High Court, McKechnie J., 
May 2007).
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Irish abortion legislation
It is a crime for anyone, including pregnant people, to provide or 
access abortion in Ireland, except as a life-saving measure under the 
PLDPA.22 Abortion is lawful only if there is a ‘real and substantial risk’ 
to the life, as opposed to the health, of the pregnant woman, and if 
that risk can only be averted by termination of the pregnancy.23 This 
means that, in most cases, pregnant people who need abortions will 
not be able to access abortion care in Ireland. The test of ‘real and 
substantial risk’ is unclear: the risk to the pregnant person’s life need 
not be immediate or imminent before abortion can be offered.24 
However, the Constitution requires doctors to wait until a severe risk 
to health caused by the pregnancy has clearly turned into a risk to life 
before offering abortion care. Doctors must undertake both medical 
and legal analysis at the same time, so that care in pregnancy is provided 
‘in the shadow of a custodial sentence for both the clinician and the 
woman’.25 Thus, in adhering to the Constitution a doctor may be 
required to place a pregnant patient’s long-term health, or life, at active 
risk before the pregnancy can be terminated. This also means, as we 
discuss in Chapter 4, that medical practitioners hold immense power 
under that Act, including power to refuse treatment or delay a decision 
so that a woman may be unable to access lawful abortion, even if her 
life is at sufficient risk to ‘qualify’ under the Act.
Even in life-threatening cases, an abortion is not permitted if the 
foetus has reached viability.26 Instead, the baby will be delivered 
early, and steps may even be taken to maintain the pregnancy until 
the foetus is viable.27 One might imagine that if the law requires 
22 Section 22, PLDPA 2013.
23 Sections 7-9, PLDPA 2013.
24 Attorney General v X (see note 6).
25 Rhona Mahony, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 11 October 2017. 
26 Attorney General v X (see note 6); PLDPA 2013.
27 ‘Viability’ here is a medical term – it refers to the point at which a foetus 
can survive outside of the womb, which is affected by multiple factors 
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viable babies to be delivered, it is less concerned about foetuses that 
have not yet attained viability. However, that is not the case. Maire 
Whelan, the Attorney General from 2011 to 2017, maintained that 
there is no necessary constitutional right to abortion even where the 
foetus has been diagnosed with a ‘fatal foetal abnormality’,28 which 
means that it will almost certainly not be born alive.29 Moreover, the 
legal prohibition on abortion applies irrespective of how advanced 
the pregnancy is.30 This also means that the prohibition applies to 
all forms of abortion; it makes no distinction between surgical and 
medical abortion (the ‘abortion pill’).31 
The PLDPA requires at least two doctors to certify that there is a 
‘real and substantial risk’ to life that can only be averted by ending 
the pregnancy before abortion can lawfully be offered.32 Although 
the constitutional right to access abortion applies equally whether the 
risk to life is from a physical risk or from a risk to suicide, the Act 
imposes additional procedural requirements in cases of risk of suicide.33 
Also, apart from in emergencies, medical professionals are entitled to 
including birthweight and gestational age: Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gyneacologists, ‘Perinatal Management of Pregnant Women at the Threshold 
of Infant Viability – The Obstetric Perspective’, Scientific Impact Paper No. 
41 (2014), available at www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-services/
guidelines/sip41. See also Fergal Malone, evidence to the Joint Committee 
on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, 11 October 2017. 
28 Given its common vernacular usage in Irish abortion law debates, we use 
the term ‘fatal foetal abnormality’ here. However, when discussing future 
law we prefer ‘foetal anomaly’, and use this term when writing prospectively 
in Chapters 4 and 5 in particular.
29 O’Halloran, Marie, ‘Clare Daly Criticises Approach to Fatal Foetal Abnormality 
Cases’, The Irish Times, 6 July 2016.
30 The PLDPLA 2013 makes no reference to gestational limits.
31 See the definition of ‘medical procedure’ in s. 2(1), PLDPA 2013. For a 
general critique of the Act see Taylor, Maeve, ‘Women’s Right to Health and 
Ireland’s Abortion Laws’ (2015) 130(1) International Journal of Gynaecology 
and Obstetrics 93.
32 Sections 6-8, PLDPA 2013.
33 Section 8, PLDPA 2013.
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refuse abortion care to a pregnant person under the Act if they have 
a conscientious objection to abortion.34 
The PLDPA makes no reference to the pregnant woman’s wishes 
or voice. Once she has sought abortion care, all other decisions are 
made by someone else: by medics, by lawyers, by courts, by ‘the 
system’. In reality, only people with no other choice use the 2013 
Act, even if their lives are in danger.35 Anyone able to do so travels 
abroad to access an abortion,36 or imports abortion pills illegally.37 As 
we have already seen, the Constitution contains a structural tolerance 
and expectation of abortion travel, and of access to information 
about abortion services abroad. The law restricts the publication of 
abortion information, and constrains medics and pregnancy counsellors 
in offering assistance.38 The law anticipates that anyone seeking an 
abortion abroad must arrange it for themselves. 
The current legal regime demonstrates in stark terms just how 
restrictive the 8th Amendment is. As shown in Chapter 2, even if the 
Oireachtas wanted to make abortion more widely available, it could 
not. For that to happen, the Constitution must be changed.
34 Section 17, PLDPA 2013.
35 Anthony McCarthy, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 8 November 2017.
36 In 2015, 3,451 women with addresses in the Republic of Ireland accessed 
abortion under the Abortion Act 1967: Department of Health, Abortion 
Statistics, England and Wales: 2015 (2016).
37 Between 2010 and 2012, the online medical abortion service Women on 
Web shipped abortion pills to 1,642 women in Ireland, and 5,600 women 
in Ireland tried to buy abortion pills from Women on Web in the five-year 
period January 2010 to December 2015: Aiken, Abigail et al, ‘Experiences 
and Characteristics of Women Seeking and Completing At-home Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy through Online Telemedicine in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland: A Population-based Analysis’ (2017) 124(8) British 
Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 1208.
38 Section 8, Information (Services outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancy) Act 1995. See further the discussion in Chapter 4.
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The 8th Amendment: beyond abortion 
While repeal of the 8th Amendment is most often discussed in the 
context of abortion—and that is the primary focus of this book—
its reach, and thus the arguments for reform, go well beyond that. 
The Amendment refers to the ‘life’ of the ‘unborn’ in general, 
rather than to abortion in particular, so that the whole duration of 
pregnancy, including labour and birth, comes within its scope. When 
a voluntarily pregnant person becomes ill, and needs an abortion, 
the 8th Amendment applies. It is less clear whether the law requires 
that treatment for a serious illness, such as cancer, should be delayed 
or denied if it would have severe consequences for the foetus.39 
We do know, however, that an otherwise healthy pregnant person 
may be subjected to unwanted medical treatment under the 8th 
Amendment. Ordinarily, adults are entitled to refuse consent to any 
medical intervention for any reason.40 However, the Health Service 
Executive’s (HSE) National Consent Policy departs from this position 
where pregnant people are concerned. It states that under the 8th 
Amendment:
the consent of a pregnant woman is required for all health and 
social care interventions. However … there is significant legal 
uncertainty regarding the pregnant woman’s right to refuse 
39 See further Lalor, Joan et al, Report on a Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (2015, TARA), available at www.
tara.tcd.ie/handle/2262/80584. See discussion to this effect in Attorney 
General v X (see note 6).
40 See Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2) [1996] 2 
IR 79; JM v Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital [2003] 1 IR 
321. That right would also, of course, include the right to refuse consent 
to abortion: SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753, 767. In the UK, the courts 
will not entertain an application to overrule a woman’s refusal of Caesarean 
section unless her mental capacity is in issue. See, for example, St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673; Re MB [1997] 38 BMLR 
175 CA; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (General Medical Council 
intervening) [2015] UKSC 11.
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treatment in circumstances in which the refusal would place 
the life of a viable foetus at serious risk. In such circumstances, 
legal advice should be sought as to whether an application to 
the High Court is necessary.41
This interpretation of the 8th Amendment constructs the pregnant 
person and her foetus as adversaries, even where she does not intend 
to terminate the pregnancy, but wishes to make a decision (for 
example, attempting vaginal birth instead of Caesarean section) that 
her medical team considers too risky. The new National Maternity 
Strategy goes even further, stating that a pregnant person’s decision 
making in pregnancy should be respected only ‘insofar as it is safe 
to do so’, and that her decision may be overridden, not only where 
there are implications for the ‘life of the baby’, but for its health ‘as 
defined by her team of health care professionals’.42 The Association 
of Maternity Services Ireland (AIMSI)43 and Midwives for Choice44 
41 Health Service Executive, National Consent Policy (2014, revised May 
2016). For High Court cases, see South Western Health Board v K and Anor 
[2002] IEHC 104; Health Service Executive v F (High Court, ex tempore, 
Birmingham J., 20 November 2010); Mother A v Waterford Regional 
Hospital (High Court, Hedigan J., 11 March 2013). Difficulties may also 
arise over advance directives, if a pregnant person loses her decision-making 
capacity. See Association for Improvements in Maternity Services – Ireland, 
Submission to the Citizens’ Assembly on the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution (2016), pp 17-19, available at http://aimsireland.ie/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/AIMSI-Submission-CitizensAssemblyArt40.3.3-FINAL-1.
pdf.
42 Department of Health, Creating a Better Future Together: National Maternity 
Strategy 2016-2026 (2016). See Egan, Emily, ‘The Role of Article 40.3.3 
in Medical and Parental Decision-Making’, presentation to the Citizens’ 
Assembly, 4 March 2017.
43 Association for Improvements in Maternity Services – Ireland, ‘What Matters 
To You Survey 2014’ (2014), available at http://aimsireland.ie/what-matters-
to-you-survey-2015/womens-experiences-of-consent-in-the-irish-maternity-
services.
44 Midwives for Choice, Submission to the United Nations Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) for Ireland’s Second Periodic Examination under 
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report that women have been threatened with arrest or court action 
where they would not comply with their medical teams’ requirements. 
In HSE v B,45 the High Court clarified that pregnant people cannot 
be subjected to highly invasive surgery where the risks to the foetus 
from refusal are low. However, it is difficult to say with clarity how 
the Amendment affects pregnancy where the risks are higher, or the 
proposed treatment less obviously invasive. United Nations (UN) 
human rights bodies have criticised the use of coercive and medically 
unnecessary treatment in Irish labour wards46 and AIMSI reports that 
women are routinely coerced to accede to tests, procedures and medical 
treatment in Irish maternity care.47 Pregnant people’s refusal of medical 
treatment has been overridden by the courts; for example, in Ms Y’s 
case, the High Court granted orders for forcible feeding and hydration 
in order to maintain a woman’s pregnancy against her will, and would 
have permitted a Caesarean section without her consent, even though 
her decision-making capacity was not in question.48 The courts are 
already aware of how oppressive coerced medical treatment can be. 
In HSE v B,49 Twomey J. held that the performance of a Caesarean 
section on a pregnant woman against her will, with the necessary force 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (2017), p 5, available at http://midwivesforchoice.
ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/MfC-Submission-to-UN-CAT.pdf.
45 [2016] IEHC 605.
46 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (UNCEDAW), Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth 
and Seventh Periodic Reports of Ireland, CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7, 9 March 
2017; United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT), Concluding 
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Ireland, CAT/C/IRL/CO/2, 
31 August 2017.
47 Association for Improvements in Maternity Services – Ireland (2014) 
(see note 43). See further http://midwivesforchoice.ie/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/MfC-Submission-to-UN-CAT.pdf, pp 8-9.
48 See further Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Contesting the Cruel Treatment of Abortion-
Seeking Women’ (2014) 22(44) Reproductive Health Matters 10.
49 HSE v B [2016] IEHC 605.
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and restraint that such a procedure entails, would be a ‘grievous assault’ 
and ‘a gross violation of her right to bodily integrity’.50 
We cannot simply assert that this system is ultimately safe for 
pregnant people. Reproductive rights campaigners point out that 
we do not accurately record all cases in which pregnant people have 
suffered long-term health consequences as a result of their pregnancy.51 
We only record deaths and ‘near misses’.52 
Even where no dispute arises around consent, the 8th Amendment 
is a crucial part of a long-established Irish medico-legal culture 
that diminishes, disempowers and has potential to harm pregnant 
people. It is troubling that non-consensual treatment of pregnant 
people continues in Ireland even as we seek to redress the historical 
injustice of symphysiotomy.53 Repeal of the 8th Amendment would 
represent a commitment to ensuring that past institutional violations of 
women’s rights do not recur. It would also reflect a shift in our societal 
understanding of where the burdens of motherhood should begin 
and end. While an individual might decide to take on the risk of ill 
health or trauma as the cost of birthing a baby, increasingly Irish voters 
understand that the Constitution should not compel a person to do so.
50 HSE v B [2016] IEHC 605, [16].
51 In 2015, the severe maternal morbidity rate was 6.35 per 1,000: Manning, 
Edel et al, Severe Maternal Morbidity in Ireland: Annual Report 2014 (2017, 
National Perinatal Epidemiology Centre), p 8. See also the MAMMI study, 
which takes a more expansive approach to morbidity, but studies only a 
fraction of first-time mothers, available at www.mammi.ie/surveys.php.
52 See further Murphy-Lawless, Jo, ‘Embodied Truths: Women’s Struggle for 
Voice and Wellbeing in Irish Maternity Services’, in Quilty, Aideen et al 
(eds) The Abortion Papers Ireland: Volume 2 (2015, Cork University Press). 
If passed, the Coroners’ Amendment Bill (2017) would ensure mandatory 
inquests in cases of maternal death.
53 See further Enright, Máiréad, ‘Ireland, Symphysiotomy and UNHRC’, 




Towards repeal: what has happened?
In all likelihood, there will be a referendum on the 8th Amendment 
in 2018. The story of how we got to this point is beyond the scope of 
a book of this length. Collective and individual activism over decades, 
feminist solidarity and enablement of women in seeking and accessing 
abortion care, individual instances of people speaking out about their 
experiences, rallies and marches, and personal conversations about 
the 8th Amendment are all part of the social mobilisation—led by 
women—to demand a change to the Constitution. So too are stories 
of the harm caused to pregnant people by the 8th Amendment and 
the oppressive cultures that it reflects, creates and perpetuates: Sheila 
Hodgers, who died in 1983 after being denied treatment for cancer 
because it might harm her unborn child; ‘X’, who in 1992, was 
temporarily prevented from travelling to end a pregnancy resulting 
from rape and who, we assume, has had to endure a political system 
that persistently discusses her traumatic teenage experience for the 
past 25 years and more;54 Savita Halappanavar, who in 2012 died 
of sepsis during a prolonged miscarriage in a hospital in Galway;55 
Michelle Harte, who accessed abortion in the UK having been denied 
both cancer treatment and an abortion, in spite of medical advice to 
terminate the pregnancy;56 ‘Ms Y’, who, although suicidal, could 
not access abortion and instead was subjected to an early Caesarean 
section to secure early delivery;57 the thousands of women who have 
scrimped, saved, begged and borrowed to travel abroad to end their 
pregnancies; the thousands more who have been unable to do so.
Although most political parties campaigning in the 2016 General 
Election recognised that the 8th Amendment was an issue,58 there 
54 Attorney General v X (see note 6).
55 See HSE, Report of Incident 50278 (2013), pp 5-6.
56 Cullen, Paul, ‘State Settled with Cancer Patient’, The Irish Times, 22 
November 2012.
57 See Fletcher, Ruth (note 48).
58 Fine Gael Election Manifesto 2016, pp 71-72; Sinn Fein General Election 
Manifesto 2016, p 45; Labour Party General Election Manifesto 2016, p 
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was no consensus on reform. The Programme for Partnership 
Government agreed in the spring of 2016 included a commitment to 
establish a Citizens’ Assembly to discuss the 8th Amendment (among 
other things).59 That Assembly began to operate in autumn 2016 
and reported to the Oireachtas in June of 2017.60 We consider its 
recommendations throughout this book, but the primary point for 
now is that, following months of evidence, testimony, submissions, 
deliberations, and legal and medical advice, the Assembly reached the 
view that the constitutional status quo could not be sustained.61 Eighty-
seven per cent of the Assembly agreed that Article 40.3.3 ‘should 
not be retained in full’. On 18 October 2017, the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee established to consider whether and how to give effect 
to the Assembly’s recommendations passed a similar proposal: that the 
Amendment should not be retained in full. 
The issue that then arises is how to give legal effect to these decisions. 
How can, and should, the Constitution be changed? What kind of 
legislation should be introduced to secure access to abortion? And 
what principles should underpin new law? This book is intended for 
anyone, lawyer or not, activist or not, who is interested in answering 
those questions.
7; Anti-Austerity Alliance General Election Manifest 2016, p 3; People 
Before Profit General Election Manifesto 2016, pp 18-19; Social Democrats 
General Election Manifesto 2016, p 39; Green Party General Election 
Manifesto 2016, p 52. Fianna Fail was an exception: there is no mention 
of the 8th Amendment in An Ireland for All: Manifesto 2016. However, 
following a number of changes of mind, the party leader proposed a judge-
led commission to consider the 8th Amendment: Newstalk radio interview 
with Micheál Martin TD, 2 December 2015.
59 Department of the Taoiseach, A Programme for Partnership Government 
(2016), p 153.
60 The Citizens’ Assembly, First Report and Recommendations of the Citizens’ 
Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (2017).
61 For a critical account of the Assembly proceedings, see Enright, Máiréad, 
‘#Strike4Repeal: Ireland’s Women’s Strike’, Critical Legal Thinking, 8 





The Constitution after the 8th
As we saw in Chapter 1, the 8th Amendment was and is a deliberate and 
extraordinary attempt to defend a conservative idea of the Constitution 
against the anticipated effects of social change. It was inserted to 
prevent the ordinary development of constitutional rights, specifically 
reproductive rights, within a ‘living’ constitutional text. Over time, this 
rot has taken hold at all levels of the constitutional law on abortion, 
producing a body of abortion law that is obstinately resistant to 
change. The stability of this constitutional order has meant the steady 
oppression of pregnant people. It is crucial that, in reforming that law, 
we abandon the damaging urge to seek ‘legal certainty’, essentially 
inherited from the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, and reopen 
abortion law to our ordinary, if flawed, processes of constitutional 
interpretation. In this chapter, we set out an agenda for how that 
might be achieved.
Options for constitutional reform
The Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
was established to consider the recommendations of the Citizens’ 
Assembly, and to advise the Oireachtas on constitutional and legislative 
abortion law reform. Like the Assembly, the Committee accepts that 
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constitutional space must be made to liberalise abortion law. The 
only way to do that is through a referendum,1 and voters must be 
presented with a simple proposition to which they can vote ‘yes’ or 
‘no’.2 The Committee has considered six options for constitutional 
reform. These are as follows:
1. Simple repeal of the 8th Amendment.
2. Simple repeal of the 8th Amendment, and publication of draft 
or outline legislation liberalising abortion access before the 
referendum. This legislation could not be passed until the 8th 
Amendment was repealed.
3. Replacing the 8th Amendment with a new constitutional 
provision setting out ‘grounds’ for abortion access (defined sets of 
circumstances in which a pregnant person would be entitled to 
access an abortion). 
4. Replacing the 8th Amendment with a provision entrenching 
new abortion legislation in the Constitution. The legislation, 
presumably, would set out new, more liberal, grounds for abortion 
access than are currently contained in the Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA).3 
5. Replacing the 8th Amendment with a provision setting out a new 
balance of constitutional rights as between the pregnant person and 
the foetus she is carrying (or amending the 8th to the same effect).4
1 Article 46.2, Constitution of Ireland.
2 The Constitution Review Group was of the view that a ‘preferendum’ (in 
which voters would indicate preferences between a range of options for 
constitutional reform) was not possible under the Constitution: The All-Party 
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Report of the Constitution Review 
Group 1996 (1996), Item 7 considered in respect of Articles 46 and 47.
3 This was attempted in the 2002 abortion referendum; Morris and Ní 
Mhaoldomnaigh v Minister for Environment (unreported, High Court, 1 
February 1 2002).
4 See, for example, Gerard Whyte’s proposal that the 8th Amendment be 
retained in substance, but the word ‘equal’ removed, as reported in McGarry, 
Patsy ‘Repealing Eighth “Removes Constitutional Protection for Unborn”’, 
The Irish Times, 20 October 2017.
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6. A provision providing that the Oireachtas shall have the exclusive 
power to decide on the content of abortion legislation, and that 
this legislation shall not be subject to review by the courts.5
We argue that simple repeal of the 8th Amendment (option 1), whether 
or not legislation is published before the referendum (option 2), is the 
most sensible of these proposals. Option 2 could provide voters with 
a concrete indication of the legislation that would follow repeal, and 
thus help to inform the referendum campaign. However, the legislation 
actually passed might differ (in big or small ways) from the outline 
published before the referendum. In Chapters 3 and 4, we outline the 
shape that any such legislation should take. 
Options 3-6, however, are potentially very cumbersome: they 
are difficult to design and use, and might generate confusing and 
distracting debate during a referendum campaign. More importantly, 
they are, in our view, misguided attempts to address particular kinds 
of ‘legal uncertainty’ perceived to arise from simple repeal. The basic 
idea behind this invocation of ‘legal uncertainty’ is that, if the 8th 
Amendment is removed, the constitutional bedrock of our abortion 
law is gone. According to this position, after repeal we would move 
from an old legal position in which the limits of abortion law, however 
narrow and punitive, are perceived to be clearly defined into a new 
one in which they seem to be much less clear. For people who take 
this position, the key question seems to be ‘What would replace 
the 8th?’6 Without a specific constitutional provision on abortion, 
we would need to decide what the remainder of the Constitution 
5 It would be possible to provide explicitly for the Oireachtas to make law 
on abortion without immunising the legislation from constitutional review. 
However, that does not seem to be the Committee’s understanding. See Fiona 
de Londras, Opening Statement, evidence to Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 27 September 2017 and the discussion of 
the Committee on options for constitutional change on 18 October 2017. 
6 The former Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, for example, said that he would not 
contemplate repeal of the 8th Amendment without knowing what might 
replace it: Newstalk radio interview, 11 September 2015.
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‘says’ about how abortion should be regulated. To be more precise, 
we would need to wait and see what the institutions empowered to 
interpret the Constitution—the Oireachtas and the courts—decide 
on what the remainder of the Constitution ‘says’ about how abortion 
should be regulated. There are two apparent concerns here. First, if 
the electorate voted to repeal the 8th Amendment, the Oireachtas 
might pass new abortion legislation that is more or less liberal than 
some voters are willing to accept. Second, if the electorate voted 
to repeal the 8th Amendment, the courts might strike down new 
abortion legislation because it is too liberal, or too conservative, to 
meet the demands of the altered constitutional text.7 Repeal of the 
8th Amendment seems to introduce a new measure of unpredictability 
into Irish abortion law. While we accept that these uncertainties may 
be sources of political concern, they are really very ordinary features 
of our constitutional system.
Everyday constitutional interpretation
The current debate about constitutional abortion law reform is, in 
some senses, a debate about text. Constitutions are written in broad, 
open-textured language. Every part of the constitutional text is capable 
of holding many meanings; reasonable people, and reasonable lawyers, 
may disagree about how text is to be interpreted.8 In interpreting a 
constitution, we do not have to remain within the ‘four corners’ of 
the document. Rather, we read the document in its societal context. 
So, established or accepted meanings of a constitutional right might 
7 This power is set out in Article 15.4, Constitution of Ireland.
8 A good example might be the constitutional text on marriage. Before 
2015, some people thought that the right to marry under the Constitution 
could apply to same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Others thought that the 
constitutional text would require an amendment to achieve this. The latter 
point of view won out, in the courts and in the Oireachtas, so that it was 
necessary to hold the marriage equality referendum: Zappone & Gilligan v 




evolve over time, as society changes. The Constitution is a living 
document.9 It cannot be ‘certain’, if by ‘certain’ we mean ‘having only 
one meaning for all time’. So, for example, even if we repealed the 
8th Amendment, we would not return to the constitutional abortion 
law as it was in 1982. The remainder of the Constitution would be 
interpreted taking into account relevant legal and social changes that 
have happened since then. The text has not remained static.
Understanding the unfixed or ‘indeterminate’ nature of constitutional 
provisions affects how we understand the role of text in the reform 
of our constitutional abortion law. Whatever change is made to the 
text of the Constitution through a referendum, we can only predict 
how it will be read in practice; we cannot tell for certain. That is true 
whether we repeal or replace the 8th Amendment. If, as discussed 
in the next section, we were to vote to insert new words into the 
Constitution according to Options 3, 4 or 5, those words might in the 
future be held to have a meaning that many of us did not expect or 
anticipate. We can also say, of course, that we can make good educated 
guesses about how even new constitutional arrangements could be 
interpreted, based on previous case law and patterns of interpretation. 
In Chapter 3, we do just that.
Under our constitutional system, we rely (sometimes gratefully and 
sometimes reluctantly) on state institutions to produce authoritative 
and reasonably settled interpretations of the constitutional text. In 
judicial terms, the Supreme Court, in particular, is the final decision 
maker on matters of constitutional interpretation.10 It interprets the 
Constitution in judgments responding to cases brought by individual 
litigants. We rely on it (and the Constitution empowers it)11 to decide, 
using established specialist techniques of legal interpretation, which 
of the possible meanings attributable to a section of constitutional 
text is most plausible and most authoritative. Often, aspects of the 
interpretation of a particular constitutional provision remain unclear 
9 Per Walsh J. in McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284.
10 Article 34.3.2, Article 34.5, Constitution of Ireland.
11 Articles 34-37, Constitution of Ireland.
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for years; for example, we discuss some unsettled aspects of the 8th 
Amendment in the next section. However, we generally expect 
that, over time, and with repeated cases, certain interpretations of 
constitutional provisions will become settled. 
In focusing on the judiciary, however, we often forget the Oireachtas’ 
fundamental role in interpreting the Constitution. Ordinarily, when 
the Oireachtas is considering new legislation, it decides for itself what 
restrictions the Constitution places on its actions and builds new 
legislation accordingly. The Attorney General, in particular, will advise 
the Government—which subsequently advises the Oireachtas—about 
whether a legislative proposal is vulnerable to later challenge in the 
courts.12 Usually, these processes provide enough certainty for law-
making purposes. In addition, as a matter of law, legislation enjoys a 
‘presumption of constitutionality’,13 and if nobody ever challenges it 
successfully in the courts, it remains securely in place, for good or ill. 
The courts generally assume that when the Oireachtas makes a law it 
respects its obligation to do so in a constitutionally compatible way.14 
Courts will be especially deferential to the Oireachtas’ decisions where 
it has legislated on an issue considered to be morally controversial.15 It 
is rare for legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. Thus, 
the courts’ powers to interpret the Constitution have not usually 
impeded the work of the Oireachtas. Even on controversial issues, 
the legal order generally remains stable. If the Supreme Court 
interprets the Constitution in a way that the majority of people 
consider inappropriate, the Oireachtas can (and often does) offer 
voters the opportunity to reverse that interpretation by a ‘corrective 
referendum’.16 
12 Article 30.1, Constitution of Ireland.
13 People (AG) v O’Callaghan [1966] 1 IR 501; East Donegal Co-op Ltd v 
Attorney General [1970] 1 IR 317.
14 Article 15.4, Constitution of Ireland.
15 See generally Foley, Brian, Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality 
(2008, IPA).
16 On ‘corrective’ referenda, see de Londras, Fiona, and Gwynn Morgan, 
David, ‘Constitutional Amendment in Ireland’, in Contiades, Xenephon (ed) 
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Abortion law as an exception to everyday constitutional interpretation
If we return to the six options for constitutional reform considered 
by the Joint Committee, we see that many of them are designed to 
intervene in this ordinary process of constitutional interpretation. Some 
are mechanical interventions, designed to guarantee ‘legal certainty’ 
by placing certain interpretations of the Constitution, and associated 
legislation, beyond bounds. Others are attempts to ‘constitutionalise’ 
abortion law; they aim to secure ‘legal certainty’ by continuing to 
regulate abortion in some detail in the constitutional text rather than 
in legislation alone.
Mechanical interventions
Options 2-5 are attempts to constrain the Oireachtas’ ordinary power 
to pass new abortion legislation after removal of the 8th Amendment. 
Although their content has not been spelled out, in principle, they 
could be read as attempts to ensure ‘legal certainty’ by setting firm 
boundaries to future abortion legislation. Option 2 is the least 
restrictive, since the Oireachtas cannot be compelled to pass any 
particular legislation, although political pressure might have that effect 
in practice. Options 3 and 5 are more restrictive still, since, depending 
on their content, they could prevent the Oireachtas from passing 
legislation providing for more extensive abortion access than was set 
out in the Constitution. Option 3 is more directive than option 5; 
it would set out specific grounds for accessing abortion, rather than 
broad principles for abortion regulation. Option 4 seems to bind the 
Oireachtas most tightly, since it would enshrine detailed abortion 
legislation in the Constitution that could not be amended, even for 
minor reasons, without a referendum. Options 3 and 5, however, also 
ensure that, in at least some circumstances, a referendum would be 
required to change new abortion law. It goes without saying, of course, 
Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, 
Canada and the USA (2012, Routledge).
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that it is more difficult to change abortion law in a referendum than 
to amend simple legislation.
Option 6 is directed, not at controlling the Oireachtas, but at 
controlling the judiciary.17 It is a clear and very unusual effort to 
constrain the courts’ ordinary power to strike down future abortion 
legislation as unconstitutional if necessary.18 In principle, this provision 
could be read as protecting either liberal or conservative abortion 
legislation from undemocratic ‘judicial activism’—interpretations 
of the Constitution that go beyond the presumed preferences of 
the majority of voters. However, option 6 would immunise future 
abortion legislation from judicial examination in almost all cases. 
This is potentially a very conservative step because it would make 
it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to challenge abortion 
legislation in the courts regardless of the extent of its incursion into 
their constitutional rights.19 
Although the 8th Amendment is different in shape from options 2-6, 
our experience of it should make us wary of any attempts to insulate 
abortion from the ordinary processes of constitutional interpretation. 
Constitutional development of Irish abortion law under the 8th 
Amendment long ago ground to a standstill. The Oireachtas has been 
unusually unwilling to assume that abortion legislation attracts the 
presumption of constitutionality or to propose legislation that runs 
even a minimal risk of unconstitutionality. Until the PLDPA, there 
17 As discussed further, options 3, 4 and 5 have significant impact on how 
a court would decide an abortion case after constitutional reform. For 
example, the judiciary would need to interpret the text of any constitutional 
amendments to decide what they mean in practice, and to determine whether 
any new abortion legislation is constitutional.
18 David Kenny, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 27 September 2017. The judiciary is only excluded in 
this way in a small number of areas of law, for example, emergency powers 
legislation when the state is at war.
19 de Londras, Fiona, ‘An Abortion Law Immune from Constitutional Review?’, 





was no legislation explaining precisely when and how a woman could 
access abortion. The only abortion legislation in force for most of the 
life of the 8th Amendment—Offences against the Person Act 1861—
criminalised abortion. For 20 years, doctors and pregnant people, 
and their legal advisers, had to interpret and apply for themselves the 
bare constitutional abortion law, as contained in the X case,20 in the 
expectation that they were liable to imprisonment if they got it wrong. 
As Savita Halappanavar’s case demonstrated,21 this meant that abortion 
was inaccessible even in cases where it was arguably constitutional. 
Although the superior courts had asked the Oireachtas to pass abortion 
access legislation—to ‘legislate for X’—on numerous occasions,22 this 
did not happen until after the European Court of Human Rights in 
a case called A, B and C v Ireland found that the lack of legislation 
establishing a clear procedure for accessing lawful abortion was a 
breach of human rights.23 
This near-complete ‘chilling’ of legislative agency is especially 
dangerous because, even if the judiciary is willing to soften the 
Amendment’s edges, abortion can be particularly inaccessible to 
judicial innovation. Cases about the 8th Amendment have more 
often been brought at the instigation of the state, by service providers, 
or by anti-abortion campaigners, rather than by pregnant people 
themselves. People seeking abortion do not usually take cases to try 
to access abortion care unless they are restricted by their circumstances 
(for example, being in the care of the state). They have neither 
the resources nor the time, and they also are unlikely to want the 
20 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.
21 HSE, Final Report: Investigation of Incident 50278 (2013), pp 5-6 and 71-
73, identifying the law as a causal factor in relation to her death. See also 
Peter Boylan, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 18 October 2017.
22 See comments of McCarthy J. at 147 in Attorney General v X (see note 20); 
McCarthy J. in SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753, 770, and McKechnie J. in 
D (A Minor) v Judge Brennan, the HSE, Ireland, and the Attorney General 
(unreported, High Court, 9 May 2007).
23 A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 13.
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publicity and distress that may come with litigation. In any event, the 
courts’ restrictive interpretations of the 8th Amendment have likely 
discouraged litigants from bringing constitutional cases at all. Crucially, 
until recently, no government has considered the possibility of coming 
to pregnant people’s aid, by taking up its ordinary responsibility to 
develop the Constitution by offering a referendum to liberalise Irish 
abortion law. We are not arguing that these roadblocks to constitutional 
interpretation were the necessary result of the 8th Amendment; rather, 
they have their roots in a variety of political strategies developed over 
three decades, too numerous and complex to examine here. Our point 
is that it would be foolhardy to formalise these damaging political 
habits, and directly enshrine them in constitutional text. 
Keeping abortion in the constitutional text
Some readers might argue that, if only we could select the perfect 
constitutional text to govern abortion, we might generate a new 
legal atmosphere in which the Oireachtas and the judiciary would 
be willing once more to develop constitutional abortion law within 
appropriate limits. They may be attracted to options 3, 4 and 5 for 
that reason. Options 3 and 4 suggest that the Constitution should 
effectively specify more or less detailed grounds for abortion access in 
the text. Option 5 preserves the idea, currently represented by the 8th 
Amendment, that the Constitution should contain a general express 
statement about how the rights of pregnant people should be limited 
or weighed against legal rights that we might bestow on the foetus. It 
is broader and more vague than Options 3 and 4, because it does not 
specify the circumstances in which abortion should be legally available. 
Contentious litigation would almost inevitably follow insertion of 
options 3-5 into the Constitution. In the meantime, past experience 
with the 8th Amendment suggests that the scope of the Oireachtas’ 
law-making power would become unclear, leaving medics and their 
legal advisers to make clinical decisions in a situation that feels little 
changed from the status quo.
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Advocates of options 3-5 are allying themselves with a model of 
constitutional abortion law that has very few comparators elsewhere 
in the world. Most countries do not try to make abortion law in the 
constitution. A handful of states provide the explicit constitutional 
protection of foetal rights suggested in option 5. However, only Ireland 
and the Philippines confer ‘equal’ protection on pregnant people and 
foetuses.24 Other countries provide for a broader protection of foetal 
life. In Chile, the provision is somewhat more prosaic—‘The law 
protects the life of the unborn’25—while the Andorran Constitution 
says that the right to life is ‘fully protect[ed] in its different phases’.26 
The constitutions of Peru and Honduras say that ‘the unborn’ is 
considered to have rights as if it were born.27 In all of these states, access 
to abortion is extremely limited, and in some states was absolutely 
prohibited at one stage even when the life of the pregnant woman 
was in danger. 
Some other states approach abortion in their constitutions not 
by asserting prenatal rights, but by explicitly outlining the power of 
the parliament to pass legislation relating to abortion. In Zambia,28 
Zimbabwe,29 Uganda,30 Kenya31 and Swaziland,32 abortion is 
unlawful unless, and to the extent only, that is provided for by law. 
In a few countries, the constitution actually specifies when abortion 
is permitted by law, as suggested in options 3 and 4 above. Kenya’s 
Constitution provides that abortion can be made available in cases of 
emergency and risk to life or health, as well as other situations provided 
24 Section 12, Constitution of the Philippines 1987.
25 Article 19(1), Constitution of Chile 1980 with amendments through 2015.
26 Article 8(1), Constitution of the Principality of Andorra 1993.
27 Article 67, Constitution of the Republic of Honduras 1982; Article 2(1), 
Constitution of Peru 1993 with amendments through 2009.
28 Article 12(2), Constitution of Zambia 1991 with amendments through 2009. 
29 Article 48(3), Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013.
30 Article 22(2), Constitution of Uganda 1995 with amendments through 
2005. 
31 Article 26(4), Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
32 Article 5, The Constitution of Swaziland 2005.
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for by law.33 The Somalian Constitution limits abortion availability to 
cases of necessity, especially to save the life of the mother.34 Swaziland’s 
Constitution provides that abortion may be allowed on medical or 
therapeutic grounds,35 including cases where a doctor certifies that 
continued pregnancy will endanger the life or constitute a serious threat 
to the physical or mental health of the woman, where there is serious 
risk that the child will suffer from a ‘physical or mental defect of such 
a nature that the child will be irreparably seriously handicapped’,36 
where the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or ‘unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a mentally retarded female’,37 or in other situations 
provided for by law.38 In both Kenya and Swaziland, however, abortion 
is actually inaccessible in practice: there is no legislation to regulate it, 
illegal and unsafe abortion is a major public health problem, and there 
are no indications that abortion will actually be legalised.39 Globally, 
constitutional structures akin to options 3-5 are not associated with 
good public health outcomes.40
Proponents of options 3-5 may argue, nevertheless, that we can 
only ensure ‘legal certainty’ in the regulation of abortion by expressly 
regulating abortion in the Constitution. As we have discussed, the 
meaning of any constitutional provision falls to be determined by 
courts; the pursuit of absolute certainty through drafting is futile.41 
33 Article 26(4), Constitution of Kenya 2010.
34 Article 15(5), Constitution of Somalia 2012.
35 Article 5(a), Constitution of Swaziland 2005.
36 Article 5(a)(i-iii), Constitution of Swaziland 2005.
37 Article 5(b), Constitution of Swaziland 2005.
38 Article 5(c), Constitution of Swaziland 2005.
39 For Kenya, see in general Center for Reproductive Rights, In Harm’s Way: 
The Impact of Kenya’s Restrictive Abortion Law (2010). 
40 See further Enright, Máiréad, ‘Why Would Any Country Put Abortion in the 
Constitution?’, Human Rights in Ireland, 20 April 2017, available at http://
humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/why-would-a-country-put-abortion-in-
the-constitution.
41 Fiona de Londras, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 27 September 2017; Ms Justice Mary Laffoy, evidence 
to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, 20 
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This position is borne out by our experience of the 8th Amendment. 
Whether the language of text intended to replace the 8th is broad, 
as in option 5, or narrow as in options 3 and 4, it will depend on 
interpretation for its meaning. Interpretation may be more expansive, 
or more rigid, than anticipated. In Chapter 1, we discussed how 
quickly the interpretation of the 8th Amendment ossified, providing 
only limited relief to pregnant people who required abortions. More 
importantly, even 35 years after its insertion into the Constitution, 
the 8th Amendment has not conferred complete ‘certainty’ on our 
abortion law. Many of those who supported its introduction, for 
example, were surprised to see it used to establish a limited right to 
abortion in case of risk to life from suicide in the X case.42 Others 
were surprised to see it used in childbirth cases where no abortion 
was sought,43 or in immigration cases.44 Even at its very core, the 8th 
Amendment has been unable to clothe the ‘unborn’ in ‘legal certainty’. 
There are at least three issues here, which we discuss in turn.
Defining the unborn
First, although the PLDPA defines unborn life for the purposes of 
that Act,45 there is no general authoritative definition of ‘the unborn’ 
under the 8th Amendment. In all likelihood, it refers to an ‘embryo 
post implantation’,46 but it has not been considered in any case about 
abortion access under the 8th Amendment. 
September 2017; David Kenny, evidence to the Joint Committee on the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, 27 September 2017.
42 Attorney General v X (see note 20).
43 Health Service Executive v B [2016] IEHC 605.
44 Baby O v MJELR [2002] IR169.
45 Section 1 defines ‘unborn’ as ‘human life … during the period of time 
commencing after implantation in the womb of a woman and ending on the 
complete emergence of the life from the body of the woman’.
46 Roche v Roche [2009] IESC 82.
27
THE CONSTITUTION AFTER THE 8TH
Foetal rights
Second, we do not know whether the foetus only has a right to 
life under the Constitution, or whether it has a broader range of 
constitutional rights. Although the constitutional right to life of the 
foetus was expressly introduced by the 8th Amendment, some judges 
claimed that it existed prior to this, as an unenumerated constitutional 
right.47 (An unenumerated right is an implicit constitutional right. 
Although not written into the Constitution, unenumerated rights 
are still protected by it, and the courts identify them and set their 
scope.) Questions about the extent of foetal rights were not materially 
important to the decisions made in these cases, meaning that these 
comments were obiter (that is, not binding interpretations). However, 
they suggest that there might be a whole set of foetal rights that existed 
before, and might continue to exist after, the 8th Amendment.48 
Second, there are conflicting decisions from the High Court on 
whether the right to life is the only prenatal constitutional right in 
Ireland, or whether the foetus might have a larger set of constitutional 
rights, although these are not cases about access to abortion.49 
47 Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling Limited and the 
Wellwoman Centre Ltd [1988] 1 IR 593; Norris v Attorney General [1984] 
IR 36; Finn v Attorney General [1983] IR 154; McGee v Attorney General 
[1974] IR 284; G v An Bord Uchtala [1980] IR 32.
48 See further Enright, Máiréad et al, ‘Abortion Law in Ireland: A Model for 
Change’ (2015) 5(1) feminists@law. 
49 Ugbelese v MJELR [2009] IEHC 598; E v MJELR [2008] IEHC 68 (cited 
with approval by MacEochaidh J. in FO v Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 
236 and again in Dos Santos v Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 237); IRM 
v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2016] IEHC 478. See 
further Enright, Máiréad, ‘The Rights of the Unborn: A Troubling Decision 






Third, we do not know whether the 8th Amendment permits abortion 
in cases of fatal foetal abnormality. Successive governments have taken 
the view that it would be unconstitutional to allow for abortion in 
such cases,50 but there are good arguments to the contrary. On the 
one hand, the state need not take impracticable or futile steps to 
preserve foetal life, which suggests that the state may not prevent the 
termination of a pregnancy where the foetus has no prospect of life 
outside the womb. On the other hand, it is possible that the 8th does 
not permit abortion in such cases because the foetal abnormality does 
not by itself create a real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman. Furthermore, since the 8th Amendment says nothing about 
the health of the foetus, it may be that in cases where there is any 
prospect, however small, that the foetus will be born alive, it is still 
‘unborn’ and protected by the 8th Amendment.51 In the absence of 
a Supreme Court decision on this precise issue, we simply do not 
know whether the 8th Amendment permits these pregnancies to be 
terminated. The Amendment has not even been able to provide the 
minimum degree of legal certainty to provide relief to some pregnant 
people affected by these diagnoses.
Repeal: legal certainty in its proper place
Those opposed to repeal of the 8th Amendment tend to argue that 
it would plunge the constitutional law on abortion into deep and 
unprecedented uncertainty. For example, some commentators have 
50 See unsuccessful Bills to permit abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality: 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) 2013 (Bill No. 
115/2013); Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (Amendment) 2015 
(Bill No. 20/2015).
51 Attorney General v X (see note 20); PP v Health Service Executive [2014] 
IEHC 622. See further Barrington, Eileen, ‘Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution 
and Fatal Foetal Abnormality’, presentation to the Citizens’ Assembly, 7 
January 2017.
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suggested that repeal would generate uncertainty around the scope 
of the rights of the unborn, and that these might re-emerge to 
restrict future abortion legislation through judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution.52 However, even if we think that these individual 
arguments are plausible, they overstate the degree of ‘legal certainty’ 
achievable within constitutional text: even the 8th Amendment has 
its chinks and gaps. We do not argue, of course, that simple repeal 
addresses these kinds of concerns with ‘legal certainty’. As we discuss 
in Chapter 3, repeal of the 8th Amendment leaves the constitutionality 
of abortion to be determined by a clutch of constitutional rights most 
of which have never been applied to an abortion case before and will 
require development. 
Our point is that this ‘legal uncertainty’ is not the unusual threat 
it has been represented to be. Moreover, as our review of options 
2-6 demonstrates, the costs of seeking exceptional certainty through 
ever more elaborate constitutional texts may be much greater than 
its benefits. Repeal is not a risk-free proposition, but we need to 
become comfortable, again, with an ordinary level of constitutional 
(un)certainty around abortion. Rather than seek out complex 
52 Madden, Deirdre, Medicine, Law and Ethics (3rd edn) (2016, Bloomsbury 
Professional), pp 484-486; Wade, Katherine, ‘Refusal of Emergency 
Caesarean Section in Ireland: A Relational Approach’ (2014) 22(1) Medical 
Law Review 1; Fiona de Londras, written submission to the Citizens’ Assembly 
(2016). Most commentators accept that the likelihood of unenumerated 
foetal rights being revived after repeal of the 8th Amendment is poor; Brian 
Murray, presentation to the Citizens’ Assembly, ‘Legal Consequences of 
Retention, Repeal, or Amendment of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution’ 14 
March 2017; Fiona de Londras (see note 5). Although we do not recommend 
that any text should replace the 8th Amendment, we recognise that some 
people are concerned that, after repeal of the 8th, foetal rights could be 
developed by a conservative judiciary in ways that undermine access to 
abortion. This concern could be addressed by a minimalist replacement 
text intended to prevent any such interpretation. Such a provision could 
put the implicit meaning of repeal into words, providing that ‘Nothing in 
this Constitution prohibits abortion as provided for by law’, as proposed by 
Fiona de Londras (see note 5).
30
REPEALING THE 8TH
constitutional mechanisms to stave off ‘legal uncertainty’, lawmakers 
should adopt new principles for constitutional change, which put 
‘certainty’ in its proper place. 
Conclusion
In Chapter 3, we discuss how pregnant people’s rights could be 
developed after repeal of the 8th Amendment. Consistent with this 
focus on the rights of pregnant people, we argue that it is appropriate 
to reconceive legal certainty for a post-repeal landscape. Political 
concern to secure exceptional kinds of ‘legal certainty’ suggests that 
abortion is an exceptional practice, that women’s bodies are uniquely 
chaotic, unpredictable and perhaps disobedient. However, as we argue 
in Chapter 3, a rights-based approach to abortion requires us to accept 
that the pregnant person is best placed to make her own abortion 
decisions, and to normalise abortion as a medical treatment. A new 
conception of legal certainty would affirm secure rights to access 
abortion and other medical treatment in pregnancy, using transparent, 
predictable processes that support autonomous decision making. The 
Oireachtas could achieve such certainty by legislating appropriately, 
by providing timely guidance and training on how that legislation 
should be implemented, and by ensuring that pregnant people have 
access to accurate, non-directive, and non-judgmental information. 
In other words, such legal certainty is achieved through a mixture of 
measures: constitutional, legislative and regulatory. 
Constitutional reform should also clearly empower the Oireachtas to 
respond quickly to scientific advances, public health crises and abuses 
of human rights. This means ensuring that the Oireachtas is free from 
unusual mechanical restraints of the kinds set out in options 2-6. The 
boundaries of the Oireachtas’ legislative power should be set by respect 
for pregnant people’s rights, and the Oireachtas should legislate in a 
way that attempts to vindicate those rights. Then, pregnant people 
who feel that legislators have misjudged the proper bounds of their 
rights are in a position to challenge the legislation in litigation, with 
a court ultimately deciding whose interpretation of the Constitution 
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better serves the rights at stake. In other words, a reasonable level of 
legal certainty about abortion is the same as the level of certainty that 




A rights-based approach to abortion
If the 8th Amendment were no longer part of our constitutional order, 
we would have the opportunity to redesign our approach to abortion 
law in Ireland. In this chapter, we address the possible shape and nature 
of a rights-based approach to abortion. Drawing on international 
human rights law, as well as on constitutional reproductive rights law 
in other countries, we consider the ways in which the constitutional 
rights ordinarily enjoyed by all persons in Ireland might be developed 
in the context of pregnancy. We also consider the state’s powers to 
regulate abortion while respecting those rights. 
Reimagining constitutional rights in pregnancy 
Repealing the 8th Amendment would not automatically create 
an unlimited constitutional right to access abortion.1 However, it 
1 For a discussion of this prospect, see Whyte, Gerard, ‘Abortion on Demand 
the Legal Outcome of Repeal of the 8th Amendment’, The Irish Times, 28 
September 2016. See responses from Ivana Bacik and Fiona de Londras 
(The Irish Times letters page, 29 September 2016), the consequent rebuttal 
from Gerard Whyte (The Irish Times letters page, 30 September 2016) and 
further response from Fiona de Londras (The Irish Times letters page, 5 
October 2016).
33
would generate opportunities to develop existing constitutional 
rights by recognising that the protection of constitutional rights 
requires access to lawful abortion in a range of circumstances. Since 
1983, all questions about reproductive justice have been routed via 
the 8th Amendment and, therefore, folded into a concern with bare 
biological life; with keeping women and foetuses alive.2 Under the 
8th Amendment, once a woman becomes pregnant, the rights she can 
usually assert under the Constitution—to privacy, to bodily integrity, 
to equality—are subordinated to the right to life of the foetus. It is 
not that she no longer holds these rights, but that they are weakened by 
the foetus’ right to life; she cannot assert a right to do anything that 
might endanger that life. In practice, this means that, at least in the 
context of abortion, those constitutional rights are held in abeyance: 
they have not been developed or interpreted by the courts in the 
context of pregnancy. If the 8th Amendment were no longer part of 
the Constitution, pregnant people’s other rights might be reimagined 
for the Ireland that has emerged since 1983.3 
2 See Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Judgment: Attorney General v X’, in Enright, Máiréad 
et al (eds) Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the 
Gendered Politics of Identity (2017, Hart/Bloomsbury Publishing). See also, 
for instance, In Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services 
outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Bill 1995 [1995] IESC 9 
rejecting an argument from the right to health as irrelevant. The suspension 
of pregnant people’s constitutional rights, at least in an abortion context, was 
the explicit aim of the Pro-Life Action Campaign. See further McGuinness, 
Sheelagh, ‘Commentary on Attorney General v X’, in Enright, Máiréad 
et al (2017). For a counter-reading, suggesting that pregnant women’s 
constitutional rights have received some consideration outside the abortion 
context, see Wade, Katherine, ‘Caesarean Section Refusal in the Irish Courts: 
Health Service Executive v B’ (2017) 35(3) Medical Law Review 494.
3 When a substantial change is made to the constitutional text, that change 
should act as a nudge towards necessary interpretation, not only of the 
change itself (for example, to figure out the meaning of new text that is 
inserted) but also of its impact on the rest of the Constitution. As a general 
matter, the Constitution is interpreted ‘harmoniously’, so that the text is 
read as a coherent whole, and interpretations that reconcile apparently 
conflicting provisions with one another are preferred. It is thus to be expected 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the Oireachtas is obliged to legislate 
within the bounds of the Constitution. This means that in making 
law, parliamentarians in Ireland are also involved in thinking about the 
requirements, limits and meaning of the Constitution.4 We may also 
find that the courts have some role in interpreting the Constitution 
after the 8th Amendment, whether cases are brought by women 
seeking to liberalise abortion access, or by anti-abortion activists 
seeking to disrupt it.5 
In mapping out possibilities for developing pregnant people’s 
constitutional rights, we draw on international human rights law. 
We frequently hear that international human rights treaties have 
limited influence on Irish law.6 It is important to be clear about the 
that a change to the text might have broader implications for constitutional 
meaning. Where, as is the case with the 8th Amendment, one piece of text 
has dominated our constitutional understanding of how the law regulates a 
certain issue, the removal of that text will generate opportunities to figure 
out a new harmonious constitutional settlement about that issue; Dillane v 
Ireland [1980] ILRM 167.
4 de Londras, Fiona, ‘In Defence of Judicial Innovation and Constitutional 
Evolution’, in Cahillane, Laura et al (eds) Judges, Politics and the Irish 
Constitution (2016, Manchester University Press).
5 Although courts cannot ordinarily compel the Oireachtas to make new law, or 
direct fiscal and economic policy, they can strike an unconstitutional piece 
of law down, and order that the state remedy the harm that has been done 
through unconstitutional action, maybe by paying damages in some cases, 
and certainly by desisting from the activity at issue. As in any context, a case 
could take different forms: it might arise if the President were to refer a new 
abortion access bill to the Supreme Court to assess its constitutionality before 
signing it into law (under Article 26), or as a challenge from an individual 
pregnant person to the constitutionality of new abortion legislation, or it 
might be that questions of constitutional rights simply arise in the course 
of a case about the meaning and application of new abortion legislation in 
an unanticipated context.
6 Coyne, Ellen, ‘Abortion Law will be Decided by Voters, Varadkar tells UN’, 
The Times Ireland Edition, (29 July 2017); Binchy, William, ‘UN Committee’s 
View on Abortion Contradicts Core Ethical Value of Human Rights’, The Irish 
Times, 18 August 2014; Leahy, Pat, ‘UN Abortion Ruling is “Not Binding”, 
Enda Kenny says’, The Irish Times, 15 June 2016.
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difference between international and domestic law here. When Ireland 
ratifies a human rights treaty, it assumes a binding legal obligation in 
international law to ensure that the rights protected in that treaty are 
respected, protected and promoted in practice at home.7 International 
courts and treaty bodies have some powers to enforce that obligation 
in the international sphere. In domestic law, human rights treaties are 
at their strongest when they have been explicitly incorporated into 
domestic law by the Oireachtas.8 Incorporation of this kind is rare, 
and without it pregnant people cannot bring cases on the basis of 
international human rights in the Irish courts; they must bring those 
cases in international forums instead.9 However, litigants may still 
rely on these rights when trying to persuade an Irish court that rights 
found in the Constitution should be interpreted to mirror international 
human rights principles. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Constitution is a living document. 
Its meaning may develop over time to reflect the requirements of ‘the 
common good’, prudence, justice, charity, dignity, individual freedom 
and social order.10 In deciding how these concepts help to define 
constitutional rights, Irish courts look at a wide range of sources,11 
7 Article 14, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
8 Article 29.6, Constitution of Ireland. See, for example, DF v Garda 
Commissioner [2014] IEHC 213. On the status of the European Convention 
on Human Rights in Irish law, see McD v L [2010] IR 199; European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003; de Londras, Fiona, and Kelly, 
Cliona, The European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact 
and Analysis (2010, Round Hall/Thompson Reuters).
9 See, for example, A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR; Mellet v Ireland, 
Human Rights Committee, Communication no. 2324/2013 (2016); Whelan 
v Ireland, Human Rights Committee, Communication 2425/2014 (2017).
10 Preamble, Constitution of Ireland 1937; McGee v Attorney General [1974] 
IR 284. For a recent example, see NVH v MJELR [2017] IESC 33, in which 
the Supreme Court found a right to work for asylum seekers, developing this 
from respect for the dignity of the person.
11 See generally Hogan, Gerard, and Whyte, Gerard, JM Kelly: The Irish 
Constitution (4th edn) (2003, Bloomsbury Professional), chapter 1. 
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including international law.12 This makes sense in the context of 
abortion law: the decisions of international human rights courts and 
monitoring bodies are a good guide to prevailing international norms 
on abortion regulation.13 International human rights institutions 
also have extensive experience in articulating legal standards around 
abortion access, including in situations where there is deep division 
and disagreement about how access to abortion ought to be protected 
by international human rights law. Some of the approaches they have 
developed might be suitable for adoption in Ireland.14 Furthermore, 
the current Irish abortion law violates numerous international human 
rights treaties.15 If the 8th Amendment were repealed, Ireland’s future 
compliance with international human rights law would be greatly 
helped if the courts articulated pregnant persons’ rights in ways that 
reflect those protected under key international conventions.16
We are not arguing that the Irish courts should passively follow 
international human rights law when deciding the meaning of 
12 See, for example, Attorney General v Damache [2009] IESC 81; People 
(DPP) v Gormley [2014] IESC 17. For recent examples of constitutional 
courts elsewhere in the world that have taken account of international human 
rights law in developing abortion law, see Fine, Johanna et al, ‘The Role of 
International Human Rights Norms in the Liberalization of Abortion Laws 
Globally’ (2017) 19(1) Health and Human Rights 69.
13 People (DPP) v Gormley (see note 12).
14 On the usefulness of international and comparative law in judicial 
interpretation and adjudication generally, see Fredman, Sandra, ‘Foreign 
Fads or Fashions: The Role of Comparativism in Human Rights Law’ (2015) 
64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 631.
15 For an up-to-date list, see ‘International Human Rights Observations on 
Abortion in Ireland’, IFPA, available at www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/
International-Human-Rights-Observations-on-Abortion-in-Ireland.
16 For recent summaries of relevant international human rights law, see Christina 
Zampas, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment to 
the Constitution, 4 October 2017; see also ‘Human Rights and Equality 
Considerations in the Development of a New Legislative and Regulatory 
Framework on Abortion’, Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, 4 
October 2017, available at www.ihrec.ie/documents/human-rights-equality-
considerations-development-new-legislative-regulatory-framework-abortion.
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constitutional rights. Instead, courts could build on international 
human rights law to understand constitutional rights during pregnancy 
in the same way as they draw on any other persuasive sources when 
undertaking constitutional interpretation. They would consider the 
meaning, fit and impact of applying a common international approach 
in interpreting the Constitution. They would exercise their judgement 
as to whether the Constitution could properly be said to match, or 
even exceed, international commitments. They might well decide, in 
a particular case, that Irish constitutional protections in pregnancy are 
much more limited than those provided for under a given international 
human rights treaty, or that the provisions of an international human 
rights treaty subvert the proper meaning of the constitutional text. 
Thus, they may refuse to follow a treaty in interpreting the constitution. 
Any remaining conflict between international and constitutional law, 
then, could only be resolved by once again changing the Constitution 
by referendum.
What constitutional rights might pregnant people have?
In this section, we engage with pregnant people’s rights under the 
Irish Constitution after removal of the 8th Amendment, drawing on 
developments in international human rights law as an interpretive aid. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, while these rights will have an obvious 
application in the context of abortion regulation, they will also be 
relevant to the protection of rights during pregnancy where no abortion 
is sought. Our aim here is not to provide a comprehensive overview of 
the applicable constitutional law,17 but to sketch possibilities for future 
constitutional argument on behalf of pregnant people.
17 For example, we do not consider arguments related to the right to liberty, 
or the right to freedom of conscience in detail here.
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The right to life
The 8th Amendment explicitly pits the right to life of the pregnant 
person against the equal right to life of the unborn. Other than in 
pregnancy, the right to life, expressly protected in Article 40.3.2 of 
the Constitution, is not restricted in this way. That Article requires 
the state to ‘by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and 
… vindicate the life … of every citizen’. With the 8th Amendment 
repealed, pregnant people would again enjoy the ordinary right 
to life under Article 40.3.2. We could use this right to argue that 
any legislation that severely restricts access to abortion, whether by 
criminalisation or otherwise, is unconstitutional. 
In McGee v Attorney General,18 decided 10 years before the 8th 
Amendment, the Supreme Court held that a woman whose health 
made pregnancy dangerous for her could not have her life put at risk 
by the laws of the state. Accordingly, Walsh J. held that the state was 
both required to make exceptions to its general prohibitions on access 
to contraception for women in her position, and positively obliged 
to assist women in that position to access the contraception needed 
to avoid putting their life in jeopardy. McGee is not an abortion case; 
indeed, the court was quite clear that ‘any action on the part of either 
the husband and wife or the State to limit family sizes by endangering 
or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offence against 
the common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights 
of the human life in question’.19 However, a great deal has changed 
since McGee was decided. In particular, the Irish people have become 
more accepting of abortion, and the international consensus on the 
permissibility of abortion has shifted dramatically. In the absence of 
the 8th Amendment, we could argue by analogy with McGee that a 
person whose pregnancy poses a threat to her life has a constitutional 
right to legal and practically accessible abortion, and to positive state 
assistance in accessing it. Importantly, after the 8th Amendment this 
18 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284, per Walsh J. at 315.
19 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284, per Walsh J. at 312. 
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exception should not be confined to those whose life is at ‘real and 
substantial risk’: that intolerably high threshold is a product of the 8th 
Amendment as interpreted in the X case.20 International human rights 
law recognises a potential violation of the right to life where legal 
restrictions on abortion access compel women to undergo dangerous 
clandestine abortions,21 exposing them to risky medical procedures, 
or requiring them to forego treatment for life-threatening illnesses.22 
This broader argument could be used to require more significant 
liberalisation of abortion access beyond the narrow ‘right to life’ 
exception currently provided in Irish law.
Removing the 8th Amendment would also allow us to think about 
the right to life beyond the simple biological condition of ‘avoiding 
death’. Instead, the right to life could be read consistently with pregnant 
people’s other constitutional rights. This might mean, in particular, that 
the Constitution could no longer support a strict distinction between 
life and health.23 So, for example, arguments for the liberalisation 
of abortion access could be rooted in the acknowledgement that a 
woman’s right to life is engaged even where she survives pregnancy 
but suffers serious damage to her physical and mental health.
The right to bodily integrity and the right to health
The right to bodily integrity is one of the unenumerated (implied) 
rights in Irish Constitution. It was originally developed in Ryan v 
Attorney General.24 In Ryan, the Supreme Court held that the state 
could not, without justification, directly impose harmful treatment 
20 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.
21 See, for example, UNHRC, CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The 
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women,  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, 
29 March 2000. 
22 Ramírez Jacinto v Mexico, Case 161/02, Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Report No. 21/07, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22, rev. 1 
(2007); see also brief discussion in Chapter 1. 
23 See further Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Judgment: Attorney General v X’ (see note 2).
24 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294.
40
REPEALING THE 8TH
or processes on the body or endanger citizens’ health.25 The right to 
bodily integrity is not an absolute right; the state can make policies 
that have effects on our control of our bodies or health; however, 
any interference with that right must be proportionate and ‘for 
the good of the whole’ society.26 The right to bodily integrity is 
a negative right: a right to freedom from external interference. At 
an individual level, it takes the form of a right to refuse consent to 
medical treatment.27 As discussed in Chapter 1, pregnant people’s right 
to refuse consent is limited by the 8th Amendment.28 After removal 
of the 8th Amendment, this would have to change. More broadly, 
the right to bodily integrity requires that the state should desist from 
any actions that disproportionately interfere with pregnant people’s 
capacity to protect their health. For example, we could argue that the 
state is required to decriminalise abortion. To the same effect, regard 
for bodily integrity might require the state to take action to prevent 
private acts that unreasonably obstruct access to abortion (such as the 
provision of inaccurate information by fraudulent crisis pregnancy 
agencies, or harassment and intimidation by anti-abortion activists).29 
This interpretation of the right to bodily integrity chimes with 
the right to health under international human rights law. Under 
international human rights law, states must take measures to ‘liberalize 
restrictive abortion laws; to guarantee women and girls access to safe 
abortion services and quality post abortion care … and to respect the 
right to women to make autonomous decisions about their sexual 
25 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 313.
26 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 313.
27 See Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2) [1996] 2 
IR 79; JM v Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital [2003] 1 IR 
321. That right would also include the right to refuse consent to abortion: 
SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753, 767.
28 Health Service Executive, National Consent Policy (2014, revised May 
2016), p 41.
29 The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v JT (1988) 3 Frewen 141; 
we discuss access to abortion care, including to abortion information, in 
more detail in Chapter 4.
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and reproductive health’ in order to vindicate the right to health.30 
The right to health (including the right to sexual and reproductive 
health)31 implies state obligations of non-interference. This means that 
states must remove any and all barriers to pregnant people’s right to 
control of their own health, including barriers interfering with access 
to health services, education and information.
However, the right to bodily integrity in Irish constitutional law 
is narrower than the international right to health.32 In particular, the 
existing constitutional right to bodily integrity cannot, thus far, be 
stretched to require the state to provide particular services, or kinds of 
medical treatment.33 This is consistent with the general principle of 
Irish constitutional law that matters of socioeconomic policy are left 
30 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(UNCESR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, 8; UNCESCR, 
General Comment No. 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health 
(Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), E/C/12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, 28; UNCESCR, Concluding 
Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Ireland, E/C.12/IRL/Co/3, 8 
July 2015, 30; UNCEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic 
Report of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7, 30 July 2013, 50-51. 
31 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), General 
Comment No. 20: The Implementation of the Rights of the Child During 
Adolescence, CRC/C/GC/20, 6 December 2016; United Nations Women, 
Division for the Advancement of Women, CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), A/54/38/Rev.1, 
1999.
32 See generally Murphy, Therese, Health and Human Rights (2013, Hart 
Publishing).
33 See further Madden, Deirdre, Medicine, Law and Ethics (3rd edn) (2016, 
Bloomsbury Professional); cf O’Brien v Wicklow UDC (unreported, High 
Court, 10 June 1994); The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365, 372 and 374. 
See similarly the finding in In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and 
the Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] 1 IR 105 that there is 
no constitutional right to health that could ground free access to healthcare
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to the government.34 After repeal of the 8th Amendment, however, 
the state would be entirely free to legislate for and fund comprehensive 
abortion care services, even if the Constitution did not compel it to 
do so.
The right to privacy and self-determination
The Constitution protects the rights to individual and to marital 
privacy, both of which might be developed following repeal of the 
8th Amendment. Privacy is not an unlimited right. The state may 
interfere with it for the purposes of the vindicating others’ rights, or 
in the interests of the ‘common good’,35 but such limitations must be 
carefully drawn. The right to marital privacy is to be enjoyed with 
‘possibly the rarest of exceptions’.36 Moreover, the right to individual 
privacy cannot be restricted simply because a person might engage in 
an activity that the majority of people think is immoral or distasteful.37
Read together with the right to bodily integrity,38 the right to 
privacy points towards a right to medical self-determination.39 This 
arguably includes a right to make decisions about whether to become 
and stay pregnant.40 Although the Supreme Court in McGee41 held 
that the right to marital privacy did not include a right to access 
34 See more recently MEO v MJELR [2012] IEHC 394.
35 MEO v MJELR [2012] IEHC 394.
36 See similarly Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights; Niemitz v 
Germany [1992] ECHR 80; X v Iceland [1976] ECHR 7.
37 McGee v Attorney General, 322 (see note 10); Norris v Attorney General 
[1984] IR 36, 71.
38 On non-consensual obstetric treatment or examination as violating the right 
to private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
see YF v Turkey App. No. 24209/94, ECHR (22 July 2003); Konovalova v. 
Russia [2016] ECHR 248.
39 UNCESCR, General Comment No. 22, [28] (see note 29); UN Women, Fourth 
World Conference on Women 1995, Beijing Declaration and the Platform 
for Action, [96].
40 UNCESCR, General Comment No. 22, [28] (see note 29).
41 McGee v Attorney General (see note 10).
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abortion, much has changed since then, and the comments in McGee 
do not preclude the development of the constitutional right to 
privacy in order to require the decriminalisation of abortion and the 
liberalisation of abortion law. This is not least because international 
human rights bodies recognise that restrictive abortion laws infringe 
pregnant people’s privacy,42 dignity and autonomy.43 
If the constitutional right to privacy were to develop in accordance 
with international human rights law, the state would be required, at 
a minimum, to ensure that any new abortion law passed was effective 
and accessible.44 As we discuss in Chapter 4, this includes taking 
measures to avoid delays in accessing treatment, and ensuring that 
certification or qualification processes are transparent and do not make 
women ‘dependent on the benevolent interpretation’45 of restrictive 
or uncertain laws. 
The right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment
The courts recognised a constitutional right to be free from torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in The State (C) v 
Frawley.46 As in international law, this right is not focused solely on 
42 A, B and C v Ireland (see note 9); Tysiąc v Poland [2007] ECHR 219, 
[106]-[107]; RR v Poland [2011] ECHR 828, [181]; KL v Peru, CCPR/
C/85/D/1153/2003, 22 November 2005, [6.3]; UNHRC, Concluding 
Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Ireland, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, 
19 August 2014, [9]; Mellet v Ireland, [7.8] (see note 9). 
43 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, Interim Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, A/66/254, 3 August 
2011, [21]. 
44 A, B and C v Ireland (see note 9); we discuss access to abortion care in a 
practical sense in Chapter 4.
45 UNCEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination  Against Women: New Zealand, CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/7, 27 
July 2012, [34]-[35].
46 [1976] IR 365.
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physical harms. It also encompasses a right to be free from serious 
psychological harm and degradation.47 In Article 40.3.2 of the 
Constitution, the state commits to vindicate the person of every 
citizen; to protect the body, mind and personality of every individual.48 
This includes an obligation to treat every person with dignity.49 The 
Irish courts have interpreted this obligation restrictively.50 They place 
particular emphasis, not on the harmful consequences of a state policy, 
but on the intention with which it was done. In practice, this means 
that it will be difficult to establish a violation of the right to freedom 
from inhuman and degrading treatment, since the state can always claim 
that its purpose was not to punish or harm the suffering individual, 
and that their suffering was the indirect consequence of an attempt 
to pursue some more benign goal. 
International human rights law takes a more expansive approach to 
this right. At an individual level, it recognises that subjecting a pregnant 
person to medical treatment without their consent can constitute 
inhuman and degrading treatment,51 and that the right is violated 
if the effect of the treatment was to humiliate and degrade, whether 
47 See, for example, Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 1, [51]; Ireland 
v United Kingdom [1980] 2 EHRR 25, [52]; UNCAT, General Comment No. 
3: Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties, CAT/C/GC/3, 13 December 
2012, [3].
48 Kinsella v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2011] IEHC 235; The State 
(Richardson) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1980] ILRM 82.
49 Kinsella v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2011] IEHC 235; The State 
(Richardson) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1980] ILRM 82.
50 It is worth noting that the right has most often been invoked in imprisonment 
cases, which, unfortunately, may explain judicial reluctance to extend it.
51 On subjecting women to obstetric treatment or examination without consent 
as inhuman and degrading treatment, see VC v Slovakia [2011] ECHR 1888; 
NB v Slovakia [2012] ECHR 991; IG v MK and RH v Slovakia [2012] ECHR 
1910; RR v Poland [2011] ECHR 828; Center for Reproductive Rights, 
Reproductive Rights Violations as Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: A Critical Human Rights Analysis (2011). On 
torture in healthcare settings more generally, see UNHRC, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, Juan E. Méndez, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013, [10]-[11]. 
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or not that was the practitioner’s intention.52 Furthermore, states are 
required both to refrain from inhuman and degrading treatment in 
their own institutions, and to take steps to prevent its imposition by 
others.53 This obligation is absolute;54 there are no exceptions, and 
no defences.55 
If we move away from the question of direct medical treatment to 
the broader issue of legislative prohibitions on abortion, international 
human rights law is also very useful. It acknowledges that restrictive 
abortion law may breach pregnant people’s rights to freedom from 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against 
Women (UNCEDAW) has said that the criminalisation, denial or 
delay of safe abortion or post-abortion care are ‘forms of gender-based 
violence that … may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’.56 This may be because a pregnant person is often exposed 
to dangerous abortion procedures where abortion is not otherwise 
legal. However, international human rights law also recognises that 
being compelled to continue a pregnancy where abortion is inaccessible 
may, in itself, constitute torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. This is because requiring a pregnant person to continue 
a pregnancy after rape,57 where that individual’s own health is at risk, 
52 VC v Slovakia (see note 50). See also UNHRC, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 
2013, [5] (note 50).
53 See, for example, UNCAT, CAT/C/GC/3, 13 December 2012, [5], [18], [23], 
[37], [39] (note 46).
54 Mavronicola, Natasa, ‘Is the Prohibition Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment Absolute in International Human Rights Law? A 
Reply to Steven Greer’ (2017) 17(3) Human Rights Law Review 479.
55 UNCAT, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Ireland, 
CAT/C/IRL/CO/2, 31 August 2017, [31].
56 UNCEDAW, General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-based Violence 
Against Women, updating General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/
GC/35, 14 July 2017, [1] and [31(a)].
57 UNCAT, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
19 of the Convention. Concluding Observations of the Committee Against 
Torture: Nicaragua, CAT/C/NIC/CO/1, 10 June 2009, [16]. 
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or where the foetus is severely impaired,58 may expose women to severe 
trauma and anguish.59 The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
confirmed this position in two recent cases against Ireland; Mellet and 
Whelan.60 A key point from these cases is that allowing pregnant people 
to travel to access abortion abroad does not sufficiently vindicate this 
right. In requiring women to travel to access abortion abroad, on 
their own, without any significant economic, medical or emotional 
support, the state exacerbates the violation caused by criminalising 
abortion in the first place. The state’s neglect, in this instance, can 
violate women’s rights.61 
The right to equality 
Abortion access also raises questions for the constitutional guarantee of 
equality.62 Restrictive abortion laws discriminate against women.63 
As we have seen in our discussion of the right to life and the right to 
bodily integrity, restrictive abortion laws mean that pregnant women 
cannot enjoy other fundamental rights in the same ways as men do.64 
58 Mellet v Ireland (see note 9); Whelan v Ireland, [7.7] (see note 9). See note 
50.
59 Mellet v Ireland, [7.4] and [7.6] (see note 9); Whelan v Ireland, [7.7] (see 
note 9). See also P and S v Poland, No. 57375/0 ECtHR (2012); KL v Peru 
(see note 41); UNHRC, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, 19 August 2014 (see note 41).
60 Mellet v Ireland (see note 9); Whelan v Ireland (see note 9). 
61 Mellet v Ireland (see note 9). See similarly The State (C) v Frawley [1976] 
IR 365, 372 noting that the right may be breached by omission. Contrast 
In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission [2017] NICA 42, currently awaiting judgment from the UK 
Supreme Court.
62 McGuinness, Sheelagh and Widdows, Heather, ‘Access to Basic Reproductive 
rights: Global Challenges’, in Francis, Leslie (ed) The Oxford Handbook of 
Reproductive Ethics (2016, OUP).
63 UNHRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Peru, CCPR/CO/70/PE, 15 November 2000, [20]. 
64 United Nations General Assembly, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard 
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Ensuring access to abortion helps to create the conditions in which 
women can plan their families. This in turn contributes to addressing 
the entrenched gender inequality associated with uneven distribution 
of childcare responsibilities. 
The 8th Amendment produces and reflects wider inequalities in 
Irish society. Whatever the Constitution says, women with money 
can usually access safe abortion when they need to; women without 
money often cannot. Indeed, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee recently held that Ireland’s current law discriminates on 
socioeconomic grounds, because wealth has such a significant impact 
on the ability to exercise reproductive autonomy in Ireland.65 In 
Ireland—as elsewhere—people without money are more often than not 
people who experience a wide variety of other intersecting inequalities. 
They may be asylum seekers, Travellers, women of colour, disabled 
people, children, or LGBTQI* people. They may live in inaccessible 
parts of the country with poor public transportation links and limited 
broadband access. Their lack of reproductive autonomy will not be 
fully addressed by expanding constitutional rights to privacy, bodily 
integrity, or freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment. Rather, as we discuss at the end of this chapter, a 
substantive and rich conceptualisation of equality, and an associated 
commitment to reproductive justice, is needed to fully realise their 
rights to access abortion—even in a post-repeal Ireland.66 
The Constitution could be part of that project. It contains a right 
to equality,67 which the Supreme Court has recognised as going ‘to 
the essence of human personality’.68 According to Article 40.1, that 
of Physical and Mental Health, A/66/254, 3 August 2011, [16] and [34]. 
65 Mellet v Ireland (see note 9).
66 Culhane, Leah, ‘Reproductive Justice and the Irish Context: Towards 
an Egalitarian Framing of Abortion’ and Sherlock, Leslie, “Towards a 
Reproductive Model of Reproductive Justice in Ireland’, both in Quilty, 
Aideen et al (eds) The Abortion Papers Ireland: Volume 2 (2015, Cork 
University Press).
67 Article 40.1, Constitution of Ireland.
68 NVH v MJELR, [10] (see note 10).
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guarantee of equality ‘shall not be held to mean that the State shall not 
in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and 
moral, and of social function’.69 This is a simple acknowledgement that 
to treat everyone the same is not to ensure equality. It can be interpreted 
restrictively: we might say that people who get pregnant should be 
required to stay pregnant, even at considerable cost to themselves, 
because this is their ‘natural’ ‘physical function’, and the state has no 
obligation to correct this. In Mellet, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee called this the ‘stereotypical idea that a pregnant woman 
should let nature run its course, regardless of the suffering involved 
for her’.70 We could move away from that stereotype and recognise 
that those who can get pregnant not only have different physical and 
social functions, but different needs if they are to fulfil those functions 
with dignity and without unnecessary suffering. That interpretation 
would require ensuring access to lawful abortion. 
International human rights law can help us to envisage that shift 
in interpretation. Under international human rights law, women are 
entitled not only to equal access to the same health services as men, 
but also to access to gender-specific healthcare where required.71 
Restricting abortion access constitutes gender discrimination in 
69 Article 40.1, Constitution of Ireland.
70 Sarah Cleveland, individual opinion in Mellet v Ireland (see note 9). 
71 United Nations Women, Division for the Advancement of Women, A/54/38/
Rev.1, 1999, [11] (see note 30); UNCESCR, Substantive Issues Arising 
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. General Comment No.16: The Equal Right of Men and 
Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 
3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 
E/C. 12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, [29]. On discrimination and obstetric 
violence, see also Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira (deceased) v Brazil, 
UNCEDAW, Views: Communication No. 17/2008, CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008, 
10 August 2011. See further UNHRC, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 2013, 
[7]-[8] (note 50). The European Court of Human Rights has been reluctant 
to accept that obstetric violence is often associated with discrimination 
against women, or particular categories of women; see, for example, Roma 
sterilisation cases such as VC v Slovakia (note 50).
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healthcare both because abortion is a procedure that only women need 
and because compelling women to continue a pregnancy exposes them 
to gender-specific health risks.72 Prohibiting abortion reduces women 
to potential mothers, thus perpetuating gender-based stereotypes. In 
Nigel Rodley’s words, our abortion law sends the message that a woman 
is ‘a vessel and nothing more’.73 Ireland has an obligation to progress 
women’s social position by modifying ‘social and cultural patterns’ of 
bias in order to eliminate gendered prejudices and stereotypes.74 If, as 
we have argued, the 8th Amendment reinforces those stereotypes in 
Irish constitutional law and medico-legal practice, addressing this will 
require more than repeal. It will require a wholesale reorientation of 
abortion law. Recognising access to abortion as being fundamentally 
grounded in equality would go some way towards achieving that.75
An outline of pregnant people’s constitutional rights after the 8th
We argue that without the 8th Amendment the constitutional case 
for decriminalisation of abortion is clear, not only in exceptional or 
‘deserving’ cases, but in all cases where women might need abortions, 
on equality and privacy grounds. A continuing prohibition on abortion 
access will be difficult to sustain in cases of risk to life, serious risk to 
health, fatal foetal abnormality and rape. The case for these exceptions 
to any general prohibition is rooted in the constitutional rights to 
life and freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Once those legislative exceptions are in place, arguments for the 
right to privacy suggest that illegitimate obstacles to abortion access 
72 United Nations Women, Division for the Advancement of Women, A/54/38/
Rev.1, 1999 (see note 30). UNHRC, Report of the Working Group on the 
Issue of Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice, A/HRC/32/44, 
8 April 2016 [23]; concurring opinions of Sarah Cleveland, Yadh Ben 
Achour, Victor Manuel Rodríguez Rescia, Olivier de Frouville and Fabián 
Omar Salvioli in Mellet v Ireland (see note 9).
73 UNHRC, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, 19 August 2014 (see note 41).
74 Article 5, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.
75 McGuinness, Sheelagh and Widdows, Heather (see note 61).
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must be removed; if abortion is made legal, it must also be practically 
accessible. Furthermore, without the 8th Amendment, respect for the 
right to bodily integrity means that it will be much more difficult to 
legitimate coercive medical treatment of pregnant people, both within 
and outside the abortion context. In order to give effect to these 
rights, people whose pregnancies are likely to be very difficult and 
distressing—because they are affected by serious medical risks, rape or 
serious foetal anomaly—will have a strong claim to the information 
and support necessary to minimise their pain and anguish. It is possible 
to go further and to make a broader claim for abortion rights on 
behalf of pregnant people who not come within the scope of these 
‘exceptions’.76 A general constitutional right to self-determination 
in matters of reproduction, established under the heads of the right to 
privacy and the right to equality, could be developed and applied, not 
only to buttress a right to access abortion in exceptional circumstances, 
but to justify legislating for abortion access for all pregnant people 
who need it. 
It seems clear, from this perspective, that the Protection of Life 
During Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA) (summarised in Chapter 1) will 
not pass constitutional muster once the 8th Amendment is repealed. 
New abortion legislation will be required. We say this for four reasons. 
First, the PLDPA criminalises abortion in almost all cases. Second, it 
prohibits abortion even in the ‘exceptional’ cases where the pregnant 
person’s health is at serious risk, where she is pregnant as a result of 
rape or where she has received a diagnosis of serious foetal anomaly. 
Third, the right to privacy is violated because the process for accessing 
a legal abortion in Ireland is humiliating and degrading, especially 
for suicidal women. The law is still very uncertain, and women are 
likely to experience serious delay in accessing treatment. Finally, if 
we take a broad reading of the constitutional position after repeal, the 
PLDPA, by prohibiting abortion in almost all cases, does not make 
effective provision for the equality and privacy rights of the majority 
of pregnant people who will require abortions.
76 We discuss this further in Chapter 4.
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After repeal of the 8th, then, the PLDPA must be replaced by new 
abortion legislation. As we have already noted, it is unlikely that we 
can make a constitutional case for ‘unrestricted’ access to abortion at 
all points in pregnancy. As we have said, the constitutional rights to 
bodily integrity, equality and privacy can be subjected to proportionate 
restrictions. The state’s interest in protecting foetal life would likely 
permit imposing some legislative restrictions on abortion access, such 
as time limits, for example. In the next section, we explain how the 
state’s interest in protecting foetal life might be used to justify some 
forms of abortion regulation.
valuing foetal life in the Constitution
Under the 8th Amendment, the foetus is a constitutional rights-
bearer.77 We assume that, after repeal, this would no longer be the case. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is generally understood that the unborn 
has an enumerated constitutional right to life, contained in the 8th 
Amendment, and may have some other unenumerated rights. Some 
people have expressed concern that even if the 8th were repealed, those 
unenumerated rights would remain, and could be further developed 
by a court in an appropriate case, even to the point of restricting the 
development of new abortion legislation. We think that this risk is very 
small. In most states, where the constitutional text does not provide 
for the right to life of the unborn, constitutional courts have been 
reluctant to enumerate one.78 It is difficult to imagine a circumstance 
in which our Supreme Court could revive unenumerated foetal rights 
after repeal of the 8th without utterly disregarding the electorate’s 
77 See the discussion in Chapter 1.
78 Where constitutions do not provide such an express right, most courts have 
been reluctant to create one, for example the Colombian Constitutional Court 
in Case T-355/06 (2006), discussed in Ngwena, Charles, ‘Conscientious 
Objection to Abortion and Accommodating Women’s Reproductive Health 
Rights: Reflections on a Decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
from an African Regional Human Rights Perspective’ (2014) 58(2) Journal 
of African Law 183.
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intent in voting for that repeal; that is, to make it possible to liberalise 
Ireland’s abortion law to some degree. Moreover, even if the foetus 
does have such unenumerated rights, they could not replicate the 
8th Amendment. For example, they would not necessarily be ‘equal’ 
to the rights of the pregnant person, or eliminate her rights from 
consideration. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we work from the assumption 
that the foetus should not have rights under the Constitution, but 
that it should have value. This is consistent with the position under 
international human rights law.79 That a state does not recognise a foetal 
right to life does not mean that the foetus has no constitutional value. 
Even without constructing the foetus as a rights-bearing constitutional 
person, the state can assert an interest in the preservation of foetal life 
through voluntary and consensual pregnancy. In the Slovak Republic,80 
the Czech Republic81 and Hungary,82 a clear distinction is drawn 
between a constitutional right (which is not enjoyed by prenatal life) 
and a constitutional value. As the Constitutional Court of the Slovak 
Republic has put it, in pursuing the goal of preserving foetal life, the 
state cannot interfere with the essence of a pregnant person’s rights. 
Women, the court held, have rights to privacy, a private life, dignity 
and must therefore be constitutionally protected to decide on her own 
‘spiritual and physical integrity’: ‘[b]y becoming pregnant … a woman 
does not waive her right to self-determination’.83
79 See, for example, Vo v France [2005] 40 EHRR 12, [82]; A, B and C v 
Ireland, [227]-[228] (see note 9); Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v 
Ireland [1992] ECHR 68. 
80 Article 15(1), Constitution of Slovkia1992 with amendments through 2014.
81 Article 6(1), Constitution of the Czech Republic 1993 with amendments 
through 2002: ‘Everyone has the right to life. Human life is worthy of 
protection even before birth.’
82 Article 2, Constitution of Hungary 2011.
83 Finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Ref. No. I. ÚS 
12/01 of 4 December 2007, published in the Collection of Laws of the 
Slovak Republic under no. 14/2008, volume 8), [13].
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The rights of pregnant people are necessarily weightier than the 
constitutional value that is attached to prenatal life, just as constitutional 
rights are generally weightier than any policy goal the state wishes to 
pursue. Any restrictions the state wished to place on abortion access 
would need to meet ordinary constitutional standards. Pregnant 
people’s rights would determine the boundaries of Irish abortion 
law. Restrictions on abortion access would be permitted, but must be 
proportionate,84 meaning they must be rational, essential in order to 
achieve the state’s aim, no more intrusive than the minimum necessary 
to achieve that aim, and otherwise proportionate to the state’s aims.85 
In other states that understand the preservation of foetal life as 
a constitutional value, it is permissible to limit abortion access by 
imposing time limits or requiring grounds to access abortion, but 
none of these limitations can trump all of the pregnant person’s other 
personal rights and interests in all circumstances.86 In the United 
States, the right to access abortion is constitutionally protected within 
the first trimester.87 The courts have recognised that some limitations 
can be placed on abortion access in order to pursue the social good of 
preserving foetal life.88 However, it is unconstitutional to place any 
84 Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 531.
85 Holland v Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2004] IEHC 97. As discussed 
further in Chapter 4, it is difficult to argue that criminalisation of abortion is 
a rational means of protecting human life, since it does not prevent pregnant 
people from obtaining abortions in practice.
86 LC v Peru, UNCEDAW, Views: Communication No. 22/2009, 4 November 
2011, [8.8], [8.12], [8.15].
87 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973).
88 Many US states restrict access to abortion: requiring impractical and 
unnecessary levels of surgical facility even for medical abortions, requiring 
women to access fatal heartbeat scans and undergo long waiting and 
reflection periods before accessing abortion care and so on. These so-called 
TRAP laws are frequently challenged, and sometimes struck down by the 
US Supreme Court. See, for example, Nash, Elizabeth et al, ‘Policy Trends 
in the States: 2016’, available at www.guttmacher.org/article/2017/01/




undue burdens on pregnant people’s right to access abortion within 
that time period.89 There is no reason why we cannot learn from other 
jurisdictions in adopting a proportionality-based approach to abortion 
access in Ireland after repeal.
It is also important to emphasise that the state can pursue its interest 
in preserving foetal life otherwise than by restricting access to abortion. 
Pregnancy is a fundamentally relational experience; the continuation 
of a pregnancy depends on the pregnant person’s sacrifice and deep 
personal commitment. Concern for the preservation of foetal life 
within that relationship is best expressed and pursued through an 
empowering, adequate and effective system of reproductive justice, 
and not through constitutional coercion to continue with pregnancy. 
That system should be built to ensure that sex is consensual, that 
consent to sex is informed by effective programmes of sex education,90 
and that contraception is readily and freely available. Accurate and 
impartial abortion information should be freely available, and abortion 
care should be available to those who wish to access it.91 Prenatal 
and obstetric medical care should be properly resourced, to preserve 
pregnant people’s health and empower those giving birth. Child rearing 
should be effectively and adequately supported by the state including 
through the provision of adequate material support, especially in the 
case of those raising children on a low income.92 
89 Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992).
90 Noeline Blackwell, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 25 October 2017.
91 See, for example, UNCRC, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third 
and Fourth Periodic Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, 1 March 2016, 
[58]; United Nations Women, Division for the Advancement of Women, 
A/54/38/Rev.1, 1999 (see note 30).
92 In this respect, it is worth noting that it has been difficult to invoke the 8th 
Amendment rights of the unborn, on its own behalf, outside of the abortion 
and childbirth context. For example, the state has resisted the invocation 
of the right in order to resist pregnant women’s deportation. See Enright, 
Máiréad, ‘The Rights of the Unborn: A Troubling Decision from the High 
Court?’, Human Rights in Ireland, 10 August 2016, available at http://
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With the 8th Amendment as our starting point, it may be difficult 
to imagine how this would work, but other countries have undertaken 
transformative changes to their abortion legislation, intended to 
pursue a commitment to rights and equality. South Africa is a good 
example. Until 1994, abortion law in South Africa was restrictive and 
little used;93 instead, illegal abortion was widespread. Apartheid meant 
that in reality illegal and dangerous abortion was an experience almost 
exclusive to non-White women. In the first democratic election in 
1994, the African National Congress included access to lawful abortion 
in its platform, and when elected passed the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 1996. This Act allows for abortion on request within 
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and then introduces grounds for access 
after that. The further into pregnancy one goes, the more restrictive 
the law becomes. Counselling is never mandated, midwives can carry 
out abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and no parental or 
spousal consent is required where a minor seeks abortion law. The 
preamble to the Act grounds its approach firmly in the Constitution’s 
transformative rights regime, including rights to health, to access to 
fertility control of one’s choice, and to the enjoyment of security 
in the body. Although there are continuing challenges to accessing 
lawful abortion, the rights-based framing of this law provides a useful 
example of the potential of grounding access to abortion in women’s 
rights, and of enabling the state to limit access only where doing so 
respects those rights. It shows what can be done when we make the 
dispositional shift from reproduction as control, to reproduction as 
freedom. Just such a shift would be possible in Ireland after repeal of 
the 8th Amendment. 
humanrights.ie/uncategorized/the-rights-of-the-unborn-a-troubling-decision-
from-the-high-court.




In this chapter, we have begun to explore a rights-based approach to 
Irish abortion law. A rights-based approach is a pragmatic approach, 
because rights have become central ideas in pro-choice campaigns 
in Ireland, as around the world. A rights-based approach can fuel an 
important challenge to established paternalistic and punitive framings 
of Irish abortion law. At a political and symbolic level, the 8th 
Amendment subordinates everyone’s agency in pregnancy to a broader 
‘Irish’ position on the morality of abortion. 94 The state has argued 
before human rights bodies that the 8th Amendment ‘represents the 
profound moral choices of the Irish people’.95 Any new constitutional 
position on abortion that seeks to respect autonomy cannot enshrine, 
or enforce, a shared national position on the morality of abortion in 
all cases. Instead, the law must proceed from the position that ‘hard 
decisions’ around crisis pregnancy are ethical regardless of whether they 
lead to continuation or termination of a pregnancy. In the context of 
hard decisions, it is wrong that the Constitution as a supposed proxy 
for the ‘will’ of the Irish people takes the hard decision away from 
us.96 A rights-based approach seeks to return the symbolic balance of 
power to pregnant people. 
It is important, however, to be mindful of the limitations of a 
narrowly legalistic focus on autonomy-based rights in any campaign 
94 McAvoy, Sandra, ‘Vindicating Women’s Rights in a Foetocentric State: The 
Longest Irish Journey’, in Giffney, Noreen and Shildrick, Margrit (eds), Theory 
on the Edge, (2013, Palgrave Macmillan); Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Reproducing 
Irishness: Race, Gender and Abortion Law’ (2005) 17 Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law 365; Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Postcolonial Fragments: 
Representations of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics’ (2001) 28(4) Journal 
of Law and Society 568; Hanafin, Patrick, ‘Valorising the Virtual Citizen: 
The Sacrificial Grounds of Postcolonial Citizenship in Ireland’ (2003) 1 Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development, http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/03-1/
hanafin.html.
95 See, for example, Mellet v Ireland (note 9); A, B and C v Ireland (note 9).
96 See generally, Chang, Ruth ‘Hard Choices’ (2017) 92 APA Journal of 
Philosophy 586.
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for abortion law reform. There are two central points here. First, as 
we have noted already, judges cannot interpret these rights unless 
and until an appropriate case comes to court. That opportunity may 
depend on the emergence of a courageous individual or individuals 
willing to bare private injury and trauma in public, as constitutional 
litigants. Thus, the courts may not have the opportunity to hear an 
appropriate case for years; they may not have the opportunity to do so 
at all. Even if cases come to court, there is always the risk that litigants’ 
cases will be framed narrowly and strategically, and that the courts will 
respond conservatively, so that, for example, rights to access abortion in 
exceptional circumstances are upheld,97 while other areas of abortion 
law are left undeveloped. So, with abortion as with so many other 
areas of governance, much of the ordinary work of constitutional 
interpretation (and of anticipating how the courts might interpret the 
Constitution if they had the opportunity to do so) must take place 
within the legislative process and associated political discourse.
In Ireland, the legislature has historically been reluctant to respond 
to constitutional decisions on abortion law; recall that it took more 
than 20 years for the Oireachtas to legislate following the X case.98 
Therefore, the work that Irish pro-choice activists have been doing 
over decades in taking ownership of rights discourse, and helping 
to reconceive abortion access as a fundamental right, will continue, 
however the courts engage with abortion in the future.99 The struggle 
to build legislation that reflects emancipatory framings of that right, 
and translates them into concrete practice, will essentially be a political 
one. We need not make the courts the central focus of our discussion 
97 See Brown, Wendy, ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ (2000) 7(2) 
Constellations 208-229; Smart, Carol, Feminism and the Power of Law 
(1989, Routledge).
98 Attorney General v X (see note 19).
99 See further, West, Robin, ‘From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-
Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights’ (2009) 118 Yale Law Journal 1394; 
Brown, Wendy, ‘Reproductive Freedom and the Right to Privacy: A Paradox 




of abortion rights, and we do not need to wait for the courts to confer 
abortion rights on pregnant people. 
Second, as our discussion of constitutional law has shown, legal 
rights are blunt instruments. For example, through the rights to 
bodily integrity and privacy, the Constitution is now reasonably well 
equipped to protect a sphere of autonomy within which individuals 
can enjoy some freedom from state interference. Through the right to 
freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, it provides 
some protection from the worst forms of state-sanctioned violence. 
If the state acknowledged that pregnant people enjoyed these basic 
rights, Irish abortion law could be transformed. But that would not 
be the end of the story. The Constitution has been of much less use 
when individuals have sought positive assistance and support from the 
state, particularly in the form of the provision of social and economic 
resources that strengthen rights to freedom from state interference. 
These limitations are not only produced by the historic conservatism 
of the Irish judiciary; they are built into the traditional structure of 
liberal rights.100 We cannot do more than sketch this argument here, 
but it is an old and long-established one in feminist theory. 
Traditional rights discourse assumes robustly autonomous individuals 
who can navigate life’s difficulties for themselves if the state will only 
remove punishments and prohibitions. Rights of this kind tend to 
displace responsibility for supporting pregnancy, and for child rearing, 
onto individuals and families, disavowing the need for broader social 
supports. Recognition of legal ‘rights to choose’, in this limited form, is 
no guarantee of emancipation.101 Feminists committed to reproductive 
100 Menon, Nivedita, ‘The Impossibility of Justice: Female Foeticide and 
Feminist Discourse on Abortion’ (1995) 29(1-2) Contributions to Indian 
Sociology 370
101 Rebouché, Rachel, ‘Abortion Rights as Human Rights’ (2016) 25(6) Social 
& Legal Studies 765.
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justice102 have long argued that most of us require more than space to 
make meaningful reproductive decisions.103 
All people seeking abortions will benefit from supportive 
relationships of care with other people and with service providers, 
and some may need additional resources and assistance, especially 
those marginalised within the broader community because of age, 
disability, poverty, addiction, ethnicity, illness, sexuality or immigration 
status. The forms of service provision that are adequate for those of 
us who already enjoy a measure of power in the community may not 
be adequate for others. In the next chapter, therefore, we begin to set 
out a legislative and regulatory framework to give effect to abortion 
rights in Ireland, which moves beyond simply giving pregnant people 
space to fend for themselves, to providing enforceable guarantees of 
access to care.
102 Erdman, Joanna, ‘The Politics of Global Abortion Rights’ (2016) 22(2) 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 39; Erdman, Joanna, ‘Procedural Turn in 
Transnational Abortion Law’ (2010) 104 American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 377; Ngwena, Charles, ‘Conscientious Objection to 
Abortion and Accommodating Women’s Reproductive Health Rights: 
Reflections on a Decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia from 
an African Regional Human Rights Perspective’ (2014) 58(2) Journal of 
African Law 183; Zampas, Christina and Gher, Jaime, ‘Abortion as a Human 
Right – International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law 
Review 249.
103 See further, Cornell, Drucilla, ‘Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs’ 
in Brown, Wendy and Halley, Janet (eds) Introduction to Left Legalism/Left 




Accessing abortion care: principles for 
legislative design
Chapter 3 outlined possible routes to developing pregnant people’s 
constitutional rights in Ireland after removal of the 8th Amendment. 
This chapter sketches how those rights could be implemented in 
legislation. We explain why abortion-specific legislation would be 
needed even if the 8th Amendment were to be removed from the 
Constitution. The bulk of this chapter outlines the kind of legislation 
that should replace the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 
(PLDPA). The Citizens’ Assembly recommendations1 form the 
backbone for our proposed replacement, but we amend and adapt 
them where necessary to give better effect to the rights that we have 
set out in Chapter 3. We begin with discussion of legislative provisions 
that ensure access to abortion, before considering the circumstances 
in which the Assembly recommended that pregnant people should be 
able to access abortions in Ireland. We depart from the punitive and 
1 The Citizens’ Assembly, First Report and Recommendations of the Citizen’s 
Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (2017). 
61
stigmatising legal frameworks developed under the 8th Amendment, 
learning from other jurisdictions2 and from the failures of the PLDPA. 
Why legislate at all?
Achieving our goals requires a clean break with the PLDPA. Even if 
repeal were to be endorsed in a referendum, pregnant people’s ability 
to actually access abortion care would not be transformed on the day 
that the constitutional change became law. As we showed in Chapter 
3, it is quite possible that the PLDPA would be found unconstitutional 
following repeal of the 8th Amendment. It remains in place until and 
unless it is replaced or amended by the Oireachtas, or struck down 
by the courts in constitutional litigation. However, it will require 
replacement after repeal, and the sooner the better.
Readers may ask why it is not enough to remove all mention 
of abortion from the Constitution, repeal the PLDPA, and then 
decriminalise abortion and treat it like any other medical procedure3 
instead of legislating for it specifically. There is a real risk that, if 
the demands of the movement to repeal the 8th are translated into 
legislation, they may be co-opted and tamed, and old patterns of 
oppression may reappear in new legal clothing.4 Without diminishing 
that concern, we note that only one ‘developed’ country—Canada—
has no national abortion legislation. Its provinces have passed policies 
2 We rely here on the UN and World Health Organization Global Abortion 
Policy Database: http://srhr.org/abortion-policies/. A map of the world’s 
abortion laws is available at www.worldabortionlaws.com/. See also Center 
for Reproductive Rights, Compilation of Legal Provisions on Abortion in 




3 On Canada as a frequently-cited model for this approach see Fletcher, Ruth, 
‘Contextualising the Canadian Model: A Commentary’ (6 December 2016) 
www.repealeight.ie/title/.
4 Smart, Carol, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989, Routledge).
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at local level, but access to services remains uneven,5 despite very 
strong judge-made constitutional law on abortion.6 In Ireland, in the 
20 years between the X case,7 and the PLDPA, equivalent difficulties 
emerged; pregnant people entitled to access life-saving abortions 
could not do so.8 It is one thing for a constitution to say that the law 
on abortion has changed, but quite another to establish and defend 
abortion services in practice.9 
Reproductive rights activists understand that abortion is a private 
matter that, ideally, should be kept between a pregnant person and 
their doctor. They are rightly concerned that the legal processes 
contained within abortion legislation can become as much tools of 
control, stigmatisation and exclusion as a source of empowerment.10 
Nevertheless, we must be clear-eyed about what ‘between a pregnant 
person and their doctor’ means, especially given increased public 
awareness of established practices in maternity care that have silenced, 
harmed and marginalised many pregnant people in Ireland.11 
Restoring abortion to medical control may mean enhancing access, but 
at some cost to human rights. ‘Hard’ regulatory instruments, including 
legislation, are helpful tools in reorienting deep-seated cultures of 
practice in maternity and abortion care. 
5 Erdman, Joanna, ‘A Constitutional Future for Abortion Rights in Canada’ 
(2017) 54(3) Alberta Law Review 727. For a history of the development of 
Canadian abortion law see Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, The History 
of Abortion in Canada, March 2017 www.arcc-cdac.ca/postionpapers/60-
History-Abortion-Canada.pdf.
6 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30.
7 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.
8 See the discussion in Chapter 2.
9 See further Fletcher (note 3).
10 Sanger, Carol, About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in Twenty-First-
Century America, (2017, Harvard University Press) pp 22-23.
11 Midwives for Choice, Submission to United Nations Committee Against 
Torture (CAT) for Ireland’s Second Periodic Examination under the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (2017), p 5, available at http://midwivesforchoice.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/MfC-Submission-to-UN-CAT.pdf at p 5.
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Discussions on abortion law often begin by defining the 
circumstances in which pregnant people should be able to access 
abortion (the ‘grounds’ for access). This is where the Citizens’ Assembly 
began its work. 12 However, we want to suggest that our first concern 
should be with ensuring than any new abortion legislation actually 
meets the needs and fulfils the rights of pregnant people, while allowing 
space for best medical practice and clinical judgment. Liberal abortion 
law on paper does not always translate into effective abortion access 
in practice,13 and human rights bodies are clear that once abortion is 
12 The Citizens’ Assembly, First Report and Recommendations of the Citizen’s 
Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (2017), p 5 and p 38. 
The Assembly spent less time directly discussing the kinds of additional 
regulations that might be necessary to support meaningful access to abortion 
for pregnant people who came within those grounds. These are contained 
in the Assembly’s five ancillary recommendations: (i) Improvements should 
be made in sexual health and relationship education, including the areas 
of contraception and consent; (ii) All women should have improved access 
to reproductive healthcare services, including family planning services, 
contraception, perinatal hospice care and termination of pregnancy if 
required; (iii) All women should have access to the same standard of 
obstetrical care, including early scanning and testing, irrespective of 
geographical location or socio-economic position; (iv) Pregnant women, 
throughout the country, should have improved access counselling and 
support facilities both during pregnancy and after abortion; (v) Further 
consideration should be given as to who will fund and carry out termination 
of pregnancy in Ireland. Although the Assembly report tells us that ‘the 
greatest consensus’ arose around these five recommendations, it also notes 
two further recommendations that were raised by a several members: (i) 
decriminalisation of abortion, including the use of the abortion pill; and (ii) 
recognition of and protection of women’s reproductive rights and autonomy. 
13 Trueman, Karen and Magwentshu, Makgoale, ‘Abortion in a Progressive Legal 
Environment: The Need for Vigilance in Protecting and Promoting Access 
to Safe Abortion Services in South Africa’ (2013) 103(3) American Journal 
of Public Health 397; Berer, Marge ‘Abortion Law and Policy Around the 




legalised it must be accessible without discrimination.14 If a new Irish 
abortion law repeats old mistakes around access, pregnant people will 
remain exposed to old human rights abuses. 15 
Decisional security for pregnant people
As we set out at the end of Chapter 2, pregnant people are entitled 
to clearly defined abortion access procedures that support, rather than 
destablise, their efforts at self-determination.16 It is obviously very 
difficult to make meaningful healthcare decisions in an atmosphere 
of uncertainty. 
Information is key to decisional security.17 The right to access 
reliable healthcare information is a fundamental aspect of the right 
to health.18 Inadequate access to healthcare information may lead 
to delays that aggravate other human rights violations because they 
14 Tysiąc v Poland [2007] ECHR 219; A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 
13; UNCESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the ICESCR, 11 August 2000) 
E/C.12/2000/4; KL v Peru UNHRC, Communication No. 1153/2003 
(2005). [7]; LC v Peru, UNCEDAW, Communication No. 22/2009, CEDAW/
C/50/D/22/2009 (2011).
15 P and S v Poland, No. 57375/08 ECtHR [168] (2008); RR v Poland [2011] 
ECHR 828, [161]; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Ireland, [9], CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014); Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Ireland, A/55/40[VOL.I] (SUPP) (2000); CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Poland, E/C.12/POL/CO/5, 2 December 2009, 
[28]; See also, Report by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe, Following His Visit to Ireland from 22 to 25 
November 2016 (29 March 2017), [95].
16 Erdman, Joanna, ‘The Politics of Global Abortion Rights’ (2016) 22(2) 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 39.
17 Erdman, Joanna, ‘The global abortion policies database—legal knowledge 
as a health intervention’, 1 November 2017, The BMJ Opinion, http://blogs.
bmj.com/bmj/2017/11/01/joanna-erdman-the-global-abortion-policies-
database-legal-knowledge-as-a-health-intervention/.
18 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland [1992] ECHR 68, [72]; Roche 
v United Kingdom (2006) 42 EHRR 30 [155]; UN General Assembly, Report 
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inhibit access to needed treatment, and add to confusion and distress.19 
Although people in Ireland have a formal constitutional right to access 
information about abortion,20 that right is limited and conditioned 
by the 8th Amendment in highly problematic ways. Human rights 
bodies have repeatedly criticised Ireland’s Regulation of Information 
(Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancy) Act 1995 
(known as the Abortion Information Act) as an obstacle to accessible 
care.21 Under the Act, any information that ‘is likely to be required 
by a woman for the purposes of availing herself of services outside the 
State for the termination of pregnancies’22 and ‘services or … persons 
who provide them’23 is strictly controlled.24 These restrictions are 
matched by strict regulation of the information that can be provided 
by crisis pregnancy agencies,25 and even by the criminal prohibition 
of doctors referring patients for abortion care abroad, regardless of 
how complex a woman’s medical condition and care needs might be.26 
Doctors often feel that they cannot even send the person’s medical 
records to a practitioner in another country; the patient must get their 
of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, A/HRC/22/53 (2013)
19 RR v Poland and P and S v Poland (see note 15).
20 Article 40.3.3, as amended by the 13th Amendment (1992).
21 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Ireland (2014) (see 
note 15) [9]; CEDAW Concluding Observations: Ireland, (9 February 2017), 
[43(c)] CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7; CESCR Concluding Observations: Ireland, (22 
June 2015), [30], E.C.12/IRL/CO/3. Also see Duffy, Deirdre and Pierson, 
Claire, Submission to Citizens’ Assembly (2016), available at https://
mcrmetropolis.uk/blog/what-happens-when-women-have-to-travel-abortion-
care-and-lessons-from-ireland/.
22 Section 2(a), Abortion Information Act 1995.
23 Section 2(b), Abortion Information Act 1995.
24 Sections 3 and 4, Abortion Information Act 1995.
25 Section 5, Abortion Information Act 1995
26 Section 8, Abortion Information Act 1995
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own files (usually copied for them by their doctors)27 and send or take 
them to an abortion care provider abroad.28 
All of this means that when a pregnant person asks their doctor, for 
example, whether abortion would be in their best interests on medical 
grounds, the doctor cannot answer honestly according to her clinical 
judgement.29 A pregnant person who is sure that she wants an abortion 
must listen to information about other courses of action, even if her 
mind is made up. An information provider cannot always be sure about 
what constitutes promotion or advocacy and so may tend to err on 
the side of caution and not say anything that might be construed as 
breaching the Act. At the same time, rogue agencies, which routinely 
promote false information about the impacts of abortion on pregnant 
people’s health, are effectively unregulated.30 
Although restrictions on information are routinely subverted and 
abortion information is widely available, it is generally presented 
carefully to avoid any charge of advocating or promoting access 
to abortion care. While the internet has made such information 
accessible to most pregnant people in Ireland, those without a 
reliable internet connection, or those who are not in control of their 
internet connection or unable to browse without supervision (such as 
teenagers, people in abusive and controlling relationships, and those 
in prison or direct provision), are most affected by these restrictions. 
The restrictions create information vacuums for some, making ‘myth 
busting’ about abortion difficult. The 1995 Abortion Information 
Act has produced general ignorance about the reality of abortion 
27 See Brendan O’Shea, representing the Irish College of General Practitioners, 
presentation to the Citizens’ Assembly, 26 November 2016.
28 Gerry Edwards, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
of the Constitution, 25 October 2017. See also Veronica O’Keane, evidence 
to the Joint Committee to the Constitution, 25 October 2017. 
29 See further the submission of Doctors for Choice to the Citizens’ Assembly 
(2016) at www.repealeight.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Doctors-for-
Choice.pdf.
30 Coyle,Ellen, ‘Harris promises action on bogus agencies’, The Times (6 April 
2017) 
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care, with an associated impact on pregnant people’s ability to make 
decisions about a procedure that they may not fully understand or be 
familiar with. 
In order to vindicate human rights in pregnancy after repeal of the 
8th Amendment, the state must safeguard pregnant people’s access 
to non-directive, non-judgmental provision of medically accurate 
information.31 This likely means funding independent counselling 
and advice services, including dedicated services for vulnerable groups 
and persons, as well as training medical staff to offer appropriate 
information. It means controlling partisan crisis pregnancy services 
and misleading graphic public protests, since these can also inhibit 
women’s ability to access unbiased, accurate information. Finally, it 
means funding sexual and reproductive health education in schools 
and communities, so that pregnant people are equipped to navigate 
conflicting sources of information.
Once a woman has decided to access abortion care, she needs to 
be able to rely on timely decision making by her physician. Delay in 
decisions about whether a woman may access lawful abortion may 
be caused by deliberate procrastination, poorly resourced services, 
or decision-making processes that do not allocate responsibilities 
appropriately. A statutory obligation to make decisions on ‘qualification’ 
in a timely manner can go some way towards addressing this issue.32 
This requirement should also ensure that once a pregnant person has 
received confirmation that she is (or is not) entitled to a lawful abortion, 
she can take some time to decide what to do, should she wish to. This 
is an important entitlement, especially where the opportunity to access 
an abortion for a particular reason is time-limited. 
31 WHO (2012) Safe abortion: technical and policy guidance for health systems, 
pp 36 and 97. 
32 There is no such requirement in the PLDPA 2013, although medics are 
required to ‘have regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far 
as practicable’; sections 7(1)(a)(ii), 8(1)(b), 9(1)(a)(ii), PLDPA 2013.
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Decisional security also requires physical security in locations 
where women may make their final decision about whether or not 
to access abortion care: surgeries, clinics, hospitals and counselling 
facilities. Protest actions at these locations sometimes take the form 
of silent vigils, but on other occasions are aggressive and intimidating. 
Commonly deployed tactics include calling the pregnant person 
‘Mum’ as she passes, asking her whether she loves her baby, showing 
photographs of stillbirths presented as abortions, videotaping, offering 
free foetal heartbeat scans and masquerading as crisis pregnancy 
agencies, as well as outright abuse and aggression.33 These tactics are 
deliberately designed to make it extremely difficult for a pregnant 
person to physically access abortion care, and to force her to rethink and 
question her decision without the provision of effective counselling and 
the support, accurate information and medical care that would enable 
her to rethink, take time, change her mind, or leave and return as she 
so wishes. That motivation distinguishes intimidation from care. The 
right to protest abortion law, or indeed any law, is not absolute.34 In 
some jurisdictions, ‘buffer zones’ have been created near places where 
abortion care is provided to prohibit protest and intimidation within a 
certain physical distance, usually around 100 metres.35 Such a scheme 
strikes a fair balance between the right of people opposed to abortion 
to exercise their speech and to assemble, and the right of the pregnant 
person to access abortion care without intimidation or distress.36 
33 See, for example, The Back Off Campaign back-off.org.
34 Van Den Dungen v the Netherlands, App. No. 22838.93, 80 Eur. Comm’n 
HR Dec. & Rep. 147, § 2 (1995). 
35 For example in Canada, British Columbia has a fixed buffer zone of 160 
metre around the abortion clinic provider (section 6(3), Access to Abortion 
Services Act 1995). Section 10(1) South Africa Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act prohibits obstructing of abortion facilities and imposes 10 
years of imprisonment penalty. 
36 The European Court of Human Rights has upheld states’ ability to impose 
geographical restrictions on protest; Ziliberberg v Moldova (App 61821/00) 
Inadmissible, 4 May 2004. See also Annen v Germany App No 3690/10, 26. 
November 2015 dissenting judgments of Judges Yudkivska and Jäderblom. 
Annen is a judgment about defamation of doctors working in abortion clinics 
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Decisional security for pregnant people thus requires information, 
timely decision making about one’s right to access lawful abortion care, 
and the physical security to make a decision without undue influence 
in locations where abortion care is provided. After repeal of the 8th 
Amendment, it is no longer the law’s function to direct people away 
from accessing abortion care. Rather, the law’s function is to enable 
people to make their own decisions about whether abortion is the right 
choice for them. This is the norm in medical law; the law should create 
the conditions for informed consent to medical treatment. For decades, 
doctors in Ireland have been constructed as the gatekeepers of access to 
very limited lawful abortion. Completing the shift to empowering and 
facilitating pregnant people to access abortion will require a wholesale 
reconceptalisation of the doctor–patient relationship under law.37
Rethinking the doctor–patient relationship: addressing stigma
Irish abortion law stigmatises the very procedure it is designed to 
regulate, those who seek to access it, and those medics who provide 
it. Stigma begins with legislative language. As with much Irish 
legislation,38 the PLDPA does not use the word ‘abortion’. Instead, 
rather than about buffer zones, and did not consider the harm such protest 
can cause to pregnant people.
37 In developing a non-hierarchical approach to abortion care which places 
pregnant people at the centre, we have a great deal to learn from the 
activist practices of care that have been improvised in the shadow of the 
8th Amendment; for example, supplying and supporting use of the abortion 
pill, or providing information and material assistance to pregnant people 
in travelling for abortions. Rebouché, Rachel, ‘The Limits of Reproductive 
Rights in Women’s Health’ (2011) 63(1) Alabama Law Review 1; Rossiter, 
Ann, Ireland’s Hidden Diaspora: The ‘Abortion Trail’ and the Making of a 
London-Irish Underground, 1980-2000 (2009: IASC Publishing); Fletcher 
, Ruth, ‘Negotiating Strangeness on the Abortion Trail’ in Rosie Harding et 
al (eds), ReValuing Care in Theory, Law, and Policy: Cycles and Connections 
(2017, Routledge).
38 For use of the term see section 7 Censorship of Publications Act 1946; 
section 10, Health (Family Planning) Act 1979; SI No. 272/2008 European 
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it speaks about the ‘termination of pregnancy’, which, in Ireland, has 
been interpreted to mean all forms of bringing a pregnancy to an end, 
including by delivering a baby.39 A first step towards destigmatising 
abortion in Irish law would be to use the word ‘abortion’ openly in 
our laws. Similarly, repeal of the 8th Amendment must be accompanied 
by a move away from using the current constitutional term ‘unborn 
child’ in law, and towards medical terminology (such as foetus or 
neonate) that avoids creating subliminal analogies between abortion 
and the killing of a born human being.40 Changing our legislative 
language would help to normalise abortion within both legal and 
medical contexts and enable open, effective conversations about 
medical options and what might be the right course of action for 
the pregnant person. If decisional security relies on information, so 
too does it rely on honest and non-directive conversations within a 
balanced doctor–patient relationship. Language is more than merely 
symbolic; it is affective. It matters, and the linguistic choices we make 
mater for the stigmatisation of abortion care.
However, language alone is not enough to rethink the relationship 
between doctor and patient in the context of abortion care. Stigma 
also persists as power imbalances in the structures of abortion law. Law 
can subordinate pregnant people’s decision making to exceptional 
certification and verification processes that make medical personnel, 
and particularly doctors, gatekeepers of pregnant people’s ethical 
decision making. When a pregnant woman has to ‘qualify’ for abortion 
care, she is made an exception to the normal operations of medical 
practice; marked as someone who cannot be trusted to make weighty 
decisions about their own medical care for themselves, someone 
Communities (Classification, Packaging, Labelling and Notification of 
Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2008; SI No 50/2016-Notification 
and Control of Diseases affecting Terrestrial Animals Regulations 2016. 
39 Department of Health, ‘Implementation of the Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act 2013 – Guidance Document for Health Professionals’ (19 
September 2014).
40 See generally Greasley, Kate, Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, 
Morality and Law (2017, Oxford University Press).
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whose decisions must be overseen and, often, overridden.41 This is 
important: having to justify personal reproductive choices may cause 
distress that exacerbates other human rights violations,42 and may 
deter people from seeking abortion care even when lawfully entitled 
to access abortion. Stigma may also have distancing effects on those 
applying legislation; intimate, ethical, clinical and personal decisions 
become unfeeling and legalistic, and appropriate care takes second 
place to the strictures of formal law. Rights-based abortion law should 
avoid unduly burdensome access procedures43 and afford a wide zone 
of trust and discretion within the doctor–patient relationship. Ideally, 
doctors provide care; they do not police reproductive decision making. 
Abortion law needs to recognise and ensure this.
This goes further than ensuring that medics facilitate abortion 
decision making, rather than gatekeeping abortion care. It also requires 
sensible and practical regulation of methods by which abortions are 
obtained. Ordinarily, we recognise that medical treatment is often self-
administered, following consultation with a qualified practitioner, and 
that the severity and complexity of a patient’s symptoms, history and 
required treatment should determine where and how they are treated. 
Irish abortion law currently only permits abortion care to be provided 
in the 25 hospitals listed in Schedule to the PLDPA. These hospitals 
are chosen for their expertise in maternity care,44 or in intensive and 
critical care.45 Under the 8th Amendment, this restriction makes sense 
because abortion is only legal in complex, life-threatening situations. 
However, if abortions are provided in a wider range of circumstances, 
they must also be available in a wider range of settings. Sometimes 
41 For example Sanger, Carol (see note 10); Marzilli, Alan, Fetal Rights (2005, 
Chelsea House Publishers) pp 101-102
42 Mellet v Ireland, Human Rights Committee, Communication no. 2324/2013 
(2016), [7.4].
43 World Health Organization, World Health Organization, Department of 
Reproductive Health and Research, Safe abortion: technical and policy 
guidance for health systems page 94 (2013).
44 Section 3(1)(a), PLDPA 2013.
45 Section 3(1)(b), PLDPA 2013.
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abortions need to take place in hospitals—for example, in cases of foetal 
anomaly where the pregnancy is terminated by inducing labour.46 
But hospital services are not usually needed where an abortion takes 
place earlier in pregnancy.47 An early surgical abortion can usually 
be performed up to 24 weeks of pregnancy. Before 12-14 weeks, the 
pregnancy is removed by vacuum aspiration, which takes five to 10 
minutes, with a very short recovery time. There are few risks, and 
before 15 weeks a general anaesthetic is not usually required. After 
12-14 weeks, dilation and evacuation will usually be used instead of 
vacuum aspiration. Again, this is a minor operation. It takes 10-20 
minutes, with one to two hours of recovery and observation time. A 
general anaesthetic will usually be offered. Both of these procedures 
will be familiar to Irish women who have travelled abroad for abortions. 
Both could be provided in specialist clinics in Ireland in the future,48 
by appropriately trained midwives as well as by doctors.49
Under the current law, many women in Ireland, in common 
with women all over the world, have used the pills misoprostol and 
mifepristone to induce medical abortions at home, although they 
46 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Termination of Pregnancy 
for Fatal Feotal Abnormality in England, Scotland and Wales: Report of a 
Working Party (May 2010).
47 World Health Organization, Department of Reproductive Health and 
Research, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems 
(see note 43), 15.
48 At present, organisations offering abortion care services in other jurisdictions 
can be prevented from setting up clinics in Ireland, and from exporting 
abortion pills to Ireland, in accordance with the 8th Amendment. If the 
Amendment is removed from the Constitution, however, provisions of EU 
law on cross-border service provision may come back into force, potentially 
entitling foreign providers based elsewhere in the EU to establish services 
in Ireland. See, by analogy, Hervey, Tamara and Sheldon, Sally, ‘Abortion 
by Telemedicine in Northern Ireland: Patient and Professional Rights across 
Borders’ (2017) 68(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 1.
49 Sheldon, Sally and Fletcher, Joanne, ‘Vacuum aspiration for induced abortion 
could be safely performed by nurses and midwives’ (2017) Journal of Family 
Planning and Reproductive Health Care 1; see, for example, sections 1(x), 
4-6, 10 of South Africa Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996.
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are not licensed for this purpose in Ireland. After repeal of the 8th 
Amendment, the state should ensure that these medicines are made 
available in Ireland, and that all existing restrictions are lifted. These 
pills are appropriate for use up to 12-14 weeks and the risks of use, 
especially under medical supervision, are very low.50 Organisations 
like Women on Web,51 Women Help Women52 and Need Abortion 
Ireland53 currently assist pregnant people in ordering, importing 
and using these pills in Ireland.54 Medical support takes the form of 
‘telemedicine’, that is, online and phone-based consultation with a 
trained volunteer or medical practitioner.55 Use of the pills is, of course, 
criminalised under existing law.56 However, people will expect to be 
able to continue to access abortion pills outside of a clinical setting even 
if Irish abortion legislation changes, and many will appreciate being 
able to do so locally and privately, with access to a medical examination, 
advice and aftercare. If abortion is to be legally available without 
restriction within early pregnancy, there is no reason why a person who 
is less than nine weeks pregnant57 and in good physical health should 
not be able to access these pills with a doctor’s prescription and take 
them at home. This approach is taken in other jurisdictions.58 It may 
50 World Health Organization (see note 43). 
51 Women on Web, www.womenonweb.org.
52 Women Help Women, https://womenhelp.org.
53 Need Abortion Ireland https://needabortionireland.org.
54 Sheldon, Sally, ‘How Can a State Control Swallowing? The Home Use of 
Abortion Pills in Ireland’ (2016) 24 Reproductive Health Matters, 90-101; 
Aiken, Abigail et al, ‘Experiences and characteristics of women seeking 
and completing at-home medical termination of pregnancy through online 
telemedicine in Ireland and Northern Ireland: a population-based analysis’ 
(2017) 124(8) British Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology 1208.
55 Hervey, Tamara and Sheldon, Sally (see note 51). 
56 Section 22, PLDPA 2013.
57 World Health Organization, (see note 43), 12.
58 In Scotland, pregnant people can take the first of two pills (mifepristone) 
under medical supervision, returning home to take the second (misoprostol) 
(Witw Staff, ‘Scotland will allow women to take abortion pill at home’, New 
York Times, 30 October 2017); In Canada, doctors are not required to watch 
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also help people in very precarious situations—for example, those in 
abusive relationships or those in prison or direct provision—to access 
abortion care safely and in a timely fashion. 
Addressing stigma within abortion care requires us to take practical 
steps to regularise the relationship between doctor and patient in the 
context of abortion. This is especially important if, as is often the case, 
medical practitioners are also going to have a role in deciding whether 
and when someone can access lawful abortion under a new legislative 
scheme. It is essential that doctors are confident in their interpretation 
and application of any new abortion law, but it is also crucial that 
they (or their legal advisers) do not adopt needlessly cautious, narrow 
or adversarial, interpretations of any abortion legislation. On a 
rights-based approach, abortion legislation should not be interpreted 
restrictively with the intention of confining access to those who truly 
‘deserve’ it. At a minimum, new legislation must be accompanied by 
guidance (ideally published before the legislation comes into force)59 
and integrated into medical practice through rights-based training.60 
the pregnant person swallow either tablet (Stephanie Taylor, Doctor calls 
for stop of ‘demeaning’ practice of watching women swallow Mifegymiso 
‘abortion pill’, CBC News, 11 August 2017).
59 The guidance on implementation of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy 
Act 2013 (Department of Health, ‘Implementation of the Protection of Life 
During Pregnancy Act 2013 – Guidance Document for Health Professionals’ 
(19 September 2014) took months to be published and, once made 
available, was conservative, cautious, and not centered on the rights and 
autonomy of pregnant persons. 
60 Training in rights-based approaches to medical care has systematically 
been provided in some parts of Latin America to ensure that narrowly 
drawn access to lawful abortion is interpreted in the most rights-compliant 
manner possible. On this, see, for example, Clyde, Jessie Abortion Laws 
Liberalizing in Latin America, But Implementation is Slow, International 
Women’s Health Coalition, 25 September 2017, available at https://iwhc.
org/2017/09/abortion-laws-liberalizing-latin-america-implementation-slow/. 
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Rethinking the doctor–patient relationship: recognising reproductive 
agency
Any new abortion legislation must ensure that doctors and other 
medical professionals are perceived, and perceive themselves, not 
as gatekeepers to abortion services, but as assistants to the pregnant 
person making an abortion decision. In order to ensure that the law 
operates in rights-based way, centring the agency of the pregnant 
person, interpretation that focuses on reducing the harm of abortion 
law processes is vital. There are some important steps to achieving this.
First, and consistent with respect for individual privacy, a pregnant 
person should not be required to disclose her case to multiple doctors. 
Human rights bodies have criticised states, including Ireland, that 
require women to receive authorisation from multiple providers before 
they can access an abortion.61 While doctors may need to consult 
with one another on the appropriateness of treatment in a particular 
case, at most one doctor should be required to certify a pregnant 
person’s entitlement to access abortion care. Furthermore, there is no 
reason why the person certifying entitlement to access an abortion 
should be a consultant in every case. In circumstances where GPs and 
midwives are qualified to provide abortion care,62 such practitioners 
should also be empowered to certify a pregnant person’s entitlement 
to access an abortion. 
Second, the law must support participatory decision making around 
abortion. The PLDPA does not require a pregnant person’s views to 
be taken into account when determining the extent and nature of 
61 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations: Ireland (see note 15); 
Report by Nils Muižnieks (see note 15) 77.
62 See, for example, sections 1(x), 4-6, 10 of South Africa Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996, and the Swedish Abortion Act 1974. 
For a broad overview see Berer, Marge, ‘Provision of abortion by mid-level 
providers: international policy, practice and perspectives’ (2009) 87(1) 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 58.
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a risk to her life.63 Any new abortion legislation must ensure that 
the pregnant person has a ‘voice’ in the decision-making process, 
just as in any other area of medical care. Those providing abortion 
care must be required, not only to diagnose any relevant medical 
condition, but also to take account of how the pregnant person 
perceives her own health and circumstances, and their impact on 
her capacity to continue the pregnancy. Medical practitioners may 
certify ‘qualification’ for abortion care, but pregnant people must 
have real agency in determining whether to continue with pregnancy. 
This is a necessary step in attempting to recalibrate the silencing and 
disempowering experiences and structures of obstetric care generally 
(which we considered in Chapter 1).
Third, a pregnant person who asks for an abortion should not 
be subjected to procedures designed to test her commitment to 
terminating the pregnancy. In some jurisdictions, pregnant people are 
required to undertake procedures such as foetal heartbeat scans, getting 
the consent of third parties,64 undertaking mandatory counselling, 
or waiting for mandatory periods before they can have an abortion 
for which they are legally ‘qualified’. While such provisions may 
seem innocuous, parts of the anti-abortion movement are committed 
to their proliferation in abortion laws around the world in order to 
make abortion effectively inaccessible even where it is lawful.65 Many 
European countries require pregnant people to undergo a period of 
reflection or counselling,66 but these requirements open up risks of 
63 Peter Boylan, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 18 October 2017: ‘while we can describe risk as low, 
middle and high, it is the woman’s interpretation of what the risk is to her 
personally that is critically important in how we deal with women who are 
pregnant, and that side of it really has to be taken into account’.
64 Among countries in the Council of Europe, only Turkey requires a married 
woman to obtain her husband’s consent.
65 McGuinness, Sheelagh, ‘A Guerilla Strategy for a Pro-Life England’ (2015) 
7(2) Journal of Information Law and Technology 283.
66 Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy Luxembourg, Slovakia. For an overview 
see Center for Reproductive Rights (note 2).
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pregnant people being subjected to biased, inaccurate or directive 
counselling that is intended to undermine their decision making, 
rather than to respect and empower them in whatever decision they 
come to.67 Such requirements may also generate delays in accessing 
treatment. Finally, law does not impose such requirements on patients 
in other complex and challenging medical contexts, so neither should 
they be imposed in the context of abortion care. 
The best way to help pregnant people to make hard choices about 
whether to continue with pregnancy is to ensure that adequate and 
accurate abortion information is available, that counselling and advice 
is available where sought and that medical practitioners can give honest 
and ethical answers based on clinical judgment when patients ask for 
their opinion. In other words, rather than try to reduce or prevent 
abortion rates through imposing ‘cooling-off’ processes and time 
periods, the state should recognise that abortion decisions are ethical, 
made following careful thought, and to be respected. The preservation 
of foetal life is best achieved through reproductive justice, not through 
reproductive coercion.
Conscientious objection and the refusal of abortion care 
Conscientious objection refers to a medical practitioner’s right to 
refuse to participate in medical care where they hold a moral or 
religious objection to doing so. It poses a particular challenge to 
the equalisation of the doctor–patient relationship in the context of 
abortion care because it allows medical personnel to deny medical 
treatment to patients for non-therapeutic reasons.68 Although 
doctors are entitled to respect for their genuinely held beliefs about 
67 Hoctor, Leah and Lamackova, Adriana, ‘Mandatory Waiting Periods and 
Biased Abortion Counseling in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2017) 139 
International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics 253.
68 Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Conscientious Objection, Harm Reduction and Abortion Care’ 
in Donnelly, Mary and Murray, Claire (eds), Ethical, Legal Ethical and Legal 




abortion, accommodating conscientious objection should not impinge 
on pregnant people’s rights to access care, or lead to harmful and 
unjustified delays or obstruction in individual cases.69 
The PLDPA provides for a right to conscientious objection for 
doctors, nurses and midwives carrying out or assisting in carrying 
out abortions except in emergency situations.70 Only those directly 
involved in performing or authorising the procedure can invoke 
conscientious objection. Those providing ancillary nursing care, or 
those working in hospital administration cannot do so.71 The PLDPA 
requires that a patient refused care for reasons of conscientious objection 
be promptly referred to a doctor who is willing to provide treatment.72 
This obligation should be maintained in any new legislation.
State-funded religious hospitals should not be permitted to refuse 
to provide legal abortion care on their premises purely on the basis 
of religious ethos. In Ireland so many hospitals and other medical 
centres operate under a religious ethos that institutional bans on 
abortion care could be very harmful. It is true that the Constitution, 
under Article 44.2.5, protects religious freedom and ‘denominational 
autonomy’. However, the provision of state-funded healthcare, unlike, 
for example, the development of canon law, or the celebration of 
religious marriage ceremonies, is not a purely religious function. In 
this domain, where even pregnant people who share the religion of a 
hospital’s board members are patients as well as ‘parishioners’, it should 
not be assumed that the professed ethos of the institution trumps their 
rights to health, bodily integrity and freedom from inhuman and 
degrading treatment, or that it outweighs the consciences of pregnant 
69 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Argentina, (2 December 2011) 
[22], E/C.12/ARG/CO/3; UNCEDAW, Concluding Observations: Hungary, 
(1 March 2013) [31(d)], CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8; UN CEDAW, ‘General 
Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health) 
(1999) A/54/38/Rev.1 [11]; See also, Nils Muižnieks,(note 15), 95.
70 Section 17, PLDPA 2013.
71 See further Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Anor (Scotland) 
[2014] UKSC 68.
72 Section 17 (3), PLDPA 2013.
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people and the consciences of the staff willing to care for them.73 
Moreover, the general position under international human rights law 
is that institutions, unlike individuals, do not have consciences that 
can be protected by the individual right to freedom of conscience.74 
Individuals’ religious freedom and freedom of conscience are adequately 
protected by allowing for an individual right of conscientious objection 
that can be exercised, or not, by medical professionals on their own 
terms.
Mass conscientious objection reduces the numbers of medical 
professionals providing abortion care, leading to ‘burnout’. It may 
also discourage medical professionals who would otherwise willingly 
provide abortion care from doing so.75 The state must ensure that 
individual rights are properly vindicated within institutions under its 
control.76 It must take steps to ensure the availability of sufficient 
doctors willing and trained to provide abortion care in all hospitals 
and in all regions.77 Part of this process might include conducting 
a ‘census’, at regional level, requiring medical professionals who 
hold conscientious objections in advance of implementation of 
73 See Doctors for Choice (note 29) arguing that ‘The 8th Amendment forced 
unprofessional, unethical practice upon Irish doctors who wish to provide 
compassionate, evidence-based care to Irish women’.
74 See CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Hungary, (note 69) [31(d)] U.N. 
Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8; see also the Colombian Constitutional Court 
in Sentencia T-388/09. Under ECHR law it is established that corporate 
persons do not enjoy individual rights such as freedom of conscience or 
freedom of expression; Company X v Switzerland (1979) 16 DR 85; Verein 
Kontakt-Information-Therapie v Austria (1988) 57 DR 81. Contrast Burwell, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services et al v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc et 
al. 573 US__ (2014).
75 See further Fletcher, Ruth (note 68).
76 See O’Keeffe v Ireland [2014] ECHR 96.
77 In International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network v Italy, 
Complaint No. 87/2012, Decision of the European Committee of Social 
Rights of 10 September 2013 the Committee found violations of the right 
to health in circumstances where such high numbers of doctors (almost 
70% nationally) were asserting the right to conscientious objection that 
abortion was effectively inaccessible in large parts of Italy. 
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new abortion law to declare them to their employers, as is done, 
for example, in Portugal.78 Registering conscientious objection in 
this way would allow advance planning of service provision. If the 
abortion law changes substantially, many medical professionals will find 
themselves facing new, and perhaps personally distressing, challenges 
to their consciences for the first time. Training during this period of 
transition must include an exploration of medical, ethical and human 
rights perspectives on abortion as well as instruction in best practice 
in abortion care.
As far as possible, people seeking abortions should be entitled 
to know in advance when a medical practitioner is likely to refuse 
them access to abortion care on grounds of conscientious objection, 
so that they can decide not to approach that practitioner in the first 
instance and thus avoid running the risk of potential distress. Medical 
practices, together with pharmacies where abortion medication might 
be dispensed on prescription, should be obliged to inform pregnant 
people in advance if they do not provide abortion care, or are unwilling 
to provide advice on abortion access. This could be done by way of 
clear, brief, waiting-room notices, as well as notices in any routinely 
distributed materials advertising abortion services, such as practice 
newsletters or community healthcare leaflets.79 We suggest that this 
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the practitioner’s 
right of freedom of conscience and the pregnant person’s right to 
access abortion care. 
Equal access to abortion care
As noted in Chapter 3, access to abortion is fundamentally about 
equality, not only between men and women but also between pregnant 
78 Law n. 16/2007, of April 17, on the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy. 
Portugal.
79 See further General Medical Council, ‘Conscientious Objection’, www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/21177.asp.
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people of different gender identity,80 age, socioeconomic means, 
ethnic and racial background, disability, immigration81 or other status. 
This requires a legislative commitment to non-discrimination in the 
provision of abortion care, paying particular attention to situations 
where stereotyping, paternalism or safeguarding requirements might 
inadvertently impede access to abortion care. It may also require 
development of specialised care pathways for pregnant people who 
may need additional support to exercise their rights to access abortion 
care, such as those pregnant through rape, or people with intellectual 
disabilities or mental health difficulties that affect their decision-
making capacity. A radical rethinking of our approach to capacity 
is essential. As we have already discussed, Irish law assumes that, in 
some cases, pregnant people should not have the ordinary power to 
make medical decisions for themselves. In other jurisdictions, where 
there is no equivalent to the 8th Amendment, courts have suggested 
that pregnancy, by itself, undermines women’s decision-making 
capacity. These issues are compounded where the pregnant person 
is mentally ill or has an intellectual disability; in particular because 
institutions, families and carers may be reluctant to support their self-
determination.82 
It will also most likely be necessary for the state to fund the services 
required to ensure safe pregnancy, including abortion services where 
80 Under the Gender Recognition Act 2015 a person assigned a female gender 
at birth can be legally recognised as a man without the need for any surgical 
intervention, and trans* or non-binary people have the biological capacity 
for pregnancy.
81 See IFPA, Submission to the Working Group on the Protection Process (2015) 
www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/documents/submissions/ifpa_submission_to_
direct_provision_wg_march_2015.pdf.
82 The key sections of the Assisted Decision-making (Capacity) Act 2015 
have not yet been commenced. At present, a clinician may act in the ‘best 
interests’ of a person found to lack capacity. Once the 2015 Act is fully in 
force, persons lacking capacity must be facilitated to participate as fully as 




necessary,83 and the Minister for Heath has already indicated that in 
his view abortion services should be publicly funded.84 
Regulating access to abortion for children requires a delicate 
balancing of child safeguarding and respect for the privacy and 
autonomy of younger people. We counsel against making parental 
consent a condition of abortion access for minors. The ordinary 
requirements relating to consent for minors should be followed,85 and 
the usual approach to child safeguarding used to intervene where the 
younger person is vulnerable or where pregnancy may have arisen 
from an abusive or exploitative relationship. A practitioner cannot 
guarantee absolute confidentiality to a patient who is under 16.86 If the 
practitioner believes that the pregnancy might have arisen from harmful 
conduct, such as sexual abuse, there is a statutory obligation to report 
it.87 In particular, where a child is under 15, all sexual intercourse is 
83 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1607, [2] 
and [7]; UNCRC, General Comment No.15 on the right of the child to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (art.24) (17 April 
2013) [56] CRC/C/GC/15; O’Regan, Ellish, O’Keeffe, Alan and MacQuinn, 
Cormac, ‘The State will fund abortions if people vote for change – Harris’, 
The Independent, 10 November 2017.
84 O’Regan, Ellish, O’Keeffe, Alan and MacQuinn, Cormac, ‘The State will 
fund abortions if people vote for change – Harris’, The Independent, 10 
November 2017.
85 Sanger, Carol (see note 10). In Ireland this requires that consent be sought 
from a child between the ages of 16 and 18 (section 23, Non-Fatal Offences 
against the Person Act 1997), although there is less legislative clarity on 
children under 16. For patients under 16 the Medical Council recommends 
that consent usually be sought from parents, although ‘[i] n exceptional 
circumstances, a patient under 16 might seek to make a healthcare decision 
on their own without the knowledge or consent of their parents. In such 
cases [a doctor] should encourage the patient to involve their parents in 
the decision, bearing in mind [the] paramount responsibility to act in the 
patient’s best interests’ Medical Council, Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners, 7th Edition, (2009), 43.4-43.5.
86 Section 28(6), Freedom of Information Act 1997.
87 Section 14, Children First Act 2015.
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unlawful,88 so that a mandatory reporting obligation arguably always 
arises when a minor under 15 presents seeking abortion care. Ensuring 
equal access to abortion care for minors may require recalibrating 
child-safeguarding requirements. A balance must be struck between 
safeguarding children from abusive, exploitative and harmful sexual 
activity, and ensuring that children can access reproductive healthcare 
when they need it without being afraid that this will inevitably lead to 
disclosure of their sexual activity to their parents in a manner and at a 
time that they cannot control and when they are, in any case, likely to 
be under extreme personal pressure. Otherwise, there is a real risk that 
younger people will avoid engagement with medical practitioners and 
instead try to deal with their crisis pregnancies alone, perhaps using 
unsafe methods, or delay engagement with a medic for so long that 
by the time they seek abortion care their pregnancy has passed a time 
limit and the law no longer allows them to access it.
Decriminalisation 
Decriminalisation of abortion is central to rights-based abortion law 
reform. Under the PLDPA, it is a criminal offence to procure an 
abortion for oneself, or to assist a pregnant person in terminating the 
pregnancy, outside of the limited grounds for lawful abortion outlined 
in the Act.89 The Abortion Information Act 1995 also criminalises 
the distribution of information essential to accessing an abortion in 
certain circumstances.90 
Although best practice increasingly seeks to regulate abortion 
in ordinary healthcare legislation, Ireland is far from unique in 
criminalising abortions.91 It is the restrictiveness of Irish law—its failure 
to make significant exceptions to blanket criminalisation—that sets 
88 Section 2, Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006 as amended by section 
16, Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017.
89 Section 22, PLDPA 2013.
90 Section 4, Abortion Information Act 1995.
91 See ‘Worldwide Abortion Regulations, Identified policy and legal sources 
related to abortion’, Erdman, Joanna, ‘The global abortion policies 
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it apart from other jurisdictions.92 As in many other former parts of 
the British Empire, abortion law in Ireland is a colonial inheritance.93 
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 criminalised abortion,94 
and the courts95 and legislatures96 of many former colonies that 
formerly shared that Act continue to be influenced by it. In some 
jurisdictions, defences to the crime have been acknowledged,97 and 
in others (for example, Canada and parts of Australia) abortion has 
been decriminalised altogether.98 The jurisdictions of the UK continue 
to criminalise abortion, aside from in the exceptional circumstances 
laid down in the Abortion Act 1967, although both politicians99 and 
medics100 have called for its decriminalisation. Although the current 
database—legal knowledge as a health intervention’, 1 November 2017, The 
BMJ Opinion, available at http://sandpit.bmj.com/graphics/2017/abort-pol/.
92 See, for example, Cook, Rebecca and Dickens, Bernard, ‘Abortion Laws in 
African Commonwealth Countries’ (1981) 25(2) Journal of African Law 60.
93 In civil law countries, prohibition of abortion is often based on the French 
Napoleonic code.
94 For the history of the Act see Sheldon, Sally, ‘The Decriminalisation of 
Abortion: an Argument for Modernisation’ (2016) 36(2) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 334.
95 The judgment in R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 has been an important 
influence in the partial liberalisation of abortion law in other common law 
countries, but was never followed in Ireland. See further Cook, Rebecca 
and Dickens, Bernard, ‘Abortion Laws in African Commonwealth Countries’ 
(1981) 25(2) Journal of African Law, 60-79.
96 Some countries, for example Nigeria retained the Act’s restrictions after 
independence. Cook, Rebecca and Dickens, Bernard (see note 92).
97 For examples see Botswana (Penal Code of Botswana 1964), Ghana (Criminal 
Code 1960), St Vincent and the Grenadines (Criminal Code in 1988), 
Barbados (Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1983), India (Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971), Israel (Penal Code 1977 updated in 
2014) and most recently Sierra Leone the Safe Abortion Act 2015. 
98 See, for example, The Canada Health Act 1984. Abortion is still a criminal 
offence in New South Wales and Norfolk Island and Queensland in Australia.
99 See the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Bill 2017.
100 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, The Care of Women 
Requesting Induced Abortion: Evidence-based Clinical Guideline Number 
7 (2011, RCOG).
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criminal penalties under the PLDPA are disproportionately high, it is 
not enough under international human rights law to reduce criminal 
sanctions. Instead, abortion must be completely decriminalised.101 
Criminalisation can mean that pregnant people who use abortion 
pills, and the friends, family, medical professionals and activists who 
assist them, risk prosecution. In England, criminal law on abortion 
has also been used by anti-abortion activists as the basis for ‘sting’ 
operations, designed to ‘expose’ misuse of the abortion law.102 In 
Northern Ireland, people have recently been prosecuted for illegal 
supply of relevant medicines to a pregnant person, for purchasing 
medicines on behalf of a pregnant person, and for inducing an 
abortion using pills.103 As far as we are aware, the last prosecution of 
a doctor for an abortion offence in Ireland was in 1964, and the last 
conviction was in 1950.104 Some might then argue that as prosecution 
is rare in Ireland, criminalisation is unproblematic. However, the rate 
101 See UNHRC, Concluding Observations on Ireland, [9], (2014) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28 (Article 
3) on the Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, (29 March 2000) 
[10] CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10,; CRC, Concluding observations on the 
combined third and fourth periodic reports of Ireland, (29 January 2016) 
[58] CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Resolution 1607, [7.1.sd].
102 British Medical Association, Decriminalisation of abortion: a discussion 
paper from the BMA, (February 2017); see similarly McGuire, Erin, ‘DPP 
will not prosecute crisis pregnancy services’, (10 December 2014), The 
Irish Times.
103 See further British Medical Association, Decriminalisation of abortion: a 
discussion paper from the BMA, (February 2017) pp 18-19.
104 We thank Dr Vicky Conway for this point. An attempt was made to prosecute 
a Dublin doctor in 1998, but the DPP did not proceed. On women’s 
historical attempts to self-induce abortions see Delay, Cara ‘“Poisons or 
other Noxious Things”: Women’s Illegal Abortion Strategies in Twentieth-
Century Ireland,’ 9 May 2014, http://historyofmedicineinireland.blogspot.
co.uk/2014/05/poisons-or-other-noxious-things-womens.html and ‘Tea 





of prosecution of the offences is irrelevant.105 First, as we know from 
current Irish abortion law,106 criminalisation itself has ‘chilling effects’ 
on medical practice,107 which means that doctors will often adopt 
the most conservative possible interpretation of legislation, in a kind 
of pre-emptive self-defence against the possibility, however slim, of 
future prosecution. There are similar difficulties in Northern Ireland, 
even though the law there is marginally more liberal than in the 
Republic.108 Second, criminalisation of abortion is heavily stigmatising. 
It exacerbates pregnant people’s distress, and may discourage people 
from seeking necessary medical and emotional support, including 
abortion aftercare.109 As we noted in Chapter 3, the state’s interest 
in preserving foetal life is often better served through positive public 
health and welfare intervention than through criminalisation. It does 
not deter people from seeking abortions, whether illegally in Ireland 
using pills or legally abroad. In many countries, criminalisation means 
that pregnant people cannot openly seek abortion care, compelling 
them to resort to secret, and perhaps unsafe, illegal abortions. That 
unsafe abortion has not become a major health issue in Ireland is largely 
explained by its proximity to England. Finally, medical malpractice is 
already adequately regulated by medical professional bodies, as well as 
by the law of medical negligence and the general criminal law.
105 For an overview of arguments for decriminalization in an English context 
see Sheldon (note 95).
106 A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 13, [254]; see also Commissioner 
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muižnieks (see 
note 15) [82] and [92].
107 See, for example, A, B and C v Ireland [2011] 53 EHRR 13, [254]; Tysiąc 
v. Poland (note 14) [116]; UNCRC Concluding Observations: Ireland, (1 
March 2016) [58(a)] CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4; CEDAW Concluding Observations: 
Ireland (note 21).
108 See discussion in NIHRC’s Application [2017] NICA 42.
109 Sifris, Ronli, ‘Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health’ 
(2010) 18 Medical Law Review 185; Kumar, Anurdha et al, ‘Conceptualising 
Abortion Stigma’ (2009) 11(6) Culture Health and Sexuality 625.
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The Citizens’ Assembly’s grounds considered
As noted in Chapter 1, the Citizens’ Assembly provided its 
recommendations on the 8th Amendment to the Oireachtas in June 
2017.110 The Assembly assumed that a new constitutional settlement 
on abortion would be followed by new legislation on abortion access, 
broadly in line with European norms and international best practice. 
The Assembly’s recommendations and proceedings concentrated 
on ‘grounds’ for abortion (a limited set of reasons recognised as 
justifying a pregnant person in accessing a legal abortion) and on 
associated gestational time limits.111 Members were asked to vote 
on whether abortion should be available under each ground and at 
which gestational stage: up to 12 weeks gestation, up to 22 weeks 
gestation, or without any time limit. The Assembly’s recommendations 
for legislation,112 produced in a series of ballots, are summarised in 
Table 1. This indicates the percentage of Assembly members who 
voted in favour of each ground, and the majority in favour of the 
preferred time limit for that ground.113 Often where there was broad 
agreement between the members that a particular ground should be 
included in new abortion legislation, there was some disagreement 
as to how late in pregnancy an individual should be able to access an 
abortion on that ground. However, the broad trend in the Assembly’s 
recommendations was to recommend significant liberalisation of Irish 
abortion law.
110 The Citizens’ Assembly (see note 1).
111 Gestational age is usually calculated from the first day of the pregnant 
person’s last menstrual cycle, which is generally considered to occur two 
weeks prior to conception.
112 The Citizens’ Assembly (see note 1).
113 The ballot can usefully be compared to a November 2017 Red C opinion poll, 





Table 1: Citizens’ Assembly recommendations on grounds for abortion and 
associated time limits
Ground % of members 
in favour to 
some degree 
Time limit % of members 
in favour of 
time limit
No restriction as to reasons 64% Up to 12 weeks 
gestation
48%1
Risk to the health of the 
woman
78% Up to 22 weeks 
gestation
46%
Risk to the mental health of 
the woman
78% Up to 22 weeks 
gestation
49%
Socioeconomic reasons2 72% Up to 22 weeks 
gestation
50%
The unborn child has a foetal 
anomaly that is not likely to 
result in death before or shortly 
after birth
80% Up to 22 weeks 
gestation
48%
Pregnancy as a result of rape 89% Up to 22 weeks 
gestation3
35%
Risk to the physical health of 
the woman
79% None 42%
Serious risk to the health of the 
woman
91% None 52%
Serious risk to the mental 
health of the woman
90% None 47%
Serious risk to the physical 
health of the woman
93% None 57%
The unborn child has a foetal 
anomaly that is likely to result 
in death before or shortly after 
birth
89% None 69%
Real and substantial risk to the 
life of the woman by suicide
95% None 61%
Real and substantial physical 
risk to the life of the woman
99% None 76%
1 44% of the Assembly members felt that abortion should be accessible under 
this ground up to 22 weeks gestation.
2 This ground was added at the request of Assembly members.
3 This vote was decided by Chair’s casting vote. 31% voted for access on grounds 
of rape up to 12 weeks gestation and 34% for access without time limit.
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In the following section, we compare the Assembly’s proposed grounds 
for abortion access to abortion legislation elsewhere and assess them 
against the principles we have already outlined. 
Abortion on request up to 12 weeks 
In countries where abortion is legally available on request, most 
abortions take place early in pregnancy. For example, most abortions in 
the UK (80% in 2015)114 are performed at or under 10 weeks gestation. 
The same should be true of Ireland, but the necessity of abortion travel 
means that Irish abortions are often later abortions. Early decisions of 
human rights treaty bodies encouraged states to repeal absolute bans 
on abortion. They asked states to facilitate access to abortion in cases 
of risk to life, risk to health, rape or incest, and severe or fatal foetal 
impairment.115 However, the development of international human 
rights law on abortion has not stopped there. Human rights bodies 
have also called on states that only allow abortion on these minimum 
grounds to liberalise their abortion laws, and permit access to abortion 
as a matter of right in the first trimester of pregnancy.116 This position 
reflects a recognition that pregnant people may need abortions for 
reasons that are not covered by these minimum grounds.117 If abortion 
114 In 2015, 3451 women with addresses in the Republic of Ireland accessed 
abortion under the Abortion Act 1967: Department of Health, Abortion 
Statistics, England and Wales: 2015 (2016).
115 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations: Ireland, [9] (2014); 
CEDAW Committee Concluding Observations: Ireland, [43], (2017); Mellet 
v Ireland (see note 42). 
116 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Poland, [8], (2004); 
Report of the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law 
and Practice, [107(b and c)] (2016).
117 Human Rights Committee, (note 120) [8], (2004); CESCR Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Poland, [29] (2002); CEDAW Committee, 
Concluding Observations: New Zealand, [34], (2012); CRC Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, para. 60(c) (2016); CRC Committee: 
Poland, [39(b)] (2015); CESCR Committee: Concluding Observations: 
Poland, [46]-[47] (2016). 
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is not available legally in Ireland in the first trimester, the majority 
of pregnant people who need abortions will only be able to obtain 
them legally if they can pay for treatment abroad. Requiring pregnant 
people to travel discriminates against poorer women, women whose 
travel is restricted because of domestic violence or immigration status, 
and girls under the control of other family members. If abortion were 
genuinely accessible in Ireland on request up to 12 weeks, we would 
anticipate that most of those abortions would be induced with pills, 
often at home in private, under medical supervision. The trauma and 
difficulty involved in travel would be eliminated.
In providing for access to abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy 
without restriction, the Citizens’ Assembly has attempted to bring Irish 
law into line with international norms. Some 61 countries worldwide, 
most located in the wealthy developed countries of the global North 
and in Central and Eastern Asia, permit pregnant people to access 
abortion on request. In a European context, Britain stands out because 
it does not permit women to access abortion without proving some 
grounds, regardless of how early in pregnancy an abortion is sought.118 
Time limits imposed on opportunities to access abortion on request 
vary widely and are as low as eight weeks (for example, in Guyana) 
and as high as 24 weeks (for example, in Singapore).119 The most 
commonly imposed time limit, especially in Europe, is 12 weeks. 
Several European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany and 
Spain, allow abortion on request up to 14 weeks gestation. Sweden 
permits abortion on request up to 18 weeks, and the Netherlands 
until viability. The Assembly recommendation falls within global and 
European norms. 
We suggest that this recommendation be given effect in any new 
legislation. However, consideration must always be given to the fact 
that some pregnant people will be unable to make an abortion decision 
before 12 weeks, particularly if they do not discover the pregnancy in 
118 Section 1, Abortion Act 1967.
119 Section 5(1) Guyana Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1995; section 
4(1)(a) Singapore Termination of Pregnancy Act 1974 (revised in 1985).
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time.120 Abortion legislation must ensure that people can also access 
abortion later in pregnancy where necessary.
Grounds for abortion
The Assembly recommends that once a pregnancy passes 12 
weeks, abortion should only be available on specified grounds, to 
accommodate pregnant people in especially demanding circumstances. 
If new abortion legislation followed the shape of the simple majority 
votes in the Assembly ballots, a pregnant woman would be able to 
access an abortion in Ireland on request (or, ‘on demand’121) in the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy. After 12 weeks gestation, she would need 
to provide reasons for accessing the abortion. Valid reasons up to 22 
weeks gestation would include the following:
• socioeconomic reasons;
• pregnancy that is the result of rape;
• risk to the woman’s physical or mental health; 
• diagnosis of a non-fatal foetal abnormality. 
Once the pregnancy reached 22 weeks, the range of valid reasons for 
having an abortion would narrow. A woman could have an abortion 
late in pregnancy only if:
• her physical health was at risk (which need not be ‘serious’ risk);
• her mental health was at serious risk; 
• there was a real and substantial risk to her life, whether for reasons 
of physical or mental illness; or
• the foetus had been diagnosed with a fatal foetal anomaly. 
120 BPAS, ‘Why women present for abortions after 20 weeks’ www.bpas.org/
media/2027/late-abortion-report-v02.pdf.
121 On de-stigmatising the phrase ‘abortion on demand’ see Lyon, Wendy, 





The Assembly essentially recommended an exceptions-based model 
for abortion legislation. It is difficult to square an exceptions-based 
model with a rights-based approach to abortion care that would treat 
abortion care as a resource that pregnant people are entitled to access. 
It is a struggle to separate exceptions-based abortion legislation from 
inherently stigmatising narratives of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
abortions. Exceptions-based legislation can also be an obstacle to 
securing ‘certainty’ and security for abortion-seeking people unless it 
is interpreted appropriately. This is especially the case where grounds 
are drafted legalistically, and separated out from one another in ways 
that discourage reasonably flexible interpretation of the law. A rights-
based approach might justify turning away from an exceptions-based 
model, and allowing abortion on one ‘umbrella’ ground, at least up 
to 22 weeks. For example, legislation could provide that pregnant 
people could access an abortion on grounds of risk to health up to 22 
weeks and, depending on the severity of that risk, later in pregnancy. 
In the next section, we discuss how such a broad health ground might 
be formulated. Alternatively, as in parts of Australia, an umbrella 
ground might simply say that abortion is available where termination 
of the pregnancy is ‘appropriate in all the circumstances’, leaving the 
evaluation of those circumstances to the certifying doctor.122 A flexible 
ground of this kind allows the certifying medical practitioner to assess 
the pregnant person’s needs holistically, focusing on the consequences 
for her of denial of abortion care, rather than on whether she meets 
one of a restrictive list of narrowly defined conditions.
We recommend that consideration be given to permitting abortion 
access, at least between 12-22 weeks, on a broad, health-based ground.
122 See for example Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Victoria), Termination of 
Pregnancy Act, 2017 (Northern Territories).
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Time limits and the myth of ‘abortion until birth’
The Assembly recommended that in some cases abortion should be 
available after 22 weeks, that is, up to term. Indeed, that is currently 
the case under the PLDPA, which has no term limit and instead focuses 
on foetal viability. Statutory time limits tell only part of the story of 
abortion availability. Even where there is no term limit, this does not 
mean that abortion is available up to term. In Canada, for example, 
federal law does not impose time limits on abortion access, but few 
clinics or hospitals will provide abortions after 21 weeks and then only 
if the pregnant person’s health or life is at grave risk, or the foetus is 
gravely or fatally impaired.123 When an abortion is requested late in 
pregnancy, all relevant circumstances should be taken into account in 
deciding on the best way to bring a pregnancy to an end, including 
by attempting live birth. However, the PLDPA, as in Ms Y’s case,124 
permits a competent pregnant person who requests an abortion late 
in pregnancy to be subjected against her will to medical procedures 
designed to prolong the pregnancy or ensure a live birth. It is not clear 
whether this position would be constitutional after repeal of the 8th 
Amendment. As discussed earlier, pregnant people’s autonomy must 
remain to the fore in medical decision making as a matter of principle.
We do not recommend an upper time limit for abortion access.
Risk to health
The Assembly proposed that abortion be available on grounds of risk 
to the health of the woman throughout pregnancy. The definition of 
‘health’ is crucial, and the Assembly did not discuss this in any detail. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) takes a holistic approach to 
123 See Priaulx, Nicky, Oral evidence ‘Inquiry on Abortion on the Grounds of 
Foetal Abnormality in England and Wales’ (17 August 2013), p 39, https://
orca.cf.ac.uk/50207/1/Oral%20Evidence_Parliamentary%20Inquiry%20
February%202013_DisCopy.pdf.
124 See Fletcher, Ruth, ‘Contesting the cruel treatment of abortion-seeking 
women’ (2014) 22(44) Reproductive Health Matters 10.
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defining health that would work well within an abortion law context. 
It defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.125 We 
argue that Irish legislation should adopt this definition of health. As we 
will shortly show, a pregnant person seeking to access abortion under 
such a broad health ground could do so on the basis of a present or 
anticipated risk to her physical or mental health. However, the ground 
could go further, allowing abortion access to be secured in cases of rape, 
socioeconomic need, or serious foetal anomaly if there is a risk that 
pregnancy or the prospect of continuing with the pregnancy against 
the pregnant person’s will would affect her health, broadly construed. 
Although the Assembly ultimately recommended that no distinction 
should be drawn between physical and mental health,126 it also voted 
on each as a potential separate ground. These votes seemed to suggest 
that as the pregnancy progresses, a distinction could be drawn between 
risks to physical and mental health, so that any risk to physical health 
might justify abortion access after 22 weeks, but only a ‘serious’ risk 
to mental health might do so. The PLDPA similarly distinguishes 
between suicidal pregnant people and those whose lives are at risk 
from physically illness. Such distinctions are discriminatory and install 
an artificial distinction between physical and mental wellbeing.
Legislation should not qualify risks to health here with language 
such as ‘serious’, or the damaging ‘real and substantial’ inherited from 
the X case.127 Such vague terms have no clear clinical meaning128 
and do not assist medical decision making. That the risk to health is 
125 Preamble, Constitution of the World Health Organization (adopted 22nd July 
1946, entered into force 7th April 1948) 14 UNTS 185.
126 In a separate ballot, taken at the request of Assembly members, 72% of the 
members voted that no distinction should be drawn between the physical 
and mental health of the woman. Nevertheless, the overall voting pattern 
indicated a distinction between physical and mental health. No further vote 
was taken to explore or seek to reconcile these differences.
127 Attorney General v X (see note 7). We discussed this in Chapter 4.
128 Erdman, Joanna (see note 17).
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severe is already implicit in a request for a termination at a later stage 
in pregnancy.129
We recommend that abortion be accessible on grounds of risk to 
health without an upper time limit. 
Socioeconomic reasons
The Assembly recommended that abortion be available for 
socioeconomic reasons up to 22 weeks. Twenty-six countries 
worldwide specifically permit women to access abortion for economic 
or social grounds. Some jurisdictions use this sort of ground as an 
alternative to legislating for abortion on request. For example, in 
Britain a woman can only access an abortion for one social reason: 
that the continuation of the pregnancy involves a risk of injury to the 
physical or mental health of any existing children of the family.130 
Elsewhere, social and economic grounds are more commonly used, 
as the Citizens’ Assembly proposed, to supplement a period of access 
to abortion on request, that is, to keep abortion access open to a wide 
range of pregnant people, later into the pregnancy. For example, in 
South Africa, abortion is legal on request up to 12 weeks, and up 
to 20 weeks ‘if the continued pregnancy would significantly affect 
the social or economic circumstances’ of the woman.131 In Norway, 
abortion is legal on request up to 12 weeks, and up to 18 weeks if 
the pregnancy, delivery or care for the child ‘places the woman in a 
difficult life situation’.132
Socioeconomic grounds can provide an independent ‘reason’ for 
accessing an abortion, or they can form part of other grounds. In some 
countries, the statutory definition of ‘health’ expressly encompasses 
economic wellbeing, or it can be interpreted to that effect. Indeed, 
129 Ruth Fletcher, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 8 November 2017.
130 Section 1(1)(a), Abortion Act 1967.
131 Section 2(1)(b)(iv) Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996.
132 Abortion Act, Law No. 50 of June 13, 1975, as amended, https://lovdata.
no/ dokument/ NL/lov/1975-06-13-50?q=abortlov. 
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should the WHO definition of health be adopted that would be the 
case in Ireland too, as it includes ‘a state of … social well-being’.133 
In other countries, the law expressly recognises that account should 
be taken of a woman’s social and economic circumstances in the 
course of assessing any risk to her health. So, for example, in Britain, 
in assessing whether a woman can access an abortion on grounds of 
risk to health ‘account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual 
or reasonably foreseeable environment’.134 
We suggest that this recommendation should be implemented in 
future legislation. However, we also suggest that this would be done 
by providing access to abortion for socioeconomic reasons under a 
‘risk to health’ ground, as part of a broader effort to avoid the worst 
difficulties associated with detailed exceptions-based legislation.
Rape
The Assembly suggests that a woman who has been raped should 
be able to access an abortion up to 22 weeks gestation. In Chapter 
3, we showed that international human rights bodies have found 
violations of the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment where women who have been raped have 
been compelled to continue their pregnancies.135 Rape grounds in 
abortion legislation can present specific difficulties if ‘proof ’ of rape 
is required as a condition of accessing abortion on that ground.136 
Some jurisdictions require women to undergo a special process to test 
the veracity of the rape claim, such as reporting to the police (as in 
133 Preamble (see note 125). 
134 Section 1(2) Abortion Act 1967.
135 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/
NIC/CO/1 (2009). See also UNCAT, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations 
of the Committee Against Torture: Nicaragua, CAT/C/NIC/CO/1, 10 June 
2009, [16].
136 Rape Crisis Network Ireland Submission to Citizens’ Assembly (2016).
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the Isle of Man),137 certification by an official in the criminal justice 
system (as in Poland),138 or commencement of prosecution. However, 
no medical test can provide proof of rape and, of course, a pregnant 
person should not have to meet a criminal standard of proof (beyond 
reasonable doubt) to secure access to abortion. A rape trial and the 
provision of an abortion for reasons of rape must remain completely 
separate processes. In addition, given existing difficulties around 
the reporting and prosecution of sexual violence, any specific proof 
procedure is likely to lead to serious delays in access to healthcare, 
as well as to distress and degradation. A health ground appropriately 
defined in line with the WHO definition considered earlier should 
allow for access to abortion in cases of rape. 
We suggest that this recommendation be implemented in future 
legislation. However, we also suggest that access to abortion be 
provided to people who have been raped under a ‘risk to health’ 
ground, as part of a broader effort to avoid the worst difficulties 
associated with detailed exceptions-based legislation.
Foetal anomaly
The Assembly recommended that abortion be accessible up to 22 
weeks where the foetus has been diagnosed with a ‘non-fatal foetal 
anomaly’, and up to term if it has been diagnosed with a ‘fatal foetal 
anomaly’. The scope of the first recommendation is not entirely clear. 
The Assembly did not spend a lot of time considering or hearing 
expert evidence on issues around foetal impairment and abortion, or 
indeed on disability and abortion. We assume that this recommendation 
concerns conditions where a live baby will be born, but will have a 
very short life, or one that is marked by very severe, untreatable or 
irreversible illness. 
Under the Assembly’s recommendations, abortion would be available 
for non-fatal foetal anomaly up to 22 weeks, and for fatal foetal anomaly 
137 Termination of Pregnancies (Medical Defences) Act 1995.
138 See, for example, P and S v Poland (note 19).
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after that period. The Irish support group Termination for Medical 
Reasons has argued that the 22-week time limit is inappropriate in 
cases of severe foetal impairment, both because pregnant people may 
not have had access to the necessary diagnostic test before that ‘cut-
off period’, and because parents may require more time to make their 
decision, following a diagnosis.139 Limiting the time available in which 
to make these decisions diminishes their difficulty and the care with 
which parents make them. 
As we noted in Chapter 3, a legally enforced compulsion to continue 
a non-viable pregnancy may violate the right to freedom from inhuman 
and degrading treatment,140 as well as the right to private and family 
life.141 International human rights law allows for termination in cases 
of severe foetal abnormality, without requiring proof that stillbirth or 
death in the womb is a near certainty.142 However, the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) 
is increasingly resisting legislation that makes it easier to obtain an 
abortion later in pregnancy in cases of foetal impairment.143 The 
Committee’s point here is not that such legislation discriminates against 
139 See similarly Priaulx, Nicky (note 123), pp 18-19. Routine dating and 
anomaly scanning is not available across all 19 maternity hospitals in 
Ireland. HSE, Creating a Better Future Together: National Maternity Strategy 
2016-2020 (2016), p 84; National Maternity Strategy Implementation Plan 
(2017), comments on Recommendation No 29.
140 See, for example, LC v Peru (note 14); KL v Peru (note 14). 
141 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Re Judicial Review [2015] 
NIQB 96 and [2015] NIQB 102.
142 Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic 
Reports of Peru, CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8 (24 July 2014); Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on 
the Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of Chile, CEDAW/C/CHL/CO/5-6 (12 
November 2012).
143 UNCRPD Concluding Observations on the initial report of the United Kingdom 
CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1; UNCRPD, ‘Comments on the draft General Comment 
No36 of the Human Rights Committee on article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
CCPR/GCArticle6/CRPD.docx.
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the impaired foetus as a person, or that states are required to protect 
its life before birth. If the law permits abortion in principle, it cannot 
forbid it in cases of foetal impairment.144 In addition, the Committee 
agrees that abortion must be made available where to refuse it would 
expose the pregnant person to inhuman and degrading treatment145 
or where a pregnant person was unable to continue a pregnancy for 
health or socioeconomic reasons after receiving a diagnosis of severe 
foetal anomaly.146
However, the Committee maintains that a specific ‘disability 
exception’ within abortion legislation reflects a failure to value disabled 
people in society. If the law allows the abortion for reasons of disability 
where it would not otherwise allow abortion at all, it sends the 
message that disabled life as such is undesirable or unacceptable.147 In 
order to address this issue, the Committee has held that states should 
not legislate to permit abortion for disability-specific reasons in later 
pregnancy.148 The Citizens’ Assembly’s recommendations could fall 
foul of this position. 
There are two ways of trying to ensure that people who receive foetal 
anomaly diagnoses would be able to access abortion should that be their 
choice, while bearing the Committee’s concerns in mind. The first is 
to proceed with a foetal anomaly ground regardless of these concerns, 
but require the legislation to be reviewed for its human rights impact 
a number of years after its commencement. Such a review clause 
would require that appropriate data (on access, refusal, grounds and 
144 Priaulx, Nicky (note 123), 5; McGuinness, Sheelagh, ‘Law Reproduction 
and Disability: fatally “handicapped”?’ (2013) 21(2) Medical Law Review 
213.
145 Criminal Code, Chapter 16, §§ 218–219b
146 Priaulx (note 123), 19.
147 Garland Thomson, Rosemarie, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Disability 
in American Culture and Literature (Columbia University Press, New York 
1997) 6.
148 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Spain, 19–23 September 2011, CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, [17]-[18]. 
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demographics, for example) be collected so that the operation of the 
law and in particular its impact on reproductive autonomy could be 
accurately ascertained and legislative amendments made as appropriate. 
The second is to interpret the risk to health ground holistically (again 
in line with the WHO definition) to ensure that abortion is available in 
appropriate cases of foetal impairment while avoiding the stigmatising 
impacts of the inclusion of a specific foetal anomaly ground. Germany’s 
law takes this approach, allowing access to abortion where the prospect 
of continuing the pregnancy in the face of a diagnosis of foetal anomaly 
poses a grave risk to the woman’s mental health.149 Crucially, this is a 
‘woman-centred’ ground that addresses the pregnant person’s current 
and future suffering, rather than a ground that appears to focus on the 
condition or perceived worth of the foetus. 
Ultimately the decision about which approach would be better is 
a matter of policy; what is most important is that women in these 
situations can make a decision about whether to end their pregnancy. 
At the same time, if the state takes seriously its interest in preserving 
foetal life, and in improving the lives of people with severe disabilities, 
it must also recognise that the task of caring for a child or adult with 
significant health needs should not fall solely to that person’s family. 
Ireland must act to address discriminatory attitudes, or poor-quality 
information, in abortion decision making. In addition, the government 
should take extensive educational and socioeconomic measures that 
support parents voluntarily to continue pregnancies, and ensure a high 
quality of life for seriously disabled children and adults.150 This is an 
extension of the broader argument that the state can best support the 
continuation of pregnancy by providing positive economic supports. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities requires measures of this kind. Ireland has yet to ratify it.
149 Section 218 Criminal Code.
150 See further NUI Galway, Centre for Disability Law and Policy, Submission 
to the Citizens’ Assembly on Repeal of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution (2016).
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We suggest that the law provide for abortion on grounds of serious 
or fatal foetal anomaly, without any time limit. Ideally, this should be 
done under a health ground. Any specific ground should be subject to 
human-rights-oriented review within a few years of the legislation’s 
commencement. 
As a final point, it is crucial to remember disabled pregnant people 
when we discuss abortion and disability. An exclusive focus on children 
as the bearers of disability rights infantilises disabled adults. It conceals 
their equal entitlement to fulfilling sexual and reproductive lives. 
Punitive laws regulating reproduction – for example on involuntary 
sterilisation – have disproportionately affected disabled women 
worldwide. Pregnant people with disabilities will sometimes need 
abortions for a variety of reasons. Their rights must also be protected.
Risk to life
A great majority of the Assembly voted for abortion to be available 
where there is a ‘real and substantial risk to the life’ of the pregnant 
woman, without any time limit. This recommendation reflects existing 
constitutional law and legislation in two ways, neither of which has 
any necessary grounding in law once the 8th Amendment is removed 
from the Constitution. First, the Assembly voted on risk to life from a 
physical health condition and from suicide separately. As already noted, 
this vote conflicts with the Assembly’s separate recommendation that 
abortion legislation should not distinguish between physical and mental 
health.151 However, this distinction reflects the PLDPA, which provides 
separate pathways for suicidal people and people whose life is at risk 
from physical illness. This distinction has been roundly criticised and 
151 In a separate ballot, taken at the request of Assembly members, 72% of the 
members voted that no distinction should be drawn between the physical 
and mental health of the woman. Nevertheless, the overall voting pattern 
indicated a distinction between physical and mental health. No further vote 
was taken to explore or seek to reconcile these differences.
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has no constitutional or other logical basis.152 Arguably, once the 8th 
Amendment is removed from the Constitution, the right to equal 
treatment would mean that requiring people who are suicidal to satisfy 
a much more onerous procedural ‘test’ than people with a physical 
condition that poses a risk to their life is unconstitutional.153 Second, 
the Assembly’s recommendations use the term ‘real and substantial’ 
risk to life. This is an unworkable hangover from the X case that is 
likely to lead to continued uncertainty in interpreting this ground. 
We suggest while it is appropriate to legislate for abortion in cases 
of risk to life without imposing any term limit, the language and 
structures of the current law should be changed, and clear and workable 
language installed in legislation instead.
Conclusion
This chapter makes four key points. First, as far as possible, abortion 
care provision must facilitate pregnant people’s self-determination 
within non-hierarchical structures. Medical professionals should 
not be gatekeepers to abortion services, but should be equipped 
to assist pregnant people to make the best healthcare decisions for 
them. Grounds-based legislation may undermine that process. These 
issues can be addressed by encouraging a rights-based approach 
to interpretation and implementation of grounds-based abortion 
legislation in practice, but many of the difficulties can be avoided by 
taking an open, flexible approach to the drafting of grounds. Second, 
procedural rights must be protected through the development of clear 
abortion access processes.154 We must bear in mind that enabling 
152 See, for example, Murray, Claire, ‘‘Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 
2013’: Suicide, Dignity and the Irish Discourse on Abortion’ (2016) 25(6) 
Social and Legal Studies 667; de Londras, Fiona, “Suicide and Abortion: 
Analysing the Legislative Options in Ireland” (2013) 19(1) Medico-Legal 
Journal of Ireland, 4.
153 Article 40.1, Constitution of Ireland.
154 Erdman, Joanna, ‘The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court 
of Human Rights’ in (eds) Cook, Rebecca, Erdman, Joanna and Dickens, 
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pregnant people to exercise their reproductive agency is not a matter 
of removing existing prohibitions on abortion and ‘leaving them to it’. 
Pregnant people must receive the information and support necessary 
to navigate those processes without fear of delay, misinformation, 
arbitrary obstruction or intimidation. Third, abortion legislation must 
be designed with all pregnant people in mind, taking account of the 
complex and intersecting needs of more vulnerable pregnant people 
in legislative design. Finally, abortion must be decriminalised. 
In the final chapter, we set out some model abortion legislation 
and explanatory notes that reflect the arguments made in this chapter.
Bernard, Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Controversies 





In this chapter, we outline draft legislation, inspired by the Citizens’ 
Assembly recommendations, but adjusting them where necessary to 
give effect to pregnant people’s rights. The explanatory notes are 
light; our decisions are explained in more detail in Chapter 4, and 
we strongly advise that Chapters 4 and 5 are read together. The draft 
legislation shows that it is possible to design workable legislation that 
gives meaningful effect to the rights of pregnant people. We build 
here on previous model drafts that we have worked on with feminist 
academic colleagues,1 benefiting from the advice of activists and civil 
society actors in the process. Of course, as we argued in Chapter 
4, legislation alone cannot achieve effective access to abortion care. 
That requires guidance, principles and an ethic of care that places 
pregnant women, their views, their opinions and their judgements 
about what is right for them at its centre. So, any legislation must be 
supported by rights-supporting interpretative aides and appropriate 
training. We think that legislation of this kind would make a real 
difference to pregnant people’s lives. To illustrate this, we include 
1 Enright, Máiréad et al, ‘General Scheme of the Access to Abortion Bill 2015’ 
(2015) 5(1) feminists@law; Enright, Máiréad, ‘General Scheme of the 
Reproductive Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 2017’ (on file with authors).
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case studies, drawing on some stories offered in submissions to the 
Citizens’ Assembly. Although space does not allow for discussion of a 
comprehensive range of case studies, this selection shows how difficult 
cases would be addressed both under the current law and under our 
proposed legislation.
Grounds, time limits, gatekeepers
Our proposal broadly mirrors the legislative recommendations of 
the Citizens’ Assembly. We adopt the same time limits it proposed: 
12 weeks, 22 weeks, and no time limit. Gradual restriction in 
availability of legal abortion as the pregnancy progresses is typically 
considered a proportionate infringement of the rights of pregnant 
people, as discussed in Chapter 3, and we suggest that this model is 
likely to be considered constitutional in Ireland after repeal of the 
8th Amendment. Under s. 4(a) of our legislation, until 12 weeks, we 
propose, as the Assembly did, that abortion should be available without 
the pregnant person being required to give any reason.2 We consider 
the justifications for this approach in Chapter 4.
Between 12 and 22 weeks, the Assembly recommended that the 
pregnant person should be required to bring her case within one of a 
range of reasons.3 As discussed in Chapter 4, however, exceptions-
based legislation may carry many serious risks for pregnant people who 
need abortions. Therefore, in s. 4(b), we show how non-exceptions-
based legislation could regulate abortion access in later pregnancy. 
Our legislation provides that, between 12 and 22 weeks, a doctor 
would consider a pregnant person’s circumstances. However, rather 
than specify each of the grounds named by the Assembly, we propose 
a single ‘health ground’ capable of responding to all of the kinds of 
case in which the Assembly felt that abortion should be available at 
this stage in pregnancy. The ground has two parts: first, a medical 
2 The Citizens’ Assembly, First Report and Recommendations of the Citizen’s 
Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (2017). 
3 The Citizens’ Assembly (2017), p 12 (see note 2). 
106
REPEALING THE 8TH
practitioner must determine that an abortion is appropriate having 
regard to the pregnant person’s state of health,4 and second, he or she 
must take account of the pregnant person’s assessment of her own 
current and future health. 
In s. 1 we adopt the World Health Organization definition of 
‘health’5 which, as we showed in Chapter 4, is sufficiently broad 
to allow for a holistic assessment of the pregnant person’s physical 
and mental health and social and economic circumstances, provided 
those applying the law interpret it in a rights-based manner.6 It also 
allows the law to reflect the fact that the same conditions affect 
pregnant people very differently, depending on their social and 
economic circumstances.7 By focusing instead on the potential health 
consequences of continuation of pregnancy in these circumstances, 
this approach mitigates some of the risks and harms associated with 
specifying a rape ground or a serious foetal anomaly ground, which 
we discussed in Chapter 4.
After 22 weeks, s. 4(c) of our legislation provides for the grounds 
recommended by the Assembly with some key changes.8 Unlike 
the Assembly, and for the reasons explained in Chapter 4, we do not 
distinguish between risks to physical and mental health. At this point 
in pregnancy, we also require the authorising practitioner to take 
into account the pregnant person’s views on the impact of continued 
pregnancy on her current and future health. The legislation does 
not qualify risk to health with language like ‘serious’ for the reasons 
explained in Chapter 4. We trust that medical practice will develop 
to ensure that abortion after 22 weeks takes place only where health 
risks are especially serious; that has been the experience in other 
4 This is a modification of section 5 of the Abortion Law Reform Act, 2008, 
Victoria Australia.
5 Preamble, Constitution of the World Health Organization 14 UNTS 185 
(1946).
6 We discussed the importance of this in Chapter 4.
7 Peter Boylan, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, 18 October 2017.
8 The Citizens’ Assembly (2017), p 12 (see note 2).
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jurisdictions, even where there is no specific law, and there is no 
reason why it would not also be the case in Ireland. The requirement 
that the risk at this point in pregnancy be a serious one is underlined 
by the requirement to consult with another practitioner. In addition, 
the draft legislation does not require that the medical practitioner’s 
decision be taken in ‘good faith’. We assume the decriminalisation of 
abortion, and so this qualification is not necessary.
Finally, unlike the Assembly, and again for reasons discussed in 
Chapter 4, we do not distinguish between a serious and fatal foetal 
anomaly ground,9 and we do not require proof of a ‘fatal’ diagnosis 
before a termination can be carried out at this point in pregnancy. 
We are aware that there are conditions that do not inevitably lead to 
death in the womb, or during or soon after birth, but that affect a 
newborn’s quality of life so severely that loving parents ought to be 
supported in deciding to spare them such terrible suffering.10 Forced 
continuation of such pregnancies may generate precisely the same 
violations of pregnant people’s human rights experienced in cases 
of fatal foetal abnormality, so that termination of pregnancy should 
be made available. Again, we trust medical and parental judgment to 
restrict the availability of abortions to severe cases. 
The Assembly did not specify which, or how many, medical 
practitioners a pregnant person should consult with before obtaining 
an abortion. Bearing in mind our discussion in Chapter 4 around the 
need to protect pregnant people’s autonomous decision making, and 
therefore to avoid burdensome certification processes, we propose that 
one medical practitioner should suffice to authorise an abortion, and 
that thought should be given to empowering medical practitioners 
other than doctors to provide abortion care, and certify abortion 
access where appropriate. We do not require that abortions take place 
9 The Citizens’ Assembly (2017) (see note 2).
10 See Termination for Medical Reasons, TMFR Ireland Submission to the 
Citizens’ Assembly (2016). See also Clare Cullen-Delsol, evidence to the 




in specific locations; as outlined in Chapter 4, it should be possible 
to accommodate a range of locations for abortion care depending on 
the individual circumstances in a particular case. Under s. 4(c), the 
authorising practitioner is required to formally consult with a colleague 
as part of evaluating the pregnant person’s case if the pregnancy has 
passed 22 weeks gestation. The second doctor is not, however, a co-
decision maker. Our intention here is to facilitate medical consultation 
without adding additional cumbersome steps to the decision-making 
process.
Autonomy and access
The protection and recognition of the rights, autonomy and agency of 
pregnant people is central to the proposed legislation. This is especially 
rooted in s. 6. This requires that the law should be interpreted in a way 
that is ‘most favourable to achieving positive health outcomes for the 
pregnant person and due regard shall be given to the need to respect the 
rights of the pregnant person to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and 
autonomy’. This is modelled on s. 4 of the Mental Health Act 2001, 
which provides clear direction to government departments, professional 
regulators, and individual decision makers and practitioners that the law 
must be interpreted and applied in a rights-based manner. We reinforce 
this in our model legislation by ensuring that abortions provided under 
the Act must be voluntary and consensual (s. 6(b)), that pregnant 
people shall not be required to receive directive counselling, read or 
view images, or undergo a waiting period as a condition of receiving 
abortion care (s. 6(d)), and that where someone qualifies for abortion 
care under the Act no procedure or treatment designed to prolong 
the pregnancy or ensure a live birth is to be undertaken without 
her consent (s. 6(c)). These provisions are all focused on protecting 
pregnant people from measures designed to undermine their access 
to abortion care where they elect to bring their pregnancy to an end, 
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and reflect experience of such measures in other jurisdictions11 and 
under the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA).12
We also include provisions designed to ensure meaningful access 
to abortion: the complete decriminalisation of abortion (s. 2), a 
statutory obligation on the Minister for Health to ensure that abortion 
services are provided in a timely manner (s. 3(1)), a guarantee of non-
discrimination in access to abortion care (s. 3(2)), a process to ensure 
that a pregnant person is enabled to seek a second opinion if refused 
abortion care (s. 5), a provision to protect medical practitioners’ right 
to conscientious objection but prevent institutions from claiming 
such an objection (s. 7), a provision to protect people entering and 
leaving premises where abortion care is provided (s. 8), and a provision 
requiring the provision of effective and accurate abortion information 
(s. 9).
As discussed in Chapter 4, in order to ensure that the Oireachtas 
remains actively engaged with the operation of the legislation, and to 
create the conditions for comprehensive and effective data gathering 
around the operation of the law—including situations where access 
to abortion care is refused—we include in s. 11 a provision requiring 
a statutory review of the human rights impact and operation of the 
Act three years after its commencement.13
A proposed legislative text
Part 1: Definitions
1. In this legislation:
a. appropriately qualified medical practitioner may include nurses 
and midwives, as well as doctors, as provided for under 
regulation;
11 See the discussion in Chapter 4.
12 See the discussion in Chapter 3.
13 This is modeled directly on s. 7 of the Gender Recognition Act 2015.
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b. health means a state of complete physical, mental and socio-
cultural wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity. It includes sexual and reproductive health;
c. pregnancy counsellor means any person or organisation 
engaging in, or holding himself, herself or itself out as 
having experience or expertise to engage in, the provision of 
information, advice or counselling to persons experiencing, 
or who have experienced, a crisis pregnancy;14
d. pregnant person includes pregnant minors and all persons who 
are pregnant regardless of their gender identity.
Part 2: Decriminalisation of abortion 
2. Criminal offences 
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be 
an offence for a pregnant person to self-induce an abortion.
b. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be 
an offence for a pregnant person to consent to or assist in 
the performance of her own abortion.
c. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be an 
offence for any person to perform or assist in the performance 
of an abortion with the pregnant person’s consent.
d. Section 22 of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
2013 is hereby repealed.
Part 3: Access to abortion
3. Guarantee of access
a. The Minister for Health shall ensure that pregnant persons 
can obtain safe and timely abortion services in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act.
14 Definition borrowed from the Health and Social Care Professionals 
(Amendment Bill) 2016, Republic of Ireland.
111
MODEL LEGISLATION
b. Access to abortion care and to abortion aftercare shall not 
be impeded because of the pregnant person’s social status, 
including her race, sex, religion, national or ethnic origin, 
marital or family status, immigration status, sexual orientation 
or age. 
4. Accessing abortion
a. Abortion before 12 weeks
i. A person who is not more than 12 weeks pregnant 
may access abortion on her request without need 
to show further grounds.
b. Abortion at between 12 and 22 weeks
i. A person who is more than 12 weeks, but not 
more than 22 weeks pregnant, may only access 
an abortion where an appropriately qualified 
medical practitioner determines that the abortion 
is appropriate having regard to her state of health.
ii. In making a determination under this section, the 
medical practitioner shall have regard, in particular, 
to the pregnant person’s own assessment of her 
current and future health.
iii. In making a determination under this section, the 
medical practitioner shall act with all reasonable 
haste and communicate the determination to the 
pregnant person in a timely fashion.
c. Abortion at more than 22 weeks
i. A person who is more than 22 weeks pregnant may 
only access an abortion where an appropriately 
qualified medical practitioner determines that the 
abortion is appropriate because of:
1) a risk to the pregnant person’s life; or
2) a risk to the pregnant person’s health; or
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3) a diagnosis of serious foetal anomaly.
ii. In making a determination under this section, the 
medical practitioner shall have regard, in particular, 
to the pregnant person’s own assessment of her 
current and future health.
iii. Otherwise than in cases of imminent risk to 
the pregnant person’s life or health, in making 
a determination under this section, the medical 
practitioner must show that he has consulted with 
another appropriately qualified medical practitioner 
who agrees that an abortion is appropriate.
iv. In making a determination under this section, the 
medical practitioner shall act with all reasonable 
haste and communicate the determination to the 
pregnant person in a timely fashion.
5. Refusal of care under s. 4
Where an appropriately qualified medical practitioner is of the opinion 
that a pregnant person who has requested an abortion under s. 4 of 
this Act is not entitled to access it, he shall:
a. immediately inform her of the refusal; 
b. provide written confirmation of the reasons for refusal within 
24 hours of refusal;
c. inform her in writing of her entitlement to seek a second 
opinion, and refer her to an alternative appropriately qualified 
medical practitioner without delay.
6. Healthcare and self-determination
a. In making any decision under this Act, or in providing 
abortion care and services, the provisions of the Act shall 
be interpreted in the manner most favourable to achieving 
positive health outcomes for the pregnant person and due 
regard shall be given to the need to respect the rights of the 




b. No procedure shall be performed on, or treatment 
administered to, a competent pregnant person under this Act, 
except with her voluntary and informed consent.
c. Where a pregnant person is entitled to an abortion under 
s. 4, nothing in this Act shall be read as justifying without the 
consent of the pregnant person, the performance of another 
procedure or treatment designed to preserve or prolong the 
pregnancy, or to ensure a live birth.
d. A pregnant person shall not be required to accept any 
directive counselling, to read or view any material or images, 
or to undergo any waiting period, as a condition of receiving 
abortion care.
Part 4: Protection of abortion access
7. Conscientious objection
a. An appropriately qualified medical practitioner may refuse to 
participate in the provision of abortion care on the basis of a 
good faith conscientious objection, except where an abortion 
is immediately necessary to save the pregnant person’s life, 
or to prevent severe damage to the pregnant person’s health.
b. An appropriately qualified medical practitioner asserting a 
conscientious objection shall, without delay:
i. inform the pregnant person of the refusal of care 
in writing;
ii. inform the pregnant person of her right to be treated 
by an alternative practitioner who does not hold the 
same objection; and
iii. make such arrangements for the transfer of her care 
as are necessary for her to access abortion care in 
a timely manner.
c. Institutions, agencies or organisations may not assert a 
conscientious objection under this section.
d. Medical practitioners asserting a conscientious objection 
to participation in abortion care must inform their patients 
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of this objection at the outset of treatment, whether by a 
prominently displayed notice or by other appropriate means.
e. In any legal proceedings arising from this section, the burden 
of establishing a conscientious objection shall rest on the 
person seeking to rely on it.
8. Protecting premises15
a. A person must not engage in prohibited behaviour within a 
radius of 100 metres from the perimeter of any premises at 
which abortions are provided.
b. In this section ‘prohibited behaviour’ means:
i. in relation to a person: besetting, harassing, 
intimidating, interfer ing with, threatening, 
hindering, obstructing or impeding that person; or
ii. threatening behaviour that can be seen or heard by 
a person accessing, or attempting to access premises 
at which abortions are provided; or
iii. recording a person accessing, or attempting to access 
premises at which abortions are provided without 
that person’s consent, or publishing or distributing 
a recording so obtained, except in discharge of 
police duty.
c. Conviction for an offence of engaging in prohibited 
behaviour under this section shall carry a penalty of a fine not 
exceeding €2,500, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months, or both.
d. All necessary police powers of detention and seizure are 
hereby provided for.
15 This section is partly based on section 9 of the Reproductive Health (Access 
to Terminations) Act 2013, Tasmania.
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9. Misleading abortion information16
a. A pregnancy counsellor shall not publish, distribute, display 
or broadcast any material likely to mislead or deceive a person 
who is accessing or attempting to access an abortion.
b. A pregnancy counsellor that does not provide referrals for 
abortion care must include in any website, advertising or 
notification material a statement clearly establishing that it 
does not provide referrals for abortion care. 
c. Failure to comply with the requirements of ss. 9(a) and 9(b) of 
this Act shall constitute an offence under this section, carrying 
a penalty of a fine not exceeding €2500, or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both.
d. The Minister for Health shall ensure the publication of 
accessible, impartial and accurate factual information on 
abortion care, and shall ensure that pregnant persons have 
timely access to such information on request.
e. A pregnancy counsellor convicted of an offence under s. 9 (a) 
or (b) shall not receive state funding, until such time as it can 
demonstrate compliance with those statutory requirements.
f. All necessary police powers of detention and seizure are 
hereby provided for.
10. Code of practice
a. The Minister for Health shall cause to be prepared, after 
consultation with such bodies as he considers appropriate, a 
code or codes of practice for personnel working in abortion 
care.
b. The code and codes of practice shall provide, in particular, 
for specific care pathways for pregnant persons who may face 
obstacles in accessing abortion care because of their age, social 
origin, physical or intellectual disability, health condition, 
16 This section is partly based on the Pregnancy Counselling (Truth in 
Advertising) Bill, 2006 (Australia).
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educational background, family status, immigration status, 
or status as a victim of crime.
11. Review of operation of Act
The Minister for Health shall: 
a. not later than three years after this section comes into 
operation, commence a review of the operation of this Act 
and of the code of practice under s. 10; and 
b. not later than 12 months after its commencement, make a 
report to each House of the Oireachtas of the findings made 
on the review and of the conclusions drawn from the findings. 
Case studies: the proposed law in practice
In this section we illustrate the operation of s. 4 with a selection of case 
studies. Each case study compares the current Irish law on abortion 
with the legislation we have proposed.17
Róisín’s case
Twenty-two weeks into her first pregnancy, Róisín begins experiencing terrible 
headaches. She attends the emergency room of her local maternity hospital. Her 
blood pressure is found to be dangerously high, and she has already suffered 
liver and kidney damage. Severe early onset pre-eclampsia is diagnosed. She is 
at serious risk of stroke and seizures, and there is a significant associated risk of 
death. Her doctors have spent three days trying to lower her blood pressure and 
prevent seizures, but it cannot be controlled. The foetus is alive, but not viable.
17 These case studies are all loosely based on stories of real pregnancies that are 








Róisín may be entitled to have birth induced early under the PLDPA 
because her life is at risk; however, it is not clear at which point in 
this case her right of access is established. Two obstetricians must be 
satisfied first that the risk of loss of her life from the pre-eclampsia has 
become ‘real and substantial’, and second that this risk can only be 
averted by the termination of the pregnancy and cannot be averted 
by the other methods they have been trying. Róisín’s doctors must 
also have regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as 
practicable. The obligation to preserve unborn human life may also be 
read as meaning that they must try to use other methods to maintain 
the pregnancy for as long as the foetus’ heart is beating, despite the 
risk to Róisín’s health and life. Unlike a case of inevitable miscarriage, 
it is not clear that this treatment is futile. So, doctors cannot intervene 
until the foetus’ heart stops beating or until Róisín’s health deteriorates 
further so that her life is at ‘real and substantial risk’. The PLDPA does 
not require doctors to take account of Róisín’s own views in deciding 
whether the pregnancy can be terminated.
Under the proposed law
Róisín would be entitled to an abortion under s. 4(c) if one doctor 
determined and a second agreed that it was appropriate on grounds of 
risk to her health. Although of course Róisín would not be required 
to decide there and then, she would be entitled to access abortion 
care as soon as she wished and the physicians would not have to wait 
for a risk to life to materialise. In deciding on the appropriateness of 
a termination, the physician would be required to take account of 
Róisín’s own assessment of her position: if she did not want to run 
the risk of waiting any longer because of her views of the potential 
impact on her health, this should carry significant weight in the medical 




Cathy, who is 40, has severe chronic depression and anxiety, which she manages 
with medication. She has had several suicidal episodes since her teens, and in her 
thirties was hospitalised for a protracted period. She became severely distressed 
when she discovered three weeks ago that she was pregnant, and her first instinct 
was to attempt suicide. She has been in a casual relationship with Tom for a short 
while, but she does not know how far into her pregnancy she is. Three days ago, 
Tom interrupted Cathy during what he believes was an attempt to hang herself. 
Cathy is refusing to see a doctor.
Under the PLDPA
Cathy may be able to access an abortion under the PLDPA, on grounds 
of risk to life from suicide. Two obstetricians and a psychiatrist would 
be required to assess her case, which may cause delays, given the 
shortage of appropriately qualified practitioners in Ireland. However, 
only one woman was granted a termination on this ground last year 
and it is not clear how Cathy could ‘prove’ a sufficient risk of suicide 
and whether one suicide attempt would be ‘sufficient’.18 It is not clear 
how far Cathy’s pregnancy has progressed. If it is close to viability, the 
Act may require Cathy’s doctors to take measures to give the foetus 
the best chance of live birth. These may include detention19 and 
compulsory medical treatment. The long-term risks of such measures 
to Cathy’s health are not relevant to the statutory analysis. Given this, 
and Cathy’s current health, experience suggests she will bypass the 
Irish legislation completely and travel to access abortion if she has 
sufficient resources.20
18 Veronica O’Keane, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 25 October 2017.
19 HSE v BS [2017] IEDC 18 indicates that a request under the PLDPA may 
place a woman at risk of detention under the Mental Health Act 2001.
20 Murray, Claire, ‘The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Suicide, 
Dignity and the Irish discourse on abortion’ (2013) 25(6) Social and Legal 
Studies 667; Peter Boylan, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 18 October 2016.
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Under the proposed law
Cathy is entitled to access an abortion under s. 4. The process for 
access will vary depending on how far the pregnancy has progressed. 
However, even if the pregnancy has advanced past 22 weeks, she may 
access an abortion under s. 4(c) if one doctor determines and a second 
agrees that an abortion is appropriate because her mental health is at 
risk. There would not be any legal need to determine whether the 
risk to her health had become a risk to her life, or to delay treatment 
accordingly. Such an interpretation of the legislation would not be 
most favourable to achieving positive health outcomes for her under s. 
6. In deciding on the appropriateness of a termination, a practitioner 
would be required to take account of Cathy’s own assessment of her 
position. Finally, under s. 6, Cathy could not be subjected to any non-
consensual or coerced treatment designed to prolong the pregnancy. 
Nuala’s case
This is Nuala’s second pregnancy. She is now 16 weeks pregnant. The pregnancy 
was planned. She was diagnosed with hyperemesis gravidarium early in the 
pregnancy. Nuala has crippling nausea most of the time and vomits up to 50 
times a day. The nausea means that she now struggles to stand or walk. She is 
unable to look after herself and relies on her husband for everyday care, and to 
care for their toddler Molly. Nuala has been hospitalised several times for severe 
dehydration, and has been advised that, later in the pregnancy, it may be necessary 
to admit her to hospital full-time until the birth in order to manage her condition. 
Nuala has become very depressed and despondent and is terrified at the thought 
of labour. Nuala was similarly ill during her first pregnancy. While she continued 
that pregnancy, and adores Molly, she does not think that she can go through the 
same process again.
Under the PLDPA
Nuala is not entitled to a termination under the PLDPA because her 
life is not at risk. If she is not in any condition to travel, she will not 
be able to access an abortion abroad. Because she is over 12 weeks 
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pregnant, a self-induced abortion with pills,21 even if it were legal, 
is inappropriate: it is essentially an induction of labour, which she 
should not attempt at home.22 The current Irish abortion law does 
not provide a solution for Nuala.
Under the proposed law
Nuala would be entitled to a termination before 22 weeks under 
s. 4(b) if one appropriately qualified medical practitioner deemed 
it appropriate having regard to her state of health. In making that 
assessment, the medic may have regard to Nuala’s social and economic 
as well as strictly medical circumstances in determining the impact of 
continued pregnancy on her health. It is understandable that a person 
in Nuala’s situation might wait, in an effort to determine whether 
she can cope with the illness until it is safe for the baby to be born. 
Under the proposed legislation, if it became necessary to terminate 
later in the pregnancy, Nuala would be permitted to do so under s. 
4(c) provided a medical practitioner determined, and a second agreed, 
that the abortion was appropriate because of the combined risk the 
pregnancy poses to her physical or mental health. Again, in making 
this decision, Nuala’s views would have to be taken into account, as 
well as the need to interpret the Act in the manner most favourable 
to achieving positive health outcomes under s. 6. The same section 
also means that Nuala could not be subjected to any non-consensual 
or coerced treatment designed to prolong the pregnancy. 
Laura’s case
Ten weeks ago, Laura, who is 27, attended a cousin’s engagement party at a 
country hotel. Towards the end of the party, her old friend Sam invited her to go 
21 Sheldon, Sally, ‘How Can a State Control Swallowing? The Home Use of 
Abortion Pills in Ireland’ (2016) 24 Reproductive Health Matters 90. 
22 Women on Waves, ‘I’ve been Pregnant for More than 12 Weeks. Can I Still 




for a walk with him. When they were isolated from the main group, Sam raped 
Laura. Laura was devastated. She did not feel able to tell anybody about the rape, 
especially since she and Sam have many friends in common. No pharmacies were 
open in the rural area where they were staying, but Laura managed to get the 
morning after pill on her return to the city a day later. The morning after pill did 
not work, and some weeks later Laura took a pregnancy test, which was positive. 
Laura cannot cope with the thought of continuing with the pregnancy because of 
its association with the rape. She also finds it impossible to speak to anyone about 
what has happened to her.
Under the PLDPA
Laura is not entitled to a termination under the PLDPA because her 
life is not currently at risk. If she is not in any condition to travel, 
she will not be able to access an abortion abroad. Assuming she is 
not over 12 weeks pregnant, a self-induced abortion with pills may 
be appropriate, but of course, this is also illegal under Irish law. The 
current Irish abortion law does not provide a solution for Laura except 
insofar as the 13th Amendment permits her to travel abroad.
Under the proposed law
The solutions available to Laura under the proposed legislation will 
vary according to how far her pregnancy has progressed. Laura will not 
be required to report the rape to anyone within the criminal justice 
system as a condition of accessing an abortion. If Laura is less than 12 
weeks pregnant, she may access an abortion on request under s. 4(a) 
without disclosing any reason to the person providing the abortion. 
If the pregnancy has progressed beyond 12 weeks, she can access an 
abortion under s. 4(b) provided a medical practitioner determines 
that it is appropriate having regard to her state of health. In making 
this decision, regard must be had to Laura’s assessment of her current 
and future health. The statutory definition of health here is wide 
enough to encompass the effects of rape and forced continuation 
of the resulting pregnancy on Laura’s mental health. Similarly, if the 
pregnancy has progressed beyond 22 weeks, Laura may able to access 
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an abortion on health grounds under s. 4(c); again, the statutory 
definition of ‘health’ is wide enough to encompass the effects of rape 
and forced continuation of the resulting pregnancy on her mental 
health. Throughout the process, Laura will only be required to see 
one doctor, although if she does so after 22 weeks, that practitioner 
will need to consult with another medical practitioner who must agree 
that abortion is appropriate. This preserves Laura’s privacy, and should 
allow her to choose a practitioner with whom she is comfortable—her 
GP, for example, or a doctor recommended by a rape crisis centre.23
Susie’s case
Susie is 19. She is a university student in Limerick, and travels to college from 
her parents’ home outside the city every weekday to attend class. Her periods are 
irregular due to polycystic ovary syndrome, and she did not suspect that she might 
be pregnant for some time. Although she had no symptoms of pregnancy, she 
became worried when she missed a second period. She took a pregnancy test at 
home during the Christmas holidays, and the result was positive, but she decided 
to wait until she had returned to university to see a doctor there. It took four days 
to get an appointment. Susie was shocked to discover that she is already 12 weeks 
pregnant. She has no savings. She has never travelled outside of Ireland on her own 
before. She has no idea about how to arrange an abortion abroad. When she asked 
the university clinic doctor for assistance, he was very unhelpful and reminded 
her that abortion is illegal in Ireland. She has come across some information 
online that suggests that abortion is dangerous to women’s mental health and will 
increase her cancer risk in future. Her parents are very controlling, and would not 
be supportive of her decision to have an abortion. 
Under the PLDPA
Susie is not entitled to a termination under the PLDPA because her 
life is not currently at risk. Because she is already 12 weeks pregnant, a 
23 Noeline Blackwell, evidence to the Joint Committee on the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 25 October 2017.
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self-induced abortion with pills may not be appropriate.24 That being 
the case, Susie may need to travel for an abortion. Susie’s case illustrates 
many of the difficulties that arise when women do not have timely 
access to reproductive healthcare and accurate abortion information 
in a non-judgmental setting. She will need to research her options, 
arrange travel and book the treatment for herself. Abortion travel 
is expensive, practically difficult and emotionally very burdensome, 
even though Susie is otherwise healthy. Susie may be compelled to 
disclose her pregnancy and her intended abortion to her parents, at 
some cost to her privacy and wellbeing. She may be able to access 
financial support through a charity such as the Abortion Support 
Network, if she is aware of it. If she struggles to raise the money for 
the procedure, she may end up accessing her abortion quite late in 
the pregnancy (up to 24 weeks if she travels to England), or may be 
compelled to remain pregnant to term. If she travels, she may decide 
to return soon after the procedure to save on costs, and this will add 
to the distress of her journey.
Under the proposed law
Susie’s case illustrates the importance of flexibility around time limits. 
She was late in discovering her pregnancy due to circumstances beyond 
her control. A 14-week time limit for abortion on request under 
the proposed legislation (rather than a tighter 10- or 12-week limit) 
would mean that Susie could still access an abortion under s. 4(a) 
without providing reasons. Even so, Susie would be able to request an 
abortion under s. 4(b), once a single doctor had assessed her health, 
taking account of her own perception of the impact of continued 
pregnancy on her health. Susie’s experience of abortion care would 
be very different under the proposed legislation. She could access it 
locally with appropriate medical supervision, without the need to travel 
24 Women on Waves, ‘I’ve been Pregnant for More than 12 Weeks. Can I Still 




long distances. A doctor could not comply with this law simply by 
dismissing her abortion request. The government would be empowered 
to regulate websites providing misleading abortion information, and 
would be compelled to ensure that accurate information was published 
and distributed widely. If abortion were funded in the same manner as 
other healthcare in pregnancy, Susie’s finances would no longer be a 
serious obstacle to abortion access. Consistent with her right to privacy, 
she would not be required to disclose her decision to her parents.
Dearbhla’s case
Dearbhla is 32. She and her husband Harry married five years ago and she is 
pregnant with their second child. Their daughter Nora is two. There is a history 
of Tay Sachs disease in the Harry’s family, and so the couple went for genetic 
counselling some weeks into the pregnancy. Blood and DNA tests showed that both 
Dearbhla and Harry were carriers. At 16 weeks, Dearbhla had an amniocentesis, 
which confirmed that the baby would be born with Tay Sachs. The couple were very 
distressed by this news. Babies with Tay Sachs, if carried to full term, will generally 
die a painful death before the age of four. Dearbhla is now 20 weeks pregnant. 
Under the PLDPA
It is not possible for Dearbhla to access an abortion under the PLDPA 
because her life is not at risk. She can continue with the pregnancy in 
Ireland, or travel to the UK for a termination. It is important to note 
that parents often do not find out about serious foetal anomalies until 
much later in the pregnancy, due to uneven availability of diagnostic 
tests. Dearbhla will be able to access a termination in the UK up to, 
or after, 24 weeks. However, a termination abroad can be traumatic 
for parents, because, as discussed in Chapter 4, it entails separation 
from family members, disruption of the grieving process, and the 
additional stress of travel.
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Under the proposed law
Dearbhla would be able to access an abortion if one medical practitioner 
agreed that a termination was appropriate having regard to her state of 
health. It is important that grieving parents are given time to make their 
decision. If Dearbhla wants to wait longer to make her decision, she will 
still be able to access an abortion after 22 weeks on grounds of serious 
foetal anomaly, with the agreement of one further medical practitioner. 
Whether an individual diagnosis comes within the scope of ‘serious 
foetal anomaly’ will depend on the circumstances, and should be a 
medical decision. However, in all cases covered under this legislation, 
the law should take account of the effects of continuing the pregnancy 
on the individual pregnant person. The deciding medical practitioner 
would be required to evaluate Dearbhla’s own assessment of her current 
and future health, consistent with respect for her self-determination. 
The statutory definition of health here is broad enough to allow him 
to take account both of her distress and informed judgement around 
the foetus’ quality of life and her assessment of the best interests of 
her existing child. The same section of the legislation would be used 





For more than 30 years, women in Ireland have made and been denied 
reproductive choices under the shadow of the 8th Amendment. In 
this book, we have shown that this provision was designed precisely 
to deny reproductive autonomy and to freeze at a particular, illiberal 
time in Irish politics the ability of women to exercise control over 
their reproductive lives, of legislators to make law and policy on 
abortion, and of doctors to provide abortion care in accordance with 
their consciences, ethics and perceptions of patients’ best interests.
In the intervening 34 years, much has changed. The 8th Amendment 
now looks a relic when read against the backdrop of international 
human rights law, international best medical practice, and societal 
attitudes to sexuality, reproduction and choice in Ireland. 
In this book, we have shown how a rights-based, agency-centred 
approach to the Constitution, to legislation, and to the relationship 
between doctors and patients can help to reinscribe constitutional 
rights and reproductive autonomy on experiences of pregnancy in 
Ireland. We have shown not only that making such law is possible 
and practicable, but also that it will be transformative only if it is 
accompanied by a shift in practical, political and legal disposition. 
This requires a rights-based approach to interpretation and application 
by medical practitioners, lawyers and courts, and a willingness by 
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parliamentarians and courts to approach the regulation of abortion with 
a commitment to constitutionalism that recognises societal change, 
takes comparative experience and evidence seriously, and abandons the 
futile and potentially dangerous search for unattainable legal certainty. 
Repeal of the 8th Amendment is a necessary but insufficient step 
towards the restructuring of pregnancy in Ireland as a fulfilling, 
empowering and emancipatory experience, whether one continues 




The manuscript for Repealing the 8th was completed on 15 November 
2017, and this postscript was finalised on 7 March 2018. At the time 
of writing this book, the Joint Oireachtas Committee (JOC) on the 
Eighth Amendment was still holding hearings. Since then, it has 
published its report1 and key party political figures have expressed 
support for its recommendations. Furthermore, on 29 January 2018 
the Cabinet announced its intention to hold a referendum for the 
repeal of the 8th Amendment and its replacement with an ‘enabling 
provision’, unlike the options that had been considered by the Joint 
Committee in its recommendations.2 On 7 March 2018, the Supreme 
Court handed down a unanimous decision confirming that the unborn 
has no rights additional to the right to life in Article 40.3.3. of the 
Constitution.3 A Cabinet meeting on 8 March 2018 confirmed the 
referendum wording and the referendum Bill debate started almost 
immediately. The referendum itself will take place by the end of May 
2018. This postscript places the proposals in our book in the context 
of these more recent political developments. 
1 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017). Available at: www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/
media/committees/eighthamendmentoftheconstitution/Report-of-the-Joint-
Committee-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-web-version.pdf.
2 Bardon, S, ‘Cabinet Agrees to Summer Vote on Replacing Eighth’, Irish 
Times, 29 January 2018. Available at www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/
cabinet-agrees-to-summer-vote-on-replacing-eighth-1.3372923. 
3 M v Minister for Justice & Ors [2018] IESC 14.
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‘Repeal and replace’: The 36th Amendment
In December 2017, the JOC recommended that any future referendum 
should offer voters the opportunity to repeal the 8th Amendment.4 A 
majority vote in favour of so-called ‘repeal simpliciter’ would mean 
deleting Article 40.3.3 without replacing it with any new text. In 
Repealing the 8th we supported this outcome. We also argued that 
a simple repeal ensured sufficient constitutional certainty for the 
Oireachtas to legislate on the availability of abortion without any 
specific ‘enabling’ provision, especially as it already has the power to 
make law on abortion under Article 15 of the Constitution. However, 
on 29 January 2018 the Taoiseach announced that, on the advice of the 
Attorney General,5 the referendum would propose repealing Article 
40.3.3 and replacing it with an ‘enabling provision’ that would affirm 
the legislative power of the Oireachtas, and minimise the risk that any 
residual unenumerated rights of the foetus would frustrate attempts to 
legislate for abortion. This course of action was confirmed by Cabinet 
on 8 March 2018. This proposed replacement is not ‘substantive’: it 
would not enshrine grounds for abortion or express statements of 
foetal rights in the Constitution. It would not immunise any future 
abortion legislation from judicial review. Fiona de Londras raised the 
possibility of this kind of ‘replace’ in her presentation to the JOC,6 
and before that in her submission to the Citizens’ Assembly.7 However, 
4 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017), pp 5-6.
5 Department of Health, Information note on legal advice received on options 
for a Referendum on Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, 30 January 2018. 
Available at http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Info-note-on-
legal-advice-received-on-options-for-a-Referendum-300118.pdf. 
6 de Londras, Fiona, Opening Statement to Joint Oireachtas Committee 
on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, 27 September 
2017. Available at www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/
eighthamendmentoftheconstitution/Opening-Statement-by-Professor-Fiona-
De-Londras,-Law-School,-Birmingham-University-270917.pdf. 
7 de Londras, Fiona, Submission to the Citizens Assembly on the 8th 
Amendment to the Constitution and Associated Matters, submitted 
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ultimately, it was not one of the six options for constitutional reform 
considered by the JOC.8
The replacement text will be: ‘Provision may be made by law for 
the regulation of termination of pregnancy’.9 This is as indicated 
by the Taoiseach in his press conference on 29 January. This is a 
simple enabling provision. The use of this formula is not entirely 
without precedent: Article 42A of the Constitution (the Children’s 
Rights Amendment) also says that ‘[p]rovision shall be made by law’ 
for adoption in certain circumstances, and for the application of 
best interests and welfare tests in child law proceedings. There, that 
formula was used to clarify that the Oireachtas could, and indeed was 
required to, introduce legislation on those matters. There are some 
differences between Article 42A and the formula for the proposed 36th 
Amendment. Article 42A is a complex provision covering many areas 
of child law. The ‘repeal and replace’ provision is shorter and simpler. 
In addition, the proposition is that ‘provision may be made’ and not 
‘provision shall be made’, suggesting that while ‘repeal and replace’ 
would confirm the Oireachtas’ power to legislate for abortion, it would 
not require introduction of any particular legislation. This provision 
would not immunise any future abortion legislation from challenge, 
for example by a pregnant person, in the courts, nor is it intended to.10
It has been argued that, even if the 8th is repealed and replaced with 
this proposed wording, the unborn remains a constitutionally protected 
subject with some rights, or at least some interests that may have a 
16 December 2016. Available at https://fdelondras.files.wordpress.
com/2013/07/delondras_casubmission.pdf. 
8 All six are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of Repealing the 8th.
9 Kevin Doyle, ‘Varadkar says further legal advice is needed on the wording of 
the Eighth Amendment referendum’, Irish Independent, 20 February 2018. 
Thirty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018.
10 Department of Health, Information note on legal advice received on options 





bearing on the constitutionality of any future abortion legislation.11 
However, in the recent Supreme Court decision in M v Minister for 
Justice, handed down on 7 March 2018, the Court clarified that the 
rights of the ‘unborn’ are contained in their entirety in Article 40.3.3, 
and that the unborn is not to be considered a ‘child’ for the purposes 
of the Constitution.12 This makes it very clear that repeal of Article 
40.3.3 – with or without the enabling provision that is proposed to 
replace it – will facilitate the passage of more liberal abortion law. 
At the same time, removal of the 8th Amendment would not mean 
that the state was not entitled to regulate abortion. As we argued in 
Chapter 3,13 it is clear that the common good of preserving foetal life 
can be pursued through any new abortion law. For example, legislation 
could include proportionate limitations on access to abortion. This 
would mean that, unlike under the 8th Amendment, the state would 
attempt to preserve foetal life through supporting, rather than coercing, 
pregnancy and parenting. As the Supreme Court held in M, the foetus 
is not ‘constitutionally invisible’ without the 8th Amendment. ‘The 
State is entitled to take account of the respect which is due to human 
life as a factor which may be taken into account as an aspect of the 
common good in legislating’.14 The foetus will also enjoy all of the 
rights of a child once born (the argument from ‘prospective rights’). 
This means for example, that, in some circumstances, such as when 
making a decision to deport the partner of a pregnant Irish woman, 
the state’s obligation to take account of the rights of individuals 
affected by a policy or order might also include an obligation to take 
account of the prospective rights of the unborn. The Court did not 
11 For discussion of unenumerated foetal rights in the Constitution see Fiona 
de Londras and Máiréad Enright, Repealing the 8th (Policy Press, 2018) 
at pp 27-28 and 52-53. At the time of writing IRM v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform [2016] IEHC 478 is under appeal to the Supreme 
Court. This judgment may provide some clarity on the existence of foetal 
rights outside of the 8th Amendment by the time the referendum is called.
12 M v Minister for Justice & Ors [2018] IESC 14.
13 See p 53, Repealing the 8th.
14 M v Minister for Justice & Ors [2018] IESC 14, para. 10.63.
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say anything about the weight to be given to prospective rights in 
those circumstances. Neither did it discuss the possible issues which 
might arise in the context of abortion. However, as we have argued 
in Chapter 3, post-repeal, any foetal rights, whether current or 
prospective, would not be absolute, and could not trump the rights 
of the pregnant woman.15 
New abortion legislation passed following repeal would enjoy 
the ‘presumption of constitutionality’16 and the use of an enabling 
provision would add weight to the argument that the People intend 
the Oireachtas to make abortion lawfully available following repeal of 
the 8th Amendment. Crucially, by the time of the referendum, draft 
abortion legislation will have been published, and this will help a 
future court to interpret the scope of the voters’ intention to liberalise 
abortion law, in voting for (or against) ‘repeal and replace’. With the 
8th Amendment removed from the Constitution, and replaced with 
a provision confirming the Oireachtas’ entitlement to make abortion 
law, we should be reasonably confident that no future court can 
return us to ‘square one’; to a position in which, despite a successful 
referendum, a future Supreme Court finds that only last-resort life-
saving abortion is constitutional. 
So, from our perspective, a minimalist, simple ‘repeal and replace’ 
along the lines proposed has much the same effect as ‘simple repeal’. We 
do not see that it offers significantly more constitutional certainty than 
simple repeal,17 but it should not cause any substantive difficulties in 
terms of constitutional interpretation. Provided the wording is simple, 
and is along the lines suggested by the Taoiseach on 29 January, people 
who want to see human-rights-compliant and accessible abortion 
law in Ireland have nothing to fear from ‘repeal and replace’. It is, 
of course, disappointing that any exceptional reference to abortion 
should remain within the constitutional text. However, ‘repeal and 
replace’ removes the provision which has stymied the development of 
15 See p 54, Repealing the 8th.
16 See p 20, Repealing the 8th.
17 On constitutional certainty see pp 29-30, Repealing the 8th.
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women’s reproductive rights in Irish constitutional law, and does not, 
in our view, add anything to the Constitution that might restrict those 
rights in unforeseen ways. After ‘repeal and replace’, new constitutional 
space opens up for the articulation of people’s rights in pregnancy in 
the ways we suggested in Chapter 3.  
Legislative reform
Decriminalisation
The JOC supported the Citizens’ Assembly recommendation that 
abortion be decriminalised.18 We discuss this recommendation in 
Chapter 4.19 As we wrote there, it is important that no special criminal 
law on abortion is applied either to pregnant people or to medical 
professionals.20 Reports suggest that the proposed legislation will 
decriminalise abortion for pregnant people who access abortion care, 
but may retain criminalisation for medical professionals.21 Should this 
be the case in the final legislation, it is likely to have implications for 
doctors’ capacity to provide care. As we argue in Repealing the 8th the 
criminal law of assault and the regulation of the medical profession 
are sufficient to protect women from non-consensual abortion so that 
the criminalisation of medical professionals does not seem necessary.22
A protected period up to 12 weeks
The JOC supported the Citizens’ Assembly recommendation 
that abortion be available on request up to 12 weeks. Reports are 
18 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017), p 12.
19 See pp 84-87, Repealing the 8th.
20 See p 87, Repealing the 8th.
21 Sarah Bardon, ‘Policy paper to include time period between abortion request 
and pill’, Irish Times, 7 March 2018.
22 See pp 84-87, Repealing the 8th.
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that this will be supported by the Government.23 We discuss this 
recommendation in Chapter 4.24
Health
The JOC recommended that abortion should be available on grounds 
of risk to the health of the woman after 12 weeks.25 We discussed 
a health ground in Chapter 4.26 This ground would not distinguish 
between risks to mental and physical health or between risks to 
health and risks to life. Reports are that this will be supported by the 
Government.27 The JOC recommended that legislation should not 
attempt to grade risks to health as more or less severe, but that risk 
should be assessed in a clinical context.28 It deferred to the Oireachtas 
on the question of gestational time limits, while noting that many 
European jurisdictions place no statutory time limit on health grounds. 
We made a similar recommendation in our ‘model’ legislation,29 noting 
that time limits will inevitably emerge as an aspect of medical practice. 
There will simply be a stage after which abortion will rarely if ever be 
performed, as there is in other countries where there is no upper time 
limit.30 As we note below, the health ground will also be important to 
many pregnant people who have been raped, or who have received a 
diagnosis of foetal impairment. It is important that, as the JOC said, 
the Minister for Health must develop appropriate guidelines on the 
23 Sarah Bardon, ‘Policy paper to include time period between abortion request 
and pill’, Irish Times, 7 March 2018.
24 See pp 90-92, Repealing the 8th.
25 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017), pp 7-8.
26 See pp 94-96, Repealing the 8th.
27 Sarah Bardon, ‘Policy paper to include time period between abortion request 
and pill’, Irish Times, 7 March 2018.
28 See pp 95-96, Repealing the 8th.
29 See Chapter 5, Repealing the 8th.
30 See pp 94-103, Repealing the 8th.
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operation of the health ground in consultation with the medical and 
midwifery professions in order to ensure meaningful access.31 
Rape
By enabling women to access abortion up to 12 weeks without the 
requirement to give reasons, the JOC’s recommendations ensure 
abortion access for people who have been raped, without having to go 
through any special process of verifying the assault. We discussed the 
difficulties of legislating for an independent rape ground in Chapter 
4.32 Some people who have been raped may take longer than 12 
weeks to seek access to an abortion. In such cases, it must be possible 
to interpret the health ground to ensure later access for those who 
need it. We await detail on how the health ground post the protected 
period of 12 weeks is likely to operate in order to assess whether it 
will operate to meet the needs of pregnant people in this situation.
Fatal foetal anomaly
The JOC supported the Citizens’ Assembly recommendation that 
abortion be available on request, without gestational limit in cases of 
fatal foetal anomaly. We discuss termination for fatal foetal anomaly 
in Chapter 4.33  The JOC did not list specific conditions which will 
be treated as ‘fatal’ since it acknowledged that, frequently, fatal foetal 
anomaly denotes a combination of complex conditions of varying 
severity.  However, for the JOC, ‘fatal’ here means that the foetus is 
likely to die before, during or shortly after birth. We assume that this 
ground would not encompass circumstances where the foetus is likely 
to live for months or years once born. Thus, some pregnant people 
will be excluded from this ground even if their foetus’ diagnosis means 
31 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017), p 8.
32 See pp 97-98, Repealing the 8th.
33 See pp 98-102, Repealing the 8th.
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that it can expect to receive only ‘end of life’ care from birth, with no 
prospect of improvement.34 
Non-fatal foetal anomaly
Unlike the Citizens’ Assembly, the JOC did not recommend that 
abortion should be available on grounds of non-fatal foetal anomaly.35 
If legislation is enacted along these lines, will pregnant people who 
receive a diagnosis of a non-fatal anomaly be able to access an abortion 
in Ireland if they need one? A small number of women in that position 
travel to the UK for terminations each year. In practical terms, such 
diagnoses (if the pregnant person has decided to seek relevant tests at 
all36) will be received after 12 weeks, when the proposed  ‘protected 
period’ when abortion can be accessed without a requirement to give 
reasons will have passed. After 12 weeks, could people in this position 
access a legal abortion in Ireland under the health ground? The JOC’s 
report does not consider this possibility in any depth.
34 It is worth remembering that ‘non-fatal’ impairments is a broad category. 
If the fatal anomaly ground is confined to situations in which the foetus is 
likely to die before, during or immediately after birth, then some families 
whose foetuses may require end of life care soon after birth, may still be 
required to travel if they feel unable to continue their pregnancies. The 
kinds of human rights issues discussed in the Mellet and Whelan cases may 
also arise here; see p 47 Repealing the 8th. For this reason, in our model 
legislation we did not distinguish between ‘serious’ and ‘fatal’ anomalies. 
See pp 112-113, Repealing the 8th.
35 See note 1, at p 129.
36 See further Rapp, R, ‘Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of 
Bioscience in a Multicultural World’ (1998) 23(1) Science, Technology, 
& Human Values 45. On women’s diverse attitudes to the experience of 
prenatal testing see further Rapp, R, ‘The Power of “Positive”: Diagnosis: 
Medical and Maternal Discourses on Amniocentesis’, in Michaelson, K, ed., 
Childbirth in America: Anthropological Perspectives, (1987, South Hadley, 
Massachusetts: Bergin and Harvey), 30; Risøy, S. & Sirnes, T ‘The decision’ 
(2015) 10 BioSocieties 317; Fitzgerald R, Legge M, Park J, ‘Choice, Rights, 
and Virtue: Prenatal Testing and Styles of Moral Reasoning in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand’ (2015) 29(3) Med Anthropol Q 400.
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A health ground could provide a route to legal termination of a 
pregnancy after receiving a particular diagnosis, while avoiding some 
of the troubling effects of enshrining a ‘disability exception’ in law.37 
Of course, the application of a health ground in this context has some 
flaws which are associated with grounds-based legislation as such.38 
Under the JOC proposals, a pregnant person would be required to 
reduce her complex personal reasons for terminating to issues of 
damage to her own health. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
by opposing the foetus’ future ‘disabled life’ to the pregnant person’s 
presumptively healthy life, the law may reinforce a stigmatising 
binary,39 and may consolidate unhelpful political understandings of 
disability in terms of tragedy, suffering and catastrophe. A legislative 
model permitting abortion  ‘on request’ until later in pregnancy, such 
as that in force in Victoria, Australia would avoid this problem, while 
supporting pregnant people’s reproductive rights.40 It would better 
reflect the reality that families sometimes face unforeseen parenting 
decisions, unique to them, and should be supported to reach these 
decisions, privately, at their own pace.41 
37 On a ‘disability ground’ and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities see p 99, Repealing the 8th. In Repealing the 8th, we considered 
that a ‘health ground’ was a more appropriate route to access to abortion 
in these circumstances than a simple disability exception. However, in this 
respect, our final draft legislation closely reflects the Citizens’ Assembly 
recommendations and so it includes a ‘serious foetal anomaly’ ground in 
late pregnancy; pp 112-113, Repealing the 8th.
38 See further, Center for Reproductive Rights, Shifting the Frame, (2017) 
at pp 42-43. Available at www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.
net/files/documents/Disability-Briefing-Paper-FINAL.pdf.
39 See further Jesudason, S and Epstein, J “The Paradox of Disability in 
Abortion Debates’ (2011) 84 (6) Contraception 541-543. 
40 ss. 4-5 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Victoria). Our model legislation 
would have achieved the same thing up to 22 weeks gestation; p 112, 
Repealing the 8th.
41 See further Termination for Medical Reasons, Submission to the 
Special Oireachtas Committee on Repeal of the 8th Amendment 




It is important to think through pregnant people’s care pathways 
after a diagnosis of foetal impairment. The guidance provided to 
doctors on interpretation of the health ground would be crucial here. 
The threshold for access may be quite high, if pregnant people are 
required to demonstrate a more ‘severe’ risk to their health, the later 
in pregnancy they request a termination. We do not suggest that every 
diagnosis of foetal impairment automatically triggers a risk to the 
pregnant person’s  health. If the law were interpreted along these lines, 
then there is a danger that it will effectively reproduce the damaging 
effects of a ‘disability ground’ under another name. So, as in any case in 
which the health ground is invoked, the medical professional assessing 
the pregnant person’s circumstances should take account of her entire 
health context.42 This includes, not only immediate or developing risks 
to her health in pregnancy, but foreseeable future risks to her health 
arising from the demands of parenting. In making that assessment the 
medical professional should bear in mind that her role is to facilitate 
abortion decision-making and not to police it. As we suggest in our 
draft legislation, the pregnant person’s own assessment of her health 
needs should be central to the decision-making process.43 
As we argued in the main text, the state has a responsibility to 
ensure pregnant people’s access to high quality healthcare information, 
so that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is an informed one.44 
An understanding of reproductive justice rooted in Crip theory45 
reminds us that decisions to terminate pregnancies are taken against the 
background  of a broader ableist culture.46 From this perspective the 
state should be concerned both with ‘building a world with disability in 
42 See the discussion of ‘Rethinking the doctor patient relationship’ on p 72 
et seq, Repealing the 8th.
43 Section 4 of the proposed legislative text contained in Chapter 5, Repealing 
the 8th.
44 See discussion of ‘Decisional security’ at p 62 et seq in Repealing the 8th.
45 Crip theory is a body of radical theory that aims to resist the cultural and 
political dominance of able-bodied heteronormativity.
46 See further Jarman, M. ‘Relations of Abortion: Crip Approaches to 
Reproductive Justice’ (2015) 27(1) Feminist Formations 46-66. 
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it’,47 which embraces a range of bodies and range of ways of inhabiting 
them, as much as with securing pregnant people’s opportunities to 
make their own reproductive decisions. That means that we must 
ensure that on receipt of a diagnosis, the pregnant person also has 
access to non-directive counselling, which provides comprehensive, 
evidence-based information. This counselling should not simply 
provide her with a de-contextualised, medicalised list of symptoms. 
It should be designed to enable her to interpret the diagnosis and 
place it in its full social context, bearing in mind that what societies 
have considered to be intolerable differences and impairments have 
varied from time to time and from place to place.48 Counselling 
should directly challenge relevant prevailing stigma around disability.49 
Doctors and midwives may also need to receive additional training 
in order to support such counselling. Although we did not put this 
recommendation on a statutory footing in our draft legislation, there 
may be a good argument for doing so in future.50 This is not least 
because the decision to terminate may be a difficult and emotional one, 
47 Garland-Thomson, R, ‘Building a world with disability in it’, in Waldschmidt, 
Berressem and Ingwersen (eds), Culture--Theory--Disability: Encounters 
between Disability Studies and Cultural Studies (2017; Transcript), at p 51.
48 See further Asch, A, Wasserman, D. ‘Where is the sin in synecdoche? 
Prenatal testing and the parent-child relationship’ in Quality of life and 
human difference: Genetic testing, health care, and disability  (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press; 2005) pp 172–216. On the challenges of 
providing appropriate information to prospective parents see further Isabelle 
Ville, Véronique Mirlesse, ‘Prenatal diagnosis: From policy to practice. Two 
distinct ways of managing prognostic uncertainty and anticipating disability 
in Brazil and in France’ (2015) 141 Social Science & Medicine, 19-26.
49 See for example HSE, Informing Families www.informingfamilies.ie.
50 Kafer, A, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Indiana University Press, 2013) 167-
168. For an example of legislation along these lines see the  Prenatally 
and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act’ (United States 
Public Law 110–374). Available at www.law.cornell.edu/topn/prenatally_
and_postnatally_diagnosed_conditions_awareness_act. For details of the 
practice in Germany, where abortion can be accessed under the health 
ground in cases of severe diagnosis of foetal impairment see Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, Pregnancy Counselling (2014) 16-17. Available 
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and the pregnant person may need support and assistance. The state 
also bears a responsibility to provide all social, health and economic 
supports necessary to encourage pregnant people to continue wanted 
pregnancies after a diagnosis of foetal impairment. These obligations 
to do reproductive justice include properly resourcing the care of 
children and adults with significant long-term health needs, whether 
those needs are diagnosable prenatally or after birth.51 However, even 
if the state takes these responsibilities seriously, it is not absolved of its 
duty to facilitate abortion access for people who need it. 
Socio-economic grounds
The JOC rejected the Assembly’s recommendation that abortion 
should be available on socio-economic grounds between 12 and 
22 weeks gestation. We discuss the good reasons for the Assembly’s 
original recommendation in Chapter 4.52 As Senator Lynn Ruane 
has noted,53 socio-economic status is not static. A person who feels 
able to continue a pregnancy at first may require a termination later 
in pregnancy; for example if she is bereaved, if family relationships 
collapse, if she becomes homeless, or if an existing child of the 
family becomes seriously ill and requires long-term care. Women 
in this position may not be able to wait for their circumstances to 
change, and may be required to continue to travel under the JOC’s 
recommendations. The JOC rejected Senator Ruane’s proposal that 
‘termination of pregnancy should be lawful on socio-economic 
grounds determined by the woman in consultation with a doctor in 
accordance with best practice’.54 A pregnant person’s socioeconomic 
at www.bmfsfj.de/blob/95278/356f87878e2f128eb9aa85c1451430fb/
schwangerschaftsberatung---218-englisch-data.pdf.
51 This, of course, is a struggle with resonances well beyond the abortion 
debate.
52 See pp 96-97, Repealing the 8th.
53 Joint Oireachtas Committee, 13 December 2017.
54 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the 
Constitution (December 2017), p 26.
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circumstances should not be ignored if she seeks an abortion under 
the health ground. Rather, as we argued in Chapter 4, the pregnant 
person’s health must be assessed holistically in context, and her own 
assessment of current and future risks to her health must be taken 
seriously.55
Beyond grounds for abortion
The JOC recommendations focus on grounds rather than on the 
mechanics of ensuring that pregnant people can access abortions 
to which they are entitled under legislation. The JOC adopted the 
ancillary recommendations of the Citizens Assembly in full. We discuss 
crucial considerations for ensuring access in Chapter 4.  As we have 
repeatedly stressed, deferring to medical practice does not solve the 
problem of ensuring access to abortion. The grounds supported by the 
JOC are, necessarily, flexible standards and not rigid rules. Malleable 
language, such as ‘risk to health’ can be interpreted restrictively and 
often opportunistically to diminish women’s access to healthcare. It is 
important to pay attention to the guidelines, which will accompany 
new Irish legislation, once they are published, and to the content of 
any training programmes designed for medical professionals working 
under the new abortion legislation. 
Of particular importance is the possibility that a mandatory 
waiting period might be imposed for access to abortion care within 
the protected period of 12 weeks in any post-repeal abortion law.56 
Mandatory waiting periods are not medically indicated: this has 
been confirmed by the World Health Organization, which notes 
that required ‘reflection periods’ act as barriers to accessing abortion 
care57 and ‘can jeopardize women’s ability to access safe, legal abortion 
55 See pp 94-96, Repealing the 8th.
56 Sarah Bardon, ‘Policy paper to include time period between abortion request 
and pill’, Irish Times, 7 March 2018.
57 WHO, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Services, 
2nd Edition (2012), p 94.
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services and demean[s] women as competent decision-makers’.58 
Waiting periods increase the risk of delays that might ultimately deny 
appropriate care to people who find travel difficult; for example, poorer 
people, those in controlling relationships, and those who need to 
travel long distances where care is not available locally. As the WHO 
Guidelines affirm, imposing mandatory waiting periods implies that 
pregnant people do not already reflect on their  abortion decisions 
before approaching a doctor. These periods undermine the decisional 
security that we argue is fundamental to the effective operation of a 
post-repeal abortion law.59 It may also be the case that women will 
choose to continue to import abortion pills through online providers 
rather than engage with legislative framework that is experienced as 
punitive, shaming and stigmatising. Insisting on a mandatory waiting 
period may, in fact, be counter-productive, creating incentives for 
pregnant people to continue to make decisions about reproductive 
life outside of the law where, for people with resources, more agency 
can be exercised.
Should the proposal for mandatory waiting periods find its way into 
legislation for access to abortion post-repeal, this makes increasingly 
important the inclusion of a review provision – as we propose in 
Repealing the 8th – to require a statutory review of the operation of 
the law after three years.60 This would allow for an evidence-based 
analysis of the impact of provisions such as a mandatory waiting period 
on women’s ability to access abortion, and the revision (if indicated 
by the evidence) of the operation of the Act.
58 WHO, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Services, 
2nd Edition (2012), p 96.
59 See pp 65-70, Repealing the 8th. 
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“This concise critique cuts through 
decades of controversy with a 
compelling case for repeal and 
proposes a workable legislative 
solution. Bravo!” 
Ailbhe Smyth, Convenor, 
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“Nuanced, detailed and clearly 
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map through the quagmire of Ireland’s 
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“An incisive, forensic and 
comprehensive analysis of the legal 
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Linda Connolly, Maynooth University
“A quick and mandatory read for anyone 
seeking the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth about the 8th 
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Mara Clarke, Founder, 
Abortion Support Network
“This careful analysis of the 8th 
Amendment, with its succinct roadmap 
for reform, should be compulsory 
reading for Irish legislators.” 
Sandra McAvoy, Historian
“This text’s novel proposals for Irish 
abortion law reform make it an essential 
read.” 
Bríd Ní Ghráinne, Sheffield University
Irish law currently permits abortion only where 
the life of the pregnant woman is at risk. Since 
1983, the 8th Amendment to the Constitution 
has recognised the “unborn” as having a 
right to life equal to that of the “mother”. 
Consequently, most people in Ireland who 
wish to bring their pregnancies to an end 
either import the abortion pill illegally, travel 
abroad to access abortion, or continue with 
the pregnancy against their will.
Now, however, there are signs of change. A 
constitutional referendum will be held in 2018, 
after which it will be possible to reimagine, 
redesign, and reform the law on abortion. 
Written by experts in the field, this book draws 
on experience from other countries, as well 
as experiences of maternal medical care in 
Ireland, to call for a feminist, woman-centered, 
and rights-based radical new approach to 
abortion law in Ireland.
Directly challenging grounds-based abortion 
law, this accessible guide brings together 
feminist analysis, comparative research, 
human rights law, and political awareness to 
propose a new constitutional and legislative 
settlement on reproductive autonomy in 
Ireland. It offers practical proposals for 
policymakers and advocates, including model 
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